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 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
 WASHINGTON 25, D C

Serial: 00724
 8 NOV 1954

Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell, USA (Ret.)
 Office of the Chief of Military History
 Room 1D635, The Pentagon
 Department of the Army
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Colonel Bidwell:

Receipt of your letter of 2 November 1954 is acknowledged.

I concur with General Mauborgne in thinking that some mention of the collaboration with the British in the communication intelligence field would be warranted in your history of the Military Intelligence Division and I therefore enclose a brief statement pertaining thereto.

It may be that General Mauborgne "feared that the Navy was about to send over one of these machines and steal Army thunder" but this is certainly not in accordance with the account contained in the official ASA history, nor is it in accordance with my quite clear recollection of the events in question, gained from first-hand contact with them. Indeed, my recollection is that the Navy was quite reluctant about the whole business of collaboration and had to be persuaded more or less to go into it. In any case, I think that part of the story of small consequence and I hope you will agree in the propriety of omitting questionable data of that sort.

Thank you for your information regarding Fabyan and his authorship. The situation is as I explained to you on the telephone: he never wrote anything but letters; he had the writings of others copyrighted in his name.

May I reiterate that we would like very much to have a copy or two of your history when it is issued, these to be for our official library?

Sincerely,

William F. Friedman

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
 Special Assistant

Incl:
 a/s

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Discussions between the Army and the Navy in regard to crypt-analytic cooperation with the British began in the summer of 1940, and after detailed consideration of the matter the Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer recommended to their respective superiors that a mission consisting of two officers from the Army Signal Intelligence organization and two from the Navy Communication Intelligence organization be sent to London to initiate collaboration. The recommendation was accepted and in January 1941 the mission left, taking with them two "Purple" machines, data for employing them in reading the Japanese highest-level diplomatic traffic, and certain other material. (The Japanese "Purple" cryptosystem and machine had been solved by Army cryptanalysts headed by Mr. Friedman; this was a feat the British cryptanalysts had given up.) In exchange, the U.S. got from the British much valuable information in connection with German and Italian systems. Army and Navy collaboration with the British began on an active basis soon thereafter and reached the point where in 1944 the two Services were in touch by radio, on a daily 24-hour basis, with the British organization. Agreements were entered into between the U.S. and the U.K. whereby the U.S. had primary responsibility for communication intelligence activities in the Pacific, the U.K. had similar responsibility in the Atlantic and in Europe. Results and technical data were exchanged freely, under certain strict controls.

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