

INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOLOGY IV

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~~Confidential~~Cryptology in the Civil War

A detailed account of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War in the United States of America can hardly be told without beginning with a bit of biography about the man who became the first signal officer in history and the first Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army, Albert J. Myer, the man in whose memory that lovely little U.S. Army post adjacent to Arlington Cemetery was named. Myer was born on 20 September 1827, and after an apprenticeship in the then quite new science of electric telegraphy he entered Hobart College, Geneva, New York, from which he was graduated in 1847. From early youth he had exhibited a predilection for artistic and scientific studies, and upon leaving Hobart he entered Buffalo Medical College, receiving the M.D. degree four years later. His graduation thesis, "A Sign Language for Deaf Mutes," contained the germ of the idea he was to develop several years later, when, in 1854, he was commissioned a 1st Lieutenant in the Regular Army, made an Assistant Surgeon, and ordered to New Mexico for duty. He had plenty of time, at this far-away outpost, to think about developing an efficient system of military "aerial telegraphy," which was what visual signaling was then called. I emphasize the word "system" because, strange to say, although instances of the use of lights and other visual signals can be found throughout the history of warfare, and their use between ships at sea had been practiced by mariners for centuries, yet down to the middle of the 19th Century surprisingly little progress had been made in developing methods and instruments for the systematic exchange of military information and instructions by means of signals of any kind. Morse's practical system of electric telegraphy, developed in the years 1832-35, served to focus attention within the military upon systems and methods of inter-communication by means of both visual and electrical signals. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, the U.S. Army took steps to introduce and to develop a system of visual signaling for general use in the field. It was Assistant Surgeon Myer who furnished the initiative in this matter.

In 1856, two years after he was commissioned assistant surgeon, Myer drafted a memorandum on a new system of visual signaling and obtained a patent on it. Two years later, a board was appointed by the War Department to study Myer's system. It is interesting to note that one of the officers who served as an assistant to Myer in demonstrating his system before the board was a Lieut. E. P. Alexander, Corps of Engineers. We shall hear more about him presently, but at the moment I will say that on the outbreak of war, Alexander organized the Confederate Signal Corps. After some successful demonstrations by Myer and his assistants, the War Department fostered a bill in Congress, which gave its approval to his ideas. But what is more to the point, Congress appropriated an initial amount of \$2,000 to enable the Army and the War Department to develop the system. The money, as stated in the Act was to be used "for manufacture of purchase of apparatus and equipment for field signaling." The act also contained another important provision: it authorized the appointment, on the Army staff, of one Signal Officer with the rank, pay, and allowances of a major of cavalry. On 2 July 1860, "Assistant Surgeon Albert J. Myer (was appointed) to be Signal Officer, with the rank of Major, 27 June 1860, to fill an original vacancy, and two weeks later Major Myer was ordered to report to the Commanding General of the Department of New Mexico for signaling duty. The War Department also directed that two officers be detailed as his assistants. During a several months' campaign against hostile Navajos, an extensive test of Myer's new system, using both flags and torches, was conducted with much success. In October 1860, a Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, later to become famous as a Confederate cavalry leader, tendered his services to aid in signal instruction.

Less than a year after Major Myer was appointed as the first and, at that time, the only Signal Officer of the U.S. Army, Fort Sumter was attacked and, after a 36-hour bombardment, surrendered. The bloody four-year war between the North and the South began. The date was 14 April 1861. Myer's system of aerial telegraphy was soon to undergo its real baptism under fire, rather than by fire. But with the outbreak of war, another new system of military [signal] communication, signaling by the electric telegraph, began to undergo its first thorough test in combat operations. This in

itself is very important in the history of cryptology. But far more significant in that history is a fact that I mentioned at the close of the last lecture, viz, that for the first time in the conduct of organized warfare, rapid and secret military communications on a large scale became practicable, because cryptology and electric telegraphy were now to be joined in a lasting wedlock. For when the war began, the electric telegraph had been in use for less than a quarter of a century. Although the first use of electric telegraphy in military operations was in the Crimean War in Europe (1854-56), its employment was restricted to communications exchanged among headquarters of the Allies, and some observers were very doubtful about its utility even for this limited usage. It may also be noted that in the annals of that war there is no record of the employment of electric telegraphy together with means for protecting the messages against their interception and solution by the enemy.

On the Union side in the Civil War, military signal operations began with Major Myer's arrival in Washington on 3 June 1861. His basic equipment consisted of kits containing a white flag with a red square in the center for use against a dark background; a red flag with a white square for use against a light background; and torches for night use. It is interesting to note that these are the elements which make up the familiar insignia of our Army Signal Corps. The most pressing need which faced Major Myer was to get officers and men detailed to him wherever signals might be required, and to train them in what had come to be called the "wigwag system,"¹ the motions of which are depicted in Fig. 1. This training included learning something about codes and ciphers, and gaining experience in their usages.

Fig. 1 4-2

But there was still no such separate entity as a Signal Corps of the Army.¹¹ Officers and enlisted men were merely detailed for service with Major Myer for signaling duty. It was not until two years after the war started that the Signal Corps was officially established and organized as a separate branch of the Army, by appropriate Congressional action.

In the meantime, another signaling organization was coming into being-- an organization which was an outgrowth of the government's taking over control

¹ And, of course, the G.I.'s of those days had a pet name for the users of the system. They called them "flag floppers."

of the commercial telegraph companies in the United States on 25 February 1862. There were then only three in number: the American, the Western Union, and the Southwestern. The telegraph lines generally followed the right-of-way of the railroads. The then Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, sought the aid of Thomas A. Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who brought some of his men to Washington for railroad and telegraphic duties with the Federal Government. From a nucleus of four young telegraph operators grew a rather large military telegraph organization which was not given formal status until on 28 October 1861 President Lincoln gave Secretary Cameron authority to set up a "U.S. Military Telegraph Department" under a man named Amos Stager, who, as general superintendent of the Western Union was called to Washington, commissioned a captain (later a colonel) in the Quartermaster Corps, and made superintendent of the Military Telegraph Department. Only about a dozen of the members of the Department became commissioned officers, and they were made officers so that they could receive and disburse funds and property; all the rest were civilians. The U.S. Military Telegraph "Corps," as it soon came to be designated, without warrant, was technically under Quartermaster General Meigs, but for all practical purposes it was under the immediate and direct control of the Secretary of War, a situation admittedly acceptable to Meigs. There were now two organizations for signaling in the Army, and it was hardly to be expected that no difficulties would ensue from the duality. In fact, the difficulties began very soon, as can be noted in the following extract from a lecture before the Washington Civil War Round Table, early in 1954, by Dr. George R. Thompson, Chief of the Historical Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army:

The first need for military signals arose at the important Federal fortress in the lower Chesapeake Bay at Fort Monroe. Early in June, Myer arrived there, obtained a detail of officers and men and began schooling them. Soon his pupils were wigwagging messages from a small boat, directing fire of Union batteries located on an islet in Hampton Roads against Confederate fortifications near Norfolk. Very soon, too, Myer began encountering trouble with commercial wire telegraphers in the area. General Ben Butler, commanding the Federal Department in southeast Virginia, ordered that wire telegraph facilities and their civilian workers be placed under the signal officer. The civilians, proud and jealous of their skills in electrical magic, objected in no uncertain terms and shortly an order arrived from the Secretary of War himself who countermanded Butler's instructions. The Army signal officer was to keep hands off the civilian telegraph even when it served the Army.

I have purposely selected this extract from Dr. Thompson's presentation because in it we can clearly hear the first rumblings of that lengthy and acrimonious feud between two signaling organizations whose uncoordinated operations and rivalry greatly reduced the efficiency of all signaling operations of the Federal Army. As already indicated, one of these organizations was the U.S. Military Telegraph "Corps," hereinafter abbreviated as the USMTC, a civilian organization which operated the existing commercial telegraph systems for the War Department, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. The other organization was, of course, the infant Signal Corps of the United States Army, which was not yet even established as a separate Branch, whereas the USMTC had been established in October 1861, as noted above. Indeed, the Signal Corps had to wait until March 1863, two years after the outbreak of war, before being established officially. In this connection it should be noted that the Confederate Signal Corps had been established a full year earlier, in April 1862. Until then, as I've said before, for signaling duty on both sides, there were only officers who were individually and specifically detailed for such duty from other branches of the respective Armies of the North and the South. Trouble between the USMTC and the Signal Corps of the Union Army began when the Signal Corps became interested in signaling by electric telegraphy and began to acquire facilities therefor.

As early as in June 1861, Chief Signal Officer Myer had initiated action toward acquiring or obtaining electrical telegraph facilities for use in the field but with one exception nothing happened. The exception was in the case of the episode in the military department in southeast Virginia, commanded by General Benjamin Butler, an episode that clearly foreshadowed the future road for the Signal Corps in regard to electrical signaling: the road was to be closed and barred. In August 1861, Col. Myer tried again and in November of the same year he recommended in his annual report that \$30,000 be appropriated to establish an electric signaling branch in the Signal Corps. The proposal failed to meet the approval of the Secretary of War. One telegraph train, however, which had been ordered by Myer many months before, was delivered in January 1862. The train was tried out in an experimental fashion, and under considerable difficulties, the most disheartening of which was the active opposition of persons in Washington, particularly the Secretary of War. So, for practically the whole of the first

two years of the war, signal officers on the Northern side had neither electrical telegraph facilities nor Morse operators--they had to rely entirely on the wig-wag system. However, by the middle of 1863 there were thirty "flying-telegraph" trains in use in the Federal Army. Here's a picture of such a train. The normal length of field telegraph lines was five to eight miles, though in some cases the instruments had worked at distances as great as twenty miles. But even before the Signal Corps began

Fig. 3 4-3

to acquire these facilities, there had been agitation to have them, as well as their Signal Corps operating personnel, all turned over to the USMTC, which had grown into a tightly-knit organization of over 1,000 men and had become very influential in Washington, especially by virtue of its support from Secretary of War Stanton. As a consequence, the USMTC had its way. In the fall of 1863, it took over all the electric telegraph facilities and telegraph operators of the Signal Corps. Colonel Myer sadly wrote: "With the loss of its electric lines the Signal Corps was crippled."

So now there were two competing signal organizations on the Northern side: The U.S. Army's Signal Corps, which was composed entirely of military personnel with no electric telegraph facilities (but was equipped with means for visual signaling), and the USMTC, which was not a part of the Army, being staffed almost entirely with civilians, and which had electric telegraph facilities and skilled Morse operators (but no means or responsibilities for visual signaling or "aerial telegraphy" which, of course, was old stuff). "Electric telegraphy" was now the thing. The USMTC had no desire to share electric telegraphy with the Signal Corps, a determination in which they were most ably assisted by Secretary of War Stanton, for reasons that fall outside the scope of the present lecture.

However, from a technical point of view it is worth going into this rivalry just a bit, if only to note that the personnel on both organizations, the military and the civilian, were not merely signalmen and telegraph operators: they served also as cryptographers and were therefore entrusted with the necessary cipher books and cipher keys. Because of this, they naturally became privy to the important secrets conveyed in cryptographic communications and they therefore enjoyed status as VIP's. This was particularly true of members of the USMTC, because they, and only they, were authorized to be custodians and users of the cipher books. Not even the

commanders of the units they served had access to them. For instance, on the one and only occasion when General Grant forced his cipher operator, a civilian named Beckwith, to turn over the current cipher book to a colonel on Grant's staff, Beckwith was immediately discharged by the Secretary of War and Grant was reprimanded. A few days later, Grant apologized and Beckwith was restored to his position. But Grant never again demanded the cipher book held by his telegraph operator.

The Grant-Beckwith affair alone is sufficient to indicate the lengths to which Secretary of War Stanton went to retain control over the USMTC, including its cipher operators, and its cipher books. In fact, so strong a position did he take that on 10 November 1863, following a disagreement over who should operate and control all the military telegraph lines, Myer, by then full Colonel, and bearing the imposing title "Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army," a title he had enjoyed for only two months, was peremptorily relieved from that position and put on the shelf. Not long afterward, and for a similar reason, Myer's successor, Lieut. Col. Nicodemus, was likewise summarily relieved as Chief Signal Officer by Secretary Stanton; indeed, he was not only removed from that position--he was dismissed from the Service without even the formality of trial by court martial. Stanton gave "phoney" reasons for dismissing Col. Nicodemus, but I am glad to say that the latter was restored his commission in March 1865, by direction of the President; also by direction of the President, Colonel Myer was restored to his position as Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army on 25 February 1867.

When Col. Myer was relieved from duty as Chief Signal Officer in November 1863, he was ordered to Cairo, Illinois, to await orders for a new assignment. Very soon thereafter he was either designated (or he may have himself decided) to prepare a field manual on signaling and there soon appeared, with a prefatory note dated January 1864, a pamphlet of 148 pages, a copy of which is now in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress. The title page reads as follows:

"A Manual of Signals: for the use of signal officers in the field.
By Col. Albert J. Myer, Signal Officer of the Army, Washington,
D.C., 1864."

Even in this first edition, printed on an Army press, Myer devoted nine pages to a reprint of an article from Harper's Weekly entitled

"Curiosities of Cipher," and in the second edition, 1866, he expanded the section on cryptography to sixty pages. More editions followed and I think we may well say that Myer's Manual, in its several editions, was the pioneer American text on military signaling. But I'm sorry to say that as regards cryptology it was rather a poor thing. Poe had done better twenty years before that in his essay entitled "A few words on secret writing".

Because of its historic nature, you may like to see what Myer's original "wig-wag code" was like. It was called "a two-element code" because it employed only two digits, 1 and 2, in permutations of 1, 2, 3 and 4 groups. For example, A was represented by the permutation 22; B, by 2122; and C, by 121, etc. In flag signaling, a "1" was indicated by a motion to the left, and a "2" by a motion to the right. Later these motions were reversed, for reasons which must have been good but are now not obvious. Here is Myer's two-element code which continued to be used until 1912:

GENERAL SERVICE CODE

A - 22	N - 11	& - 1111
B - 2122	O - 21	ing - 2212
C - 121	P - 1212	tion - 1112
D - 222	Q - 1211	
E - 12	R - 211	End of word - 3
F - 2221	S - 212	End of sentence - 33
G - 2211	T - 2	End of message - 333
H - 122	U - 112	Affirmative - 22,22.22.3
I - 1	V - 1222	Repeat - 121.121.121
J - 1122	W - 1121	Error - 212121
K - 2121	X - 2122	
L - 221	Z - 2222	

Note: No. 3 (end of word) was made by a forward downward motion, called "front". There were about a dozen more signals, for numerals, for frequently used short sentences, etc.

We must turn our attention now to the situation as regards the organization for signaling in the Confederate Army. It is of considerable interest to note that in the first great engagement of the War, that of the first Bull Run battle, the Confederate Signal Officer was that young Lieutenant, E. P. Alexander, who had assisted in demonstrating the wig-wag system before a board appointed by the War Department to study Myer's system. Alexander, now a Captain in grey, used Myer's system during the battle, which ended in disaster for the Union forces; and it is said that Alexander's contribution by effective signaling was an important factor in the Confederate victory. Dr. Thompson, whom I have quoted before, says of this battle:

Thus the fortunes of war in this battle saw Myer's system of signals succeed, ironically, on the side hostile Myer. Because of general unpreparedness and also some disinterest and ignorance, the North had either wig-wag signals nor balloon observations.

Dr. Bull Run

The only communication system which succeeded in signal work for the Union Army was the infant USMTC. But the Confederate system under Alexander, off to a good start at Bull Run, throughout the war operated with both visual and electric telegraphy, and the Confederates thought highly enough of their signal service to establish it on an official basis, on 19 April 1862, less than a year after that battle. Thus, although the Confederate Signal Corps never became a distinct and independent branch of the Army as did the Union Signal Corps, it received much earlier recognition from the Confederate Government than did the Signal Corps of the Federal Government. Again quoting Dr. Thompson:

The Confederate Signal Corps was thus established nearly a year earlier than its Federal counterpart. It was nearly as large, numbering some 1,500, most of the number, however, serving on detail. The Confederate Signal Corps used Myer's system of flags and torches. The men were trained in wire telegraph, too, and impressed wire facilities as needed. But there was nothing in Richmond or in the field comparable to the extensive and tightly controlled civilian military telegraph organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with an iron hand from Washington.

We come now to the codes and ciphers used by both sides in the war, and in doing so we must take into consideration the fact that on the Union side, there were, as I have indicated, two separate organizations for signal communications; one for visual signaling, the other for electric. We should therefore not be too astonished to find that the cryptosystems used by the two competing organizations were different. On the other hand, on the Confederate side, as just noted, there was only one organization for signal communications, the Signal Corps of the Confederate States Army, which used both visual and electric telegraphy, the latter facilities being taken over and employed when and where they were available. There were reasons for this marked difference between the way in which the Union and the Confederate signal operations were organized and administered but I do not wish to go into them now. One reason, strange to say, had to do with the difference between the crypto-communication arrangements in the Union and in the Confederate Armies.

We will discuss the cryptosystems used by the Federal Signal Corps first and then those of the Confederate Signal Corps. Since both corps used visual signals as their primary means, we find them employing Myer's visual-signaling code shown above. At first both sides sent unenciphered messages; but soon after learning that their signals were being intercepted and were being read by the enemy, each side decided to do something to protect its messages. Initially both decided on the same artifice, viz, changing the visual-signaling

equivalents for the letters of the alphabet, so that, for instance, "22" was not always "A," etc. This sort of changing-about of values soon became impractical, since it prevented memorizing the wig-wag equivalents once and for all. The difficulty in the Union Army's Signal Corps was solved by the introduction into usage of a cipher disk invented by Myer himself. A full description of the disk in its various embodiments will be found in Myer's Manual, but here's a picture of three forms of it. You can see how readily

Fig. 3 4-4

(Leave half-page)

the visual wig-wag equivalents for letters, figures, etc., can be changed according to some pre-arranged indicator for juxtaposing, ^{f2/} concentric disks. In my Fig. 3 the top left disks (Fig. 1 of Myer's Plate XXVI) show that the letter A is represented by 112, B, by 22, etc. By moving the two circles to a different juxtaposition a new set of equivalents will be established. Of course, if the setting is kept fixed for a whole message the encipherment is strictly monoalphabetic; but Myer recommends changing the setting in the middle of the message or, more specifically, at the end of each word, thus producing a sort of polyalphabetic cipher which would delay solution a bit. An alternative way, Myer states, would be to use what he called a "countersign word," but which we call a keyword, each letter of which would determine the setting of the disk for a single word or for two consecutive words, etc. Myer apparently did not realize that retaining or showing externally, that is, in the cipher text, the lengths of the words of the plain text very seriously impairs the security of the cipher message. A bit later we shall discuss the security afforded by the Myer disk in actual practice.

In the Confederate Signal Corps, the system used for encipherment of visual signals was apparently the same as that used for enciphering telegraphic messages, captured a number of times, it was apparently disdained by the Confederates, who preferred to use a wholly different type of device, as will be described presently, for both visual and electric telegraphy.

So much for the cryptosystems used in connection with visual signals by the Signal Corps of both the North and the South, systems which we may designate as "tactical ciphers." We come now to the systems used for what we may call "strategic ciphers," because the latter were usually exchanged between the seat of Government and field commanders, or among the latter. In the case of these communications the cryptosystems employed by each side were quite different.

On the Northern side the USMTC used a system based upon what we now call transposition but in contemporary accounts they were called "route ciphers" and that name has stuck. The designation isn't too bad, because the processes of encipherment and decipherment, though dealing not with the individual letters of the message but with entire words, involves the following prescribed paths or routes in a diagram in which the message is written. I know no simpler or more succinct description of the route cipher than that given by one of the USMTC operators, J. E. O'Brien, in an article in Century Magazine, XXXVIII, September 1889, entitled "Telegraphing in Battle":

The principle of the cipher consisted in writing a message with an equal number of words in each line, then copying the words up and down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word at the end of each column, and substituting other words for important names and verbs.

A more detailed description in modern technical terms would be as follows: A system in which in encipherment the words of the plain-text message are inscribed within a matrix of a specified number of rows and columns, inscribing the words within the matrix from left to right, in successive lines and rows downward as in ordinary writing, and taking the words out of the matrix, that is, transcribing them, according to a prearranged route to form the cipher message. The specific routes to be followed were set forth in numbered booklets, each being labelled "War Department Cipher" followed by a number. In referring to them hereinafter I shall use the term "cipher books," or sometimes, more simply, the term "ciphers," although the cryptosystem involves both cipher and code processes. It is true that the basic principle of the system, that of transposition, makes the system technically a cipher system as defined in our modern terminology; but the use of "arbitraries," as they were called, that is, words arbitrarily assigned to represent the names of persons, geographic points, important nouns and verbs, etc., makes the system technically a code system as defined in our modern terminology.

There were in all about a dozen cipher books used by the USMTC throughout the war. For the most part they were employed consecutively, but, it seems that sometimes two different ones were employed concurrently. They contained not only the specific routes to be used but also indicators for the routes and for the sizes of the matrices; and, of course, there were bits of code words, with their meanings. These route ciphers were supposed to have been the invention of Anson Stager, whom I have mentioned before in connection with the establishment of the USMTC, and who is said to have first devised such ciphers for General McClellan's use in West Virginia, in the summer of 1861, before McClellan came to Washington to assume command of the Army of the Potomac.

Anson Stager and many others thought that he was the original inventor of the system, but such a belief was quite in error because word-transposition methods similar to Stager's were in use hundreds of years before his time. For instance, in 1685, in an unsuccessful attempt to invade Scotland in a conspiracy to set the Duke of Monmouth on the throne, Archibald Campbell, 9th Earl of Argyll, suffered an unfortunate "accident". He was taken prisoner and beheaded by order of James the Second. The communications of the poor Earl were not secure, and when they fell into government hands they were soon deciphered. The method Argyll used was that of word transposition, and if you are interested in reading a contemporary account of how it was solved, look on pages 56-59 of that little book I mentioned before as being one of the very first books in English dealing with the subject of cryptology, that by James Falconer, entitled Cryptomenysis Patafacta: Or the Art of Secret Information Disclosed Without a Key, published in London in 1685. There you will find the progenitor of the route ciphers employed by the USMTC, years after Argyll's abortive rebellion.

The route ciphers employed by the USMTC are fully described in a book entitled The Military Telegraph during the Civil War, by Colonel William R. Plum, published in Chicago in 1882. I think Plum's description of them is of considerable interest and I recommend his book to those of you who may wish to learn more about them, but they are pretty much all alike. If I show you one example of an actual message and explain its encipherment and decipherment I will have covered practically the entire gamut of the route ciphers used by the USMTC, so basically very simple and uniform were they. And yet, believe it or not, legend has it that the Southern signalmen were unable to solve any of the messages transmitted by the USMTC. This long-held legend I find hard to believe. In all the descriptions I have encountered in the literature not one of them, save the one quoted above from O'Brien, tries to make these ciphers as simple as they really were; somehow, it seems to me, a subconscious realization on the part of Northern writers, usually ex-USMTC operators, of the system's simplicity prevented a presentation which would clearly show how utterly devoid it was of the degree of sophistication one would be warranted in expecting in the secret communications of a great modern army in the decade 1860-1870, three hundred years after the birth of modern cryptography in the papal states of Italy.

Let us take the plain text of a message which Plum (page 58) used in an example of the procedure in encipherment. The cipher book involved is No. 4 and I happened to have a copy of it so we can easily check Plum's work. Here's the message to be enciphered:

Washington, D.C.
July 15, 1863

For Simon Cameron

I would give much to be relieved of the impression that Meade, Couch, Smith and all, since the battle of Gattysburg, have striven only to get the enemy over the river without another fight. Please tell me if you know who was the one corps commander who was for fighting, in the council of war on Sunday night.

(Signed) A. Lincoln

Plum shows the word-for-word encipherment in a matrix of seven columns and eleven rows. He fails to tell us why a matrix of those dimensions was selected; presumably the selection was made at random, which was certainly permissible.

Fig. 4

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(heavy) (null)				(county) (null)	(square) (null)	
<u>Incubus</u> Washington, D.C.	<u>Stewart</u> July	<u>Brown</u> 15th	<u>Norris</u> 18	<u>Knox</u> 60	<u>Madison</u> 3	for
sigh Simon	man	Cammer Cameron	on	flea . (period)	I I	wood would
give give	much much	Toby to be	<u>traveled</u> relieved	<u>serenade</u> of the	impression that impression that	
<u>Bunyan</u> Mende	<u>bear</u> , (comma)	<u>ax</u> Couch	<u>cat</u> , (comma)	<u>children</u> Smith	and and	awl all
<u>bat</u> , (comma)	since since	the the	<u>knit</u> battle	of of	get Gettys	ties
<u>large</u> burg	ass , (comma)	have have	striven striven	only only	to to	get get
<u>village</u> the enemy	<u>skeleton</u> over	<u>turnip</u> the r. ver	without without	another another	<u>optic</u> fight	<u>hound</u> . (period)
Please Please	tell tell	me me	if if	you you	no know	who who
was was	the the	<u>Harry</u> one	<u>Madrid</u> corps	<u>locust</u> commander	who who	was was
for for	<u>oppressing</u> fighting	<u>bitch</u> , (comma)	<u>quail</u> in the	<u>counsel</u> council	of of	war war
on on	<u>Tyler</u> Sunday	<u>Rustle</u> night	<u>upright</u> Signature	<u>Adrian</u> A. Lincoln	bless (null)	him (null)
	(Monkey) (null)	(silk) (null)	(Martyr) (null)			(suicide) (null)

3 Ruled paper was provided to aid in accuracy. In the diagram the upper of each pair of lines of writing is the cipher, the lower one, the plain text.

Simon Cameron was Lincoln's Secretary of War until Jan 1862, when he was replaced by Edwin M. Stanton. If this message cited by Plum is authentic, and there is no reason to doubt this, then Cameron was still in friendly contact with Lincoln, possibly as a special observer.

Note the seven "nulls" (non-significant, or "blind" words) at the tops and bottoms of certain columns, these being added to the cipher text in order to confuse a would-be decipherer. At least that was the theory, but how effective this subterfuge was can be surmised, once it became known that employing nulls was the usual practice. Note also the two nulls (bless and him) at the end of the last line to complete that line of the matrix.

The cipher message is then copied down following the route prescribed by the indicator "BLONDE," as given on page 7 of Cipher Book No. 4. The indicator could have also been "LINIMENT."

Fig. 5 page 7 No. 4 photograph

To explain the diagram at the top of Fig. 5 I will show you the "Direction for Use" which appear on the reverse side of the title page of "War Department Cipher No. 4," because I'm afraid you wouldn't believe me if I merely told you what they say. In Fig. 6 is a picture of the title page and I follow it with Fig. 7, a photograph of what's on its reverse side of the title page:

[Title page No. 4--back of the page--photos--Direction for Use]

Figs. 6 & 7

Do you imagine that the chap who was responsible for getting this cipher book approved ever thought about what he was doing when he caused those "Directions for Use" to be printed? It doesn't seem possible. All he would have had to ask himself was, "Why put this piece of information in the book itself? Cipher books before this have been captured. Suppose this one falls into enemy hands; can't he read, too, and at once learn about the intended deception? Why go to all the trouble of including "phoney" routes anyway? If the book doesn't fall into enemy hands what good are the "phoney" routes anyway? Why not just indicate the routes in a straightforward manner, as had been done before? Thus: "Up the 6th column (since "6" is the first number at the left of the diagram), down the 3rd, up the 5th, down the 7th, up the 1st, down the 4th and down the 2nd. This matter is so incredibly fatuous that it is hard to understand how sensible men--and they were sensible--could be so illogical in their thinking processes. But there the "Directions for Use" stand, for all the world to see and to judge.

Now for the transposition step. The indicator "BLONDE" signifies a matrix of seven columns and eleven rows, with the route set forth above, viz, up the 6th column, down the 3rd, etc., so that the cipher text with a "phoney" address and signature,⁴ becomes as follows:

TO A. HARDER CALDWELL,

Washington, D.C.

Cipher Operator, Army of the Potomac:

Blonde bless of who no optic to get and impression I Madison square Brown canner Toby ax the have turnip me Harry bitch rustle silk Adrian counsel locust you another only of children serenade flea Knox County for wood that awl ties get hound who was war him suicide on for was please village large bat Bunyan give sigh incubus heavy Norris on trampled cat knit striven without if Madrid quail upright martyr Stewart man much bear since ass skeleton tell the oppressing Tyler monkey.

(Signed) D. HOMER BATES

Note that the text begins with the indicator "BLONDE". In decipherment the steps are simply reversed. The indicator tells what size matrix to outline; the words beginning "bless of who no optic . . ." are inscribed within the matrix: up the 6th column; then, omitting the "check word" or "null" (which in this case is the word "square") down the 3rd column, etc. The final result should correspond to what is shown in Fig. 4. There then follows the step of interpreting orthographic deviations, such as interpreting "sigh", "man," "canner," and "on" as Simon Cameron; the word "wood" for "would", etc. The final step reproduces the original plain text.

Save for one-exception, all the route ciphers used by the USMTC conformed to this basic pattern. The things that changed from one cipher book to the next were the indicators for the dimensions of the matrices and for the routes, and the "arbitraries" or code equivalents for the various items comprising the "vocabulary," the number of them increasing from one edition to the next, just as might be expected. The sole exception to this basic pattern is to be seen in Cipher Book No. 9 and on only one page of the book. I will show you that page:

Fig. 8
p. 12 - Cipher Book No. 9

What we have here is a deviation from the straightforward route transposition, up the . . .column, down the . . .column, etc. By introducing one diagonal path in the route (the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th words in a message of five columns, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th words in a message of six columns) the simple up and down route no longer holds true. The

⁴It was the usual practice to use for address and signature the names of the USMTC operators concerned.

words on the diagonal interrupt the normal up and down paths and introduce complexities in the method. In fact, the complexities, seemed to be a bit too much for the USMC cipher operators because, as far as available records show, these complicated routes were never used.

I now wish to make a number of general and a few specific comments on Plum's description of the cryptosystems used by the USMTC.

First, we have learned that although Anson Stager has been credited with inventing the type of cipher under consideration in this study, he was anticipated in the invention by about 200 years. Also, he is given the lion's share of the credit for devising those ciphers although he did have a number of collaborators. Plum names four of them, presumably because he thought them worthy of being singled out for particular attention. Plum and others tell us that copies of messages handled by the USMTC were sometimes intercepted by the enemy but not solved. He cites no authority for this last statement, merely saying that such intercepts were published in the newspapers of the Confederacy with the hope that somebody would come up with their solution. And it may be noted that none of the Confederate accounts of war activities cite instances of the solution of intercepted USMTC messages, although there are plenty of citations of instances of interception and solution of enciphered visual transmissions of the Federal Army's Signal Corps.

Plum states that 12 different cipher books were employed by the Telegraph Corps, but I think there were actually only eleven. The first one was not numbered, and this is good evidence that a long war was not expected. This first cipher book had 16 printed pages. But for some reason, now impossible to fathom, the sequence of numbered books thereafter was as follows: Nos. 6 and 7, which were much like the first (unnumbered) one; then came Nos. 12, 9, 10--in that strange order; then came Nos. 1 and 2; finally came Nos. 3, 4, and 5. (Apparently there was no No. 8, or No. 11 - at least they are never mentioned.)

It would be ridiculous to think that the irregularity in numbering the successive books was for the purpose of communication-security, but there are other things about the books and the cryptosystem that appear equally silly. There may have been good reasons for the erratic numbering of the books, but if so, what they were is now unknown. Plum states that No. 4, the last one used in the war, was placed into effect on 23 March 1865, and that it and all other ciphers were discarded on 20 June 1865. However, as noted, there was a No. 5, which Plum says was given a limited distribution. I have a copy of it, but whether it was actually put into use I do not know. Like No. 4, it had 40 pages. About 20 copies were sent to certain members of the USMTC, scattered among 12 states; and, of course, Washington must have had at least one copy.

We may assume with a fair amount of certainty that the first (the unnumbered) cipher book used by the USMTC was merely an elaboration of the one Stager produced for the communications of the governors of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, and of which a copy is given by only one of the writers who have told us about these ciphers, namely, David H. Bates. Bates, in his series of articles entitled "Lincoln in the Telegraph Office" (The Century Magazine, Vol. LXXIV, Nos. 1-5, May-Sept, 1907)* shows a facsimile thereof (p. 292, June 1907 issue), and I have had as good a reproduction made of it as is possible from the rather poor photographic facsimile. The foregoing cipher is the prototype upon which all subsequent cipher books were based, the first of the War Department series being the one shown by Plum.

* The series was then put out in book form under the same title by the D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1907, reprinted in 1939.

Fig 9 The first Stager list for governors

When these ciphers came into use it was not the practice to misspell certain words intentionally; but as the members of the USMC (who, as I've told you, not only served as telegraph operators but also as cipher clerks) developed expertness, the practice of using non-standard orthography was frequently employed to make solution of messages more difficult. You have already seen examples of this practice, and one can find hundreds of other examples of this sort of artifice. Then, further to increase security, more and more code equivalents were added to represent such things as ordinal and cardinal numbers, months of the year, days of the week, hours of the day, punctuation, etc. As a last step, additional code equivalents for frequently used words and phrases were introduced. One good example of two typical pages from one of these books will characterize them all.

Fig 10 Photo of p. 14-15 from No. 12

You will notice that the code equivalents are printed but their meanings are written in by hand. This was usually the case, and the reason is obvious: for economy in printing costs, because the printed code equivalents of plain-text items in cipher books belonging to the same series are identical; only their meanings change from one book to another, and of course, the transposition routes, their indicators, and other variables change from one book to another. I am fortunate in having six of these cipher books in my private collection, so that comparisons among them are readily made. The first feature to be noted is that the code equivalents are all good English dictionary words

(or proper nouns), of not less than three nor more than seven (rarely eight) letters. A careful scrutiny shows that in the early editions the code equivalents are such as are not very likely to appear as words in the plain-text messages; but in the later editions, beginning with No. 12, more than 50% of the words used as code equivalents are such as might well appear in the plain-text of messages. For example, words such as AID, ALL, ARMY, ARTILLERY, JUNCTION, CONFEDERATE, etc., baptismal names of persons, and names of cities, rivers, bays, etc., appear as code equivalents. Among names used as code equivalents are SHERMAN, LINCOLN, THOMAS, STANTON, and those of many other prominent officers and officials of the Union Army and the Federal Government, as well as of the Confederate Army and Government; and, even more intriguing, such names were employed as indicators for the number of columns and the routes used - the so-called "Commencement Words." It would seem that names and words such as those I've mentioned might occasionally have brought about instances where difficulty in deciphering messages arose from this source of confusion, but the literature doesn't mention them. I think you already realize why such commonly-used proper names and words were not excluded. There was, indeed, method in this madness.

But what is indeed astonishing to note is that in the later editions of these cipher books, in great majority of cases the words used as "arbitraries," differ from one another by at least two letters (for example, LADY, and BAMB, LARK, and LAWN, ALBA and ASIA, LOCK and WICK, MILK and MINT), or by more than two (for example MYRTLE and MYSTIC, CARBON and CANCER, AIDES and ATLAS). One has to search for cases in

which two words differ by only one letter, but they can be found if you search long enough for them, as, for example, QUINCY and QUINCE, PINE and PIKE, NOSE and ROSE. Often there are words with the same initial trigraph or tetragraph, but then the rest of the letters are such that errors in transmission or reception would easily manifest themselves, as, for example, in the cases of MONSTER and MONARCH, MAGNET and MAGNOLIA. All in all, it is important to note that the compiler or compilers of cipher books had adopted a principle known today as the "two-letter differential," a feature found only in codebooks of a much later date. In brief, the principle involves the use, in a given codebook, of code groups differing from one another by at least two letters. This principle is employed by knowledgeable code compilers to this very day, not only because it enables the recipient of a message to detect errors in transmission or reception, but also to correct them. This is made possible if the permutation tables used in constructing the code words are printed in the codebooks, so that most errors can be corrected without calling for a repetition of the transmission. It is clear, therefore, that the compilers of these cipher books took into consideration the fact that errors are to be expected in Morse telegraphy, and by incorporating, but only to a limited extent, the principle of the two-letter differential, they tried to guard against the possibility that errors might go undetected. Had artificial 5-letter groups been used as code equivalents, instead of dictionary words, possibly the cipher books would also have contained the permutation tables. But it must be noted that permutation tables made their first appearance only about a quarter of a century

after the Civil War had ended, and then only in the most advanced types of commercial codes.

There is, however, another feature about the words the compilers of these books chose as code equivalents. It is a feature that manifests real perspicacity on their part, and you probably already have divined it. A few moments ago I said that I would explain why, in the later and improved editions of these books, words which might well be words in plain-text messages were not excluded from the lists of code equivalents: it involves the fact that the basic nature of the cryptosystem in which these code equivalents were to be used was clearly recognized by those who compiled the books. Since the cryptosystem was based upon word transposition, what could be more confusing to a would-be cryptanalyst, working with messages in such a system, than to find himself unable to decide whether a word in the cipher text of a message he is trying to solve is actually in the original plain-text message and has its normal meaning, or is a code word with a secret significance--or even a null, a non-significant word, a "blind" or a "check word," as those elements were called in those days? That, no doubt, is why there are, in these books, so many code equivalents which might well be "good" words in the plain-text messages. And in this connection I have already noted an additional interesting feature: at the top of each page devoted to indicators for signaling the number of columns or rows in the specific matrix for a message are printed the so-called "commencement words," or what we now call "indicators". Now there are nine such words, in sets of three, any one of which could actually be a real word or name in the plain-text message. Such words

when used as indicators could be very confusing to enemy cryptanalysts, especially after the transposition operation. Here, for example, are the "commencement words" on page 5 of cipher book No. 9: Army, Anson, Action, Astor, Advance, Artillery, Anderson, Ambush, Agree; on page 7 of No. 10: Cairo, Curtin, Cavalry, Congress, Childs, Calhoun, Church, Cobb, etc. Moreover, in Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 10 the "line indicators," that is, the words indicating the number of horizontal rows in the matrix, are also words such as could easily be words in the plain-text messages. For example, in No. 1, page 3, the line indicators are as follows:

Address	1	Faith	Assume	6	Bend
Adjust	2	Favor	Awake	7	Avail
Answer	3	Confine	Encamp	8	Active
Appear	4	Bed	Enroll	9	Absent
Appeal	5	Beef	Enough	10	Accept

Note two things in the foregoing list: first, there are variants-- there are two indicators for each case; and second, the indicators are not in strict alphabetic sequence. This departure from strict alphabeticity is even more obvious in the pages devoted to vocabulary, a fact of much importance cryptanalytically. Note this feature, for example, in Fig. 10, which shows pages 14 and 15 of cipher book No. 12.

In this respect, therefore, these books partake somewhat of the nature of two-part or "randomized" codes, or, in British terminology, "hatted" codes. In the second lecture of this series the physical difference between one-part and two-part codes was briefly explained, but an indication of the technical cryptanalytic difference between these two types of codes may be useful at this point. Two-part codes are much more difficult to solve than one-part codes, in which both the plain-text elements and their code equivalents progress in parallel

sequences. In the latter type of determination of the meaning of one code group quickly and rather easily leads to the determination of the meanings of other code groups above or below the one that has been solved. For example, in the following short but illustrative example, if the meaning of ~~the~~ code group 1729 has been determined to be "then", the meaning of the code group 1728 could well be "the", and that of

1728 -- the
1729 -- then
1730 -- there

the code group 1730, "there". But in a two-part code, determining the meaning of the code group 0972 to be "then", gives no clue whatever

7621 -- the
0972 -- then
1548 -- there

as to the meaning of the groups 7621 or 1548. For ease in decoding messages in such a code there must be a section in which the code groups are listed in numerical sequence, and are accompanied by their meanings, which, of course, will be in a random sequence. The compilers of the USMC cipher books must have had a very clear idea of what I have just explained, but they made a compromise of a practical nature between a strictly one-part and a strictly two-part code, because they realized that a code of the latter sort is twice as bulky as one of the former sort, besides being much more laborious to compile and check the contents for accuracy. The arrangement they chose wasn't too bad, so far as cryptosecurity was concerned. As a matter of fact, and speaking from personal experience in decoding a rather long message addressed to General Grant, I had a difficult time in locating many of the code words in the book, because of the departure from strict alpha-

betelisy. I came across that message in a work-book in my collection, the work-book of one of the important members of the Union -- none other than our friend Plum, from whose book, The Military Telegraph During the Civil War, comes much of the data I've presented in this lecture. On the fly-leaf of Plum's work-book there appears, presumably in his own handwriting, the legend "V. R. Plum Gift Opv with Gen. G. H. Thomas". Here's one of the messages he deciphered in cipher book No. 1, the book in which, he says, more important telegrams were sent than in any other:

Fig 11

Note how many "arbitraries" appear in the plain-text message, that is before transposition. After transposition the language of plain-text, code words, indicators and nulls mixes the cryptogram mystifying. * And yet, was the system as inscrutable as it's users apparently thought? It is to be remembered, of course, that messages were then transmitted by wire telegraphy, not by radio, so that enemy messages could be obtained only by "tapping" telegraph lines or capturing couriers or headquarters with their files intact. Opportunities for these methods of acquiring enemy traffic were not frequent, but they did occur from time to time, and in one case a Confederate signalman hid in a swamp for several weeks and tapped a Federal telegraph line, obtaining a good many messages. What success, if any, did Confederate cryptanalysts have in their attempts to solve such

USMC cryptograms as they did intercept? We shall try to answer this question in due time.

As indicated earlier, there were no competing signal organizations in the Confederacy as there were on the Union side. There was nothing at the center of government in Richmond or in the combat zone comparable to the extensive and tightly-controlled civilian military telegraph organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with such an iron hand from Washington. Almost as a concomitant it would seem, there was in the Confederacy, save for two exceptional cases, one and only one officially established cryptosystem to serve the need for protecting tactical as well as strategic communications, and that was the so-called Vignere

In searching for a good example my eye caught the words "Lincoln shot" at the left of the matrix and I immediately thought that the message had to do with Booth's assassination of the President. But after hurriedly transcribing the message and finding nothing in it having anything to do with the shooting it occurred to me to look up the indicators for a matrix of six rows and eight columns. They turned out to be LINCOUR (message of 8 columns), EROT (6 rows). The word SMALL beneath the "Lincoln shot" is a variant for EROT, also meaning "6 rows".

Cipher, which apparently was the cipher authorized in an official manual prepared by Capt J. H. Alexander as the partial equivalent of Myer's Manual of Signals. You won't find the name Vigenere in any of the writings of contemporary signal officers of either the North or the South. The signalmen of those days called it the "Court Cipher", this term referring to the system in common use for diplomatic or "court" secret communications about this period in history. It is that cipher which employs the so-called Vigenere Square with a repeating key.* Here is the square which Plum calls the "Confederate States Cipher Key" and which is followed by his description of its manner of employment:

Fig 12

To put into cipher the first message, which is put up by using "Manchester Bluff" as the key, and the second by the key term, "Complete Victory", find at the left-hand side of the table the first letter of the first word to be ciphered, and columns in which these letters are so found, will be seen the arbitrary letter with each successive letter of the message and key term, repeating on the latter till finished. Thus, "Sherman is victorious," put in cipher by using the first key, would read, as shown by the capitals, C-o-m-p-l-e-t--e-v--i-c-t-o-r-y. C-o-m-p. Of course, any change in the key

U V Q G X E G M N D K V H F P K C G H

word, term or phrase changes the arbitraries, and if neither the real message nor the key is known, it would be somewhat vexatious working it out, unless there were some such suggestive words as occur in Davis's message above, which indicate the ciphered words very clearly; e.g.,

"By which you may effect" o t p q g e x y k "above that part" h j o p g k n a c t
a crossing of the river

This meaning occurred to the author, at first sight, and doubtless would be to any one familiar with military affairs in that section. Having guessed real words, it is very easy to work out the letters of the key. The following two important ciphers were transmitted as divided below; i.e., each word was sent separately, not all mixed, as in the Pemberton cipher. This division does not facilitate translation by the key at all, but materially assists without it, and was, therefore, bad practice. We give below, each message, with its translation, because these telegrams were very important. The curious reader may, at his leisure, by using the key board, study out the key terms, one of which will be found entirely new and quite apropos, in the light of what speedily followed.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, MILITARY TELEGRAPH, Dated Headquarters, February 25, 1865, Received at Richmond, Va., 12:25 AM.

TO HON. J. C. BRECKENRIDGE, Sec'y of War:--I recommend that the taysnee in qoutwp rratvmy ubwaqbtm exfvzj and isvaqjru ktutl are not of immediate necessity, uv kppqfubpgr apc thalf should be laqhtap.

(Signed)

R. E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--I recommend that the removal of public property, machinery, stores and archives which are not of immediate necessity, be commenced. All powder should be secured.

* A keyword is employed to change the alphabets cyclically, thus making the cipher what is called today a periodic or multiple-alphabet cipher controlled by the individual letters of a key, which may consist of a word, a phrase, or even of a sentence, repeated as many times as necessary.

HEAD-QUARTERS C. S. ARMY, March 24, 1865.

GEN. E. KIRBY SMITH, comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept., Gen:--
 Vvg ecilmypm rvcog ui lacmides kfch kdf wasptf us tcfsto
 abxc bix azfkmgjsiimivbceq qb ndel ueisu ht kfg suhd egh
 opcm mfs uvajwh xryncoci yu ddxxtapt iu icjgkpxt es vvjau
 mrrr twhtc hbxo iu eoieg o rdegx en ucr pv ntiptyxec rqrariyyb
 rgzq ppx rksjeph ptax rep ekez raecdstrpt mmsseb acgg nsfqvfv
 mc kfg smhe ftrf wh mrv kkgc pyh fefm ckfrlisytyxl xj jtbbx
 rq htcd wbxz awvv fd acgg avxvzv yciag oe nzyfet igca scuh.

I am most respectfully your obdt. servt.,

(Signed) R.E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--Gen: The president deems it advisable that you should be charged with the military operations on both banks of the Miss., and that you should endeavor as promptly as possible to cross that river with as large a force as may be prudently withdrawn from your present Dept. You will accordingly extend your command to the east bank of the Miss., and make arrangements to bring to thi-side such of your present force as you may deem best.

I am most respectfully your obedient servant.

There are certain comments to be made on the foregoing messages. In the first place, note that in the first message certain words are left unenciphered; in the second place, in both the first and second message, the ciphers retain and clearly show the lengths of the words which have been enciphered. Both of these faulty practices greatly weaken the security of ciphers because they leave good clues to their contents and can easily result in facilitating solution of the messages. We know today that cipher messages must leave nothing in the clear. Even the address and the signature, the date, time and place of origin, etc., should if possible be hidden; and the cipher text should be in completely regular groupings, first, so as not to disclose the lengths of the plain-text words, and second, to promote accuracy in transmission and reception.

So far as my studies have gone, I have not found a single example of a Confederate Vigenere cipher which shows neither of these two fatal weaknesses. The second of the two examples is the only case I have found in which there are no unenciphered words in the text of the message. And the only example I have been able to find in which word lengths are not shown (save for one word) is in the case of the following message.

Vicksburg, Dec. 26, 1862.

GEN. J.E. JOHNSTON, JACKSON:

I prefer osavvr, it has reference to xhvkjqchffabpzelreqpsvnyk to prevent anuzeyxswstpjw at that point, raecpsghvelvtzfautlilaslt lhifnaigtswalifgccajd.

(Signed) J. C. PEMBERTON
 Lt. Gen. Comdg.

Even in this case there are unenciphered words which afforded a clue which enabled our man Plum to find the key and solve the message. It took some time, however, and the story is worth telling.

According to Plum, the foregoing cipher message was the very first one captured by USMC operators, and it was obtained during the siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered on 4 July 1863. But note the date of the message: 26 December 1862. What was done with the captured message during the months from the end of December 1862 to July 1863? Apparently nothing. Here is what Plum reports:

What efforts General Grant caused to be made to unravel this message, we know not. It was not until October, 1864, that it and others came into the hands of the telegraph cipherers, at New Orleans, for translation

The New Orleans operators who worked out this key (Manchester Bluff) were aided by the Pemberton cipher and the original telegram, which was found among that general's papers, after the surrender of Vicksburg; also by the following cipher dispatch, and one other.

Plum gives the messages involved, their solution, and the keys, the latter being the three cited above. It would seem that if the captured Pemberton message had been brought to General Grant's attention and he did nothing about it, he was not much interested in intelligence. Secondly, the solution of the Pemberton message and the one message with its plain text (the Pemberton message) and two messages not only with interspersed plain-text words but also with spaces showing word lengths. But Plum does not indicate how long it took for solution. Note that he merely says that the messages came into the hands of the telegraph cipherers in October 1864; he does not tell when solution was reached.

In the various accounts of these Confederate ciphers there is one and only one writer who makes a detailed comment on the two fatal practices to which I refer. A certain Dr. Charles E. Taylor, a Confederate veteran (in an article entitled "The Signal and Secret Service of the Confederate States", published in the Confederate Veteran, Vol. XL, Aug-Sept 1932), after giving an example of encipherment according to the "court cipher" says:

It hardly needs to be said that the division between the words of the original message as given above was not retained in the cipher. Either the letters were run together continuously or breaks, as if for words, were made at random. Unlike the folly of the method was revealed by experience, only a few special words in a message were put into cipher, while the rest was sent in plain language. This . . . I think it may be said that it was impossible for well prepared cipher to be correctly read by any one who did not know the key-word. Sometimes, in fact, we could not decipher our own messages when they came over telegraph wires. As the operators had no meaning to guide them, letters easily became changed and portions, at least, of messages rendered unmeaningly (sic) thereby.

Frankly, I don't believe Dr. Taylor's comments are to be taken as characterizing the practices that were usually followed. No other ex-signalman who has written about the ciphers used by the Confederate Signal Corps makes such observations and I think we must simply discount what Dr. Taylor says in this regard.

It would certainly be an unwarranted exaggeration to say that the two weaknesses in the Confederate cryptosystem cost the Confederacy the victory for which it fought so mightily, but I do feel warranted at this moment in saying that further research may well show that certain battles and campaigns were lost because of insecure crypto-communications.

A few moments ago I said that, save for an exception or two, there was in the Confederacy one and only one cryptosystem to serve the need for secure tactical as well as strategic communications. One of these exceptions concerned the cipher used by General Beauregard after the battle of Shiloh (8 April 1862). This cipher was purely monoalphabetic in nature and was discarded as soon as the official cipher system was prescribed in Alexander's manual. It is interesting to note that this was done after the deciphered message came to the attention of Confederate authorities in Richmond via a northern newspaper: It is also interesting to note that the Federal War Department had begun using the route cipher as the official system for USMIC messages very promptly after the outbreak of war, whereas not until 1862 did the Confederate States War Department prepare an official cryptosystem, and then it adopted the "court cipher".

The other exception involved a system used at least once before the official system was adopted and it was so different from the letter that it should be mentioned. On 26 March 1862, the Confederate States President, Jefferson Davis, sent General Johnston by special messenger a dictionary, with the following accompanying instruction:*

I send you a dictionary of which I have the duplicate, so that you may communicate with me by cipher, telegraphic or written, as follows: First give the page by its number; second the column by the letter L, M or R, as it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-hand columns; third, the number of the word in the column, counting from the top. Thus, the word junction would be designated by 146, L, 20.

The foregoing as you no doubt have already realized, is one of the types of cryptosystems used by both sides during the American Revolutionary Period almost a century before, except that in this case the dictionary had three columns to the page instead of two. I haven't tried to find the dictionary but it shouldn't take long to locate it, since the code equivalent of the word "junction" was

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, New York: The Century Co., 1884, Vol. I p. 581. I ✓

given: 146, L, 20. Moreover, there is extant at least one fairly long message, with its decode. How many other messages there may be in National Archives I don't know.

Coming back now to the "court cipher," you will probably find it just as hard to believe, as I find it, that according to all accounts three and only three keys were used by the Confederates during the three and a half years of warfare from 1862 to mid-1865. It is true that Southern signalmen make mention of frequent changes in key but only the following three are specifically cited:

1) COMPLETE VICTORY 2) MANCHESTER BLUFF 3) COME RETRIBUTION.

It seems that all were used concurrently. There may have been a fourth key, IN GOD WE TRUST, but I have seen it only once, and that is in a book explaining the "court cipher". Note that each of the three keys listed above consists of exactly 15 letters, but why this length was chosen is not clear. Had the rule been to make the cipher messages contain only 5-letter groups, the explanation would be easy: 15 is a multiple of 5 and this would be of practical value in checking the cryptographic work. But, as has been clearly stated, disguising word lengths was apparently not the practice even if it was prescribed, so that there was no advantage in choosing keys which contain a multiple of 5 letters. And, by the way, doesn't the key COME RETRIBUTION sound rather ominous to you even these days?

Sooner or later a Confederate signal officer was bound to come up with a device to simplify ciphering operations, and a gadget devised by a Captain William H. Barker seemed to meet the need. Myer's Manual there is a picture of one form of the device, shown here in Fig. 13. I don't think it necessary to explain how it worked, for it is almost self-evident. Several of these devices were captured during the war, one of them being among the items in the NSA Museum (Fig. 14). But here's a photograph, Fig. 15, of the one found in the office of Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin after the capture of Richmond.

CIPHER DEVICE Fig. 15

How many of these devices were in existence or use is unknown, for their construction was an individual matter--apparently it was not an item of regular issue to members of the corps.

In practically every account of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War you will find references to ciphers used by Confederate secret service agents engaged in espionage in the North as well as in Canada. In particular much attention is given to a set of letters in cipher which were intercepted by the New York City Postmaster and which were involved in a plot to print Confederate currency and bonds. Much ado was made about the solution of these ciphers by cipher operators of the USMC in Washington and the consequent breaking up of the plot. But I won't go into these ciphers for two reasons. First, the alphabets were all of the simple monoalphabetic type, a total of six altogether being used. Since they were composed of symbols, a different series for each alphabet, it was possible to compose a cipher word by jumping from one series to another without any external indication of the shift. However, good eyesight and a bit of patience were all that was required for solution in this case because of the inept manner in which the system was used: whole words, sometimes several successive words, were enciphered by the same alphabet. But the second reason for my not going into the story is that my colleague Edwin C. Fishel, whom I've mentioned before, has done some research among the records in our National Archives dealing with this case and he has found something which is of great interest and which I feel bound to leave for him to tell at some future time, as that is his story, not mine.

So very fragmentary was the amount of cryptologic information known to the general public in those days that when there was found on John Wilkes Booth's body a cipher square which was almost identical with the cipher square which had been mounted on the cipher reel found in Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin's office in Richmond. The Federal authorities in Washington attempted to prove that this necessarily meant that the Confederate leaders were implicated in the plot to assassinate Lincoln, and had been giving Booth instructions in cipher. Here's a picture of the cipher square found on Booth, and also in a trunk in his hotel room in Washington.

Fig. 15

The following is quoted from Philip Van Doren Stern's book entitled Sergeant Missions of the Civil War (Rand McNally and Co., New York, 1951, p. 320):

Everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher and that for a Confederate agency (which Booth is known to have been) to possess a copy of a variation of it meant no more than if a telegraph operator was captured with a copy of the Morse Code. Hundreds--and perhaps thousands of people were using the Vigenere. But the Government was desperately seeking evidence against the Confederate leaders so they took advantage of the atmosphere of mystery which has always surrounded cryptography and used it to confuse the public and the press. This shabby trick gained nothing, for the leaders of the Confederacy eventually had to be let go for lack of evidence.

To the foregoing I will comment that I doubt very much whether "everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher." Probably not one of them had even heard the name Vigenere or had even seen a copy of the table, except those captured in operations. I doubt whether anyone on either side even knew that the cipher used by the Confederacy had a name; or least of all, that a German Army reservist named Kasfeld, in a book published in 1863, showed how the Vigenere cipher could be solved by a straightforward mathematical method.

I have devoted a good deal more attention to the methods and means for crypto-communications in the Civil War than they deserve, because professional cryptologists of 1961 can hardly be impressed either by their efficacy from the point of view of ease and rapidity in the cryptographic processing, or by the degree of the technical security they imparted to the messages they were intended to protect. Not much can be said for the security of the visual signaling systems used in the combat zone by the Federal Signal Corps for tactical purposes, because

they were practically all based upon simple monoalphabetic ciphers, or variations thereof, as for instance, when whole words were enciphered by the same alphabet. There is plenty of evidence that Confederate signalmen were more or less regularly reading and solving those signals. What can be said about the security of the route ciphers used by the USMTC for strategic or highcommand communications in the zone of the interior? It has already been indicated that, according to accounts by ex-USMTC men, such ciphers were beyond the cryptanalytic capabilities of Confederate cryptanalysts, but can we really believe that this was true? Considering the simplicity of these route ciphers and the undoubted intellectual capacities of Confederate officers and soldiers, why should messages in these systems have resisted cryptanalytic attack? In many cases the general subject matter of a message and perhaps a number of specific items of information could be detected by quick inspection of the message. Certainly, if it were not for the so-called "arbitraries" the general sense of the message could be found by a few minutes work, since the basic system must have been known through the capture of cipher books, a fact mentioned several times in the literature. Capture of but one book (they were all generally alike) would have told Confederate signalmen exactly how the system worked and this would naturally give away the basic secret of the superseding book. So we must see that whatever degree of protection these route ciphers afforded, message security depended almost entirely upon the number of "arbitraries" actually used in practice. A review of such messages as are available shows wide divergencies in the use of "arbitraries". In any event the number actually present in these books must have fallen far short of the number needed to give the real protection that a well-constructed code can give. Thus it seems to me that the application of native intelligence, with some patience, should have been sufficient to solve USMTC messages--or so it would be quite logical to assume. That such an assumption is well warranted is readily demonstrable.

It was, curiously enough, at about this point in preparing this lecture that my friend and colleague of my NSA days, Mr. Edwin C. Fishel, gave me just the right material for such a demonstration. In June of 1960, Mr. Fishel had given Mr. Phillip Bridges, who is also a member of NSA and who knew nothing about the route ciphers of the USMTC, the following authentic message sent on 1 July 1863 by General George G. Meade, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to General Couch at Washington:

(Message to be furnished) Ptg. 17

It took Mr. Bridges only a few hours, five or six, to solve the cryptogram, and he handed the following plain-text to Mr. Fishel:

Thomas been it-----"Hulls"
 For Parson. I shall try and get to you by tomorrow morning a
 reliable gentlemen and some scouts who are acquainted with a
 country you wish to know of. Rebels this way have all concentrated
 in direction of Gettysburg and Chambersburg. I occupy Carlisle.
 Signed Optic. Great battle very soon. tree much deal "Hulls"

The foregoing solution is correct, save for one pardonable error:

"Thomas" is not a "null" but an indicator for the dimensions of the matrix and the route. "Parson" and "Optic" are code names and I imagine that Mr. Bridges recognized them as such but, of course, he had no way of interpreting them, except perhaps by making a careful study of the events and commanders involved in the impending action, a study he wasn't called upon to undertake.

The foregoing message was enciphered by Cipher Book No. 12, in which the indicator THOMAS specifies a "Message of 10 lines and 5 columns". The route was quite simple and straightforward: "Down the 1st (column), up the 3rd; down the 2nd; up the 5th down the 4th."

It is obvious that in this example the absence of many "arbitrariness," made solution a relatively easy matter. What Mr. Bridges would have been able to do with the cryptogram had there been many of them is problematical. Judging by his worksheets, it seemed to me that Mr. Bridges did not realize when he was solving the message that a transposition matrix was involved; and on questioning him on this point his answer was in the negative. He realized this only later.

A minor drama in the fortunes of Major General D. C. Buell, one of the high commanders of the Federal Army, is quietly and tersely outlined in two ciphers telegrams. The first one, sent on 29 Sept. 1862, from Louisville, Kentucky, was in one of the USMC cipher books, and was externally addressed to Colonel Anson Stager, head of the USMC, but the internal addressee was Major General H. W. Halleck, "General-in-Chief" [our present day "Chief of Staff"]. The message was externally signed by William H. Drake, Buell's cipher operator, but the name of the actual sender, Buell, was indicated internally. Here's the telegram:

COLONEL ANSON STAGER, Washington:

Austria await I is over to requiring orders return blissful
 for your instant command turned and instructions and rough looking
 further shall further the Camden me of ocean September poker twenty
 I the to I command obedience repair orders quickly pretty.
 Indianapolis your him accordingly my fourth received 1862 wounded
 nine have twenty turn have to to to alvord hasty.

WILLIAM H. DRAKE

Rather than give you the plain-text of this message, perhaps you would like to work it out for yourselves, for with the information you've already received the solution should not be difficult. The message contains one error, which was made in its original preparation: one word was omitted.

The second telegram, only one day later, was also from Major General Buell, to Major General Halleck, but it was in another cipher book--apparently the two books involved were used concurrently. Here it is:

GEORGE C. MAYNARD, Washington:

Regulars ordered of my to public out suspending received 1862 spoiled thirty I dispatch command of continua of best otherwise worst Arabia my command discharge duty of my last for Lincoln September period your from sense shall duties the until Seward ability to the I a removal evening Adam herald tribune.*

PHILIP BRIDGER

As before, I will give you the opportunity to solve this message for yourselves. (At the beginning of the next lecture I shall present the plain-text of both messages.)

Next you see a photograph of an important message which you may wish to solve yourself. It was sent by President Jefferson Davis to General Johnston, on a very significant date, 11 April 1863. For ease in working on it I give also a transcription, since the photograph is very old and in poor state. I believe that this message does not appear in any of the accounts I've read.

Fig. 18

To return to J. W. Brown, whom I've mentioned before and who gives us most of what little sound information there is about the cryptanalytic successes of both sides. First, let's see what the Union signalmen could do with rebel ciphers. Here are some statements he makes (p. 214):

The first deciphering of a rebel signal code of which I find any record was that made by Capt. J. S. Hall and Capt. R. A. Taylor, reported Nov. 25, 1862. Four days later, Maj. Myer wrote to Capt. Gushing, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac, not to permit it to become public "that we translate the signal messages of the rebel army".

April 9, 1863, Capt. Fisher, near Falmouth, reported that one of his officers had read a rebel message which proved that the rebels were in possession of our code. The next day he was informed that the rebel code taken (from) a rebel signal officer was identical with one taken previously at Yorktown.

He received from Maj. Myer the following orders:

*A curious coincidence--or was it a fortuitous foreshadowing of an event far in the future?--can be seen in the sequence of the last two words of the cipher text. The message is dated September 30, 1862; the New York Herald and the New York Tribune combined to make the New York Herald-Tribune on March 19, 1924--62 years later!

"Send over your lines, from time to time, messages which, if it is in the power of the enemy to decipher them, will lead them to believe that we cannot get any clue to their signals."

"Send also occasionally messages untrue, in reference to imaginary military movements, as for instance, --"The Sixth Corps is ordered to reinforce Keyes at Yorktown."

Undoubtedly, what we have here are references to the general cipher system used by the Confederates in their electric-telegraph communications, for note the expression "Send over your lines". This could hardly refer to visual communications. Here we also have very early instances, in telegraphic communications, of what we call cover and deception, i.e., employing certain rules to try to hide the fact that enemy signals could be read, and to try to deceive him by sending spurious messages for him to read; hoping the fraud will not be detected.

Brown's account of Union cryptanalytic successes continues (p. 215):

In October, 1863, Capt. Merrill's party deciphered a code, and in November of the same year Capt. Thickett and Capt. Marston deciphered another in Virginia.

Lieut. Howgate and Lieut. Flock, in March, 1864, deciphered a code in the Western Army, and at the same time Lieut. Benner found one at Alexandria, Virginia.

Capt. Paul Babcock, Jr., then Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Cumberland, in a letter dated Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 26, 1864, transmitting a copy of the rebel signal code, says:

Capt. Cole and Lieut. Howgate, acting Signal Officers, occupy a station of communication and observation on White Oak Ridge at Ringgold, Ga. . . . On the 22nd inst. the rebels changed their code to the one enclosed, and on the same day the above-mentioned officers by untiring zeal and energy succeeded in translating the new code, and these officers have been ever since reading every messages sent over the rebel lines. Many of these messages have furnished valuable information to the general commanding department.

The following is also from Brown (p. 279):

About the first of June (1864), Sergt. Calvin was stationed at Fort Strong, on Morris Island, with the several codes heretofore used by the rebels, for the purpose of reading the enemy's signals if possible. For nearly two weeks nothing could be made out of their signals, but by persevering he finally succeeded in learning their codes. Messages were read by him from Beach Inlet, Battery Bee, and Fort Johnson. Gen. J. G. Foster, who had assumed command of the Department of the South, May 26th, was so much pleased with Sergt. Calvin's work, that in a letter addressed to Gen. Halleck, he recommended "that he be rewarded by promotion to Lieutenant in the Signal Corps, or by a brevet or medal of honor." This recommendation was subsequently acted upon, but, through congressional and official wrangling over appointments in the Corps, he was not commissioned until May 13, 1865, his commission dating from Feb. 14, 1865.

(p-281) During the month, Sergt. Calvin added additional laurels to the fame he had earned as a successful interpreter of rebel signals. The enemy had adopted a new cipher for the transmission of important messages, and the labor of deciphering it

devolved upon the sergeant. Continued watchfulness at last secured the desired result, and he was again able to translate the important dispatches of the enemy for the benefit of our commanders. The information thus gained was frequently of special value in our operations, and the peculiar ability exhibited by the sergeant led Gen. Foster once more to recommend his promotion.

(p-266) About the same time an expedition under Gen. Potter was organized to act in conjunction with the navy in the vicinity of Bull's Bay. Lieut. Fisher was with this command, and by maintaining communications between the land and naval forces facilitated greatly the conjoined action of the command. Meanwhile every means was employed to intercept rebel messages. Sergt. Colvin, assigned to this particular duty, read all the messages within sight, and when the evacuation of Charleston was determined upon by the enemy, the first notification of the fact came in this way before the retreat had actually commenced. As a reward for conspicuous services rendered in this capacity, Capt. Merrill recommended that the sergeant be allowed a medal, his zeal, energy and labors fully warranting the honor.

After the occupation of Charleston, communications was established by signals with Fort Strong, on Morris Island, Fort Johnson and James Island, Mount Pleasant, and Stymeyer's Mills. A line was also opened with the position occupied by the troops on the south side of the Ashley river.

With regard to Confederate reading of Union visual signals, Brown makes the following observations of considerable interest (p.274):

The absolute necessity of using a cipher when signalling in the presence of the enemy was demonstrated during these autumn months by the ease with which the rebels read our messages. This led to the issuing of an order that all important messages should be sent in cipher. Among the multitude of messages intercepted by the enemy, the following were some of the more important:-

Brown thereupon cites 25 such messages but he gives no indication whatever as to the source from which he obtained these examples or how he knew they had been intercepted. They all appear to be tactical messages sent by visual signals.

In many of the cases cited by Brown it is difficult to tell whether wig-wag or electric telegraph messages were involved. But in one case, (evacuation of Charleston) it is perfectly clear that visual messages were involved, when Brown says that Sgt. Colvin "read all the messages within sight."

Further with regard to rebel cryptanalytic success with Union messages, Brown has this to say (p.213):

The reports of Lieut. Frank Markoe, Signal Officer at Charleston, show that during the siege thousands of messages were sent from one post to another, and from outposts to headquarters, most of which could have been sent in no other way, and many were of great importance to the Confederate authorities.

Lieut. Markoe says that he read nearly every message we sent. He was forewarned of our attack on the 18th of July, 1863. He adds regretfully, however, that through carelessness of the staff officers at headquarters it leaked out that he was reading our messages. Our officers then began to use the cipher disk. In August he intercepted the following message: "Send me a copy of rebel code immediately, if you have one in your possession". He therefore changed his code. ... A little later our officers used a cipher which Lieut. Markoe says he was utterly unable to unravel.

It is unfortunate that neither Lieut. Markoe, the Confederate cryptanalyst, nor Brown, the Union signalman, tell us what sort of cipher this was that couldn't be unravelled. I assume that it was the Myer disk used properly, with a key phrase of some length and with successive letters, not whole words, being enciphered by successive letters of the key. But this is only an assumption and may be entirely erroneous.

In the forgoing citations of cryptanalytic successes it is significant to note, that visual messages were intercepted and read by both sides; second, that Confederate telegraphic messages protected by the Vignere cipher were read by Union personnel whenever such messages were intercepted; and third, that USMC telegraph messages protected by the route cipher apparently intercepted occasionally but never solved. Later I shall make some comments on this last statement, but at the moment let us note that technically the Vignere cipher is theoretically much stronger than the route cipher, so that we have here an interesting situation, viz, the users of a technically inferior cryptosystem were able to read enemy messages protected by a technically superior one, but the users of a technically superior cryptosystem were not able to read enemy messages protected by a technically inferior one—a curious situation indeed.

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Once before in this lecture it was mentioned that the visual signalmen of each side were reading the visual signals of the other side. This led to the use, by both sides, of ciphers to protect the signals transmitted by the visual method. But in addition, discovery that Confederate operators were

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intercepting messages by tapping the telegraph lines when possible (which, it is to be noted, certainly represents one of the earliest, if not indeed the very earliest instances of intercepting electrically-transmitted messages), let to the adoption of curious subterfuges to thwart such interception yielding good intelligence. The following account of an episode of this sort is taken from a book published in 1907 entitled Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, by David H. Bates, one of the members of the Military Telegraph Corps:

During Burnside's Fredericksburg campaign in 1862, the War Department operators discovered indication of an interloper on the wire leading to his headquarters at Acquia Creek. These indications consisted of an occasional irregular opening and closing of the circuit and once in a while strange signals, which were evidently not made by any of our own operators. It is proper to note that the characteristics of each Morse operator's sending are just as pronounced as easily recognized as are the characteristics of ordinary handwriting, so that when a message is being transmitted over a wire, the identify of the sender may readily be known to any other operator within hearing who has ever worked with the sender of such signals. [Here we have the earliest reference to what we now call "Morse-Operator Identification".] A somewhat similar means of personal identification occurs every day in the use of the telephone. [We must remember here that Bates was writing in 1907. Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone a decade after the close of the Civil War.]

At the time referred to, therefore, we were certain that our wire had been tapped at an unguarded point. In some way or other the Confederate learned that we suspected the presence on the wire, and he then disclosed to us the fact that he was from Lee's army and had been on our wire for several days, and that, having learned all that he wanted to know, he was then about to cut and run. We gossiped with him for a while and then ceased to hear his signals and knew, or believed, that he had gone. [What shall we say about the naivete of these early intercept operations and operators?]

Meanwhile, we had taken measures to discover his whereabouts by sending out linemen to patrol the line; but his tracks were well concealed and it was only after the intruder had left that we found the place where our wire had been tapped. He had made the secret connection by means of fine-silk-covered magnet wire, so-called, in such a manner as to conceal the joint almost entirely. Meantime, Burnside's operator was temporarily absent from his post, and we were obliged to have recourse to a crude plan for concealing the text of telegrams to the Army of the Potomac, which we had followed on other somewhat similar occasions when we believed the addressee or operator at the distant point (not provided with the cipher-key) was particularly keen and alert. This plan consisted primarily of sending the message backward, the individual words being misspelled and otherwise garbled. We had practiced on one or two dispatches to Burnside before the Confederate operator was discovered to be on the wire, and we were placed to get this prompt answer, couched also in the same outlandish language, which was, however, intelligible to us after a short study of the text in each case. The general and ourselves soon became quite expert in this home-made cipher game, as we all strove hard to clothe the dispatches in strange, uncouth garb.

Bunt

In order to deceive the Confederate operator, however, we sent to General Burnside a number of cipher-messages, easy of translation, and which contained all sorts of bogus information for the purpose of misleading the enemy. General Burnside of his operator at once surmised our purpose, and the general thereupon sent up in reply a lot of "balderdash," also calculated to deceive the uninitiated. [Here we have an early instance of "cover and deception" in electrical communications.]

It was about this time that the following specially important dispatch from Lincoln was filed for transmission:

November 25, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek, Va.: If I should be in boat off Acquia Creek at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, could you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or two with me.--A Lincoln.

Although the Confederate operator had said good-by several days before the date of this message, we were not sure that he had actually left. We undertook therefore to put Lincoln's telegram in our home-made cipher, so that if the foreign operator were still on our wire, the message might not be readily made out by the enemy. At the same time extra precautions were taken by the Washington authorities to guard against any accident to the President while on the visit to General Burnside. No record is now found of the actual text of this cipher-dispatch, as finally prepared for transmission, but going back over it word for word, I believe the following is so nearly like it as to be called a true copy:

Washington, D. C.,
November 25, 1862.

BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek: Can Inn Ale me withe 2 oar our Ann pas Ann me flesh ends N. V. corn Inn out with U cud Inn heaven day nest Wed roe Moore Tom darkey hat Creek Why Hawk of abbott Inn B chewed I if.--Bates.

By reading the above backward, observing the phonetics, and bearing in mind that flesh is the equivalent of meat, the real meaning is easily found. It cannot be said that this specimen exhibits especially clever work on the part of the War Department staff, nor is it likely that the Confederate operator, if he overheard its transmission, had much trouble in unraveling its meaning. As to this we can only conjecture.

Burnside readily translated this cryptogram, if it may be dignified with so high-sounding a name, and replied in similar gibberish that he would meet Lincoln at the place and time specified. At this meeting on the steamer Baltimore was discussed the plan of a movement against Lee's intrenchments which was made three weeks later, and which resulted in our army being repulsed with the loss of many thousands of lives.

Another special transposition of this type was used in 1865 when Lincoln was staying at City Point and Richmond. After 6 April the route transposition ciphers were no longer used for presidential dispatches. [Did they continue to be used for military communications? Plum states that "No. 4 and all other ciphers were discarded after 20 June 1865," but he goes on to say that No. 5 was sent to about 20 U.S. Military Telegraphers, so presumably that cipher book may have been used for a short time. Plum adds that the books were retained by these recipients "until they were discharged".] The reason for this abandonment of cipher is not clear: the operator may have felt that now that the war was believed practically over--Lee surrendered three days later--cipher communications was less imperative. In any case, telegrams were sent in plain text thereafter. [Communications security discipline became very lax, now that the war was over].

omit

For an important message sent by Lincoln on 3 April a special type of cipher was used, closely resembling that to Burnside. The reason for the unusual encipherment was a desire to conceal the news from cipher operators who might happen to see it while relaying it to Washington. The ruse resorted to was surprisingly simple: the order of the words was merely reversed and nonstandard spelling adopted! The text is as follows:

City Point, Va., 8:30 A.M., April 3, 1865.

Tinker, War Department: A. Lincoln its in fune a in hymn to start
I army treating there possible if of cut too foreard pushing is
He is so all Richmond aunt confide is Andy evacuated Petersburg
reports Grant morning this Washington Secretary War. Beckwith

~~Secret~~

intercepting messages by tapping the telegraph lines when possible (which, it is to be noted, certainly represents one of the earliest, if not indeed the very earliest instances of intercepting electrically-transmitted messages), let to the adoption of curious subterfuges to thwart such interception yielding good intelligence. The following account of an episode of this sort is taken from a book published in 1907 entitled Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, by David H. Bates, one of the members of the Military Telegraph Corps:

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At the time referred to, therefore, we were certain that our wire had been tapped at an unguarded point. In some way or other the Confederate learned that we suspected the presence on the wire, and he then disclosed to us the fact that he was from Lee's army and had been on our wire for several days, and that, having learned all that he wanted to know, he was then about to cut and run. We gossiped with him for a while and then ceased to hear his signals and knew, or believed, that he had gone. [What shall we say about the naivete of these early intercept operations and operators?]

Meanwhile, we had taken measures to discover his whereabouts by sending out linemen to patrol the line; but his tracks were well concealed and it was only after the intruder had left that we found the place where our wire had been tapped. He had made the secret connection by means of fine silk-covered magnet wire, so-called, in such a manner as to conceal the joint almost entirely. Meantime, Burnside's operator was temporarily absent from his post, and we were obliged to have recourse to a crude plan for concealing the text of telegrams to the Army of the Potomac, which we had followed on other somewhat similar occasions when we believed the addressee or operator at the distant point (not provided with the cipher-key) was particularly keen and alert. This plan consisted primarily of sending the message backward, the individual words being misspelled and otherwise garbled. We had practiced on one or two dispatches to Burnside before the Confederate operator was discovered to be on the wire, and we were placed to get this prompt answer, couched also in the same outlandish language, which was, however, intelligible to us after a short study of the text in each case. The general and ourselves soon became quite expert in this home-made cipher game, as we all strove hard to clothe the dispatches in strange, uncouth garb.

In order to deceive the Confederate operator, however, we sent to General Burnside a number of cipher-messages, easy of translation, and which contained all sorts of bogus information for the purpose of misleading the enemy. General Burnside of his operator at once surmised our purpose, and the general thereupon sent up in reply a lot of "balderdash," also calculated to deceive the uninitiated. [Here we have an early instance of "cover and deception" in electrical communications.]

It was about this time that the following specially important dispatch from Lincoln was filed for transmission:

November 25, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek, Va.: If I should be in boat off Acquia Creek at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, could you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or two with me.--A Lincoln.

Although the Confederate operator had said good-by several days before the date of this message, we were not sure that he had actually left. We undertook therefore to put Lincoln's telegram in our home-made cipher, so that if the foreign operator were still on our wire, the message might not be readily made out by the enemy. At the same time extra precautions were taken by the Washington authorities to guard against any accident to the President while on the visit to General Burnside. No record is now found of the actual text of this cipher-dispatch, as finally prepared for transmission, but going back over it word for word, I believe the following is so nearly like it as to be called a true copy:

Washington, D. C.,
November 25, 1862.

BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek: Can Inn Ale me withe 2 car our Ann pas
Ann me flesh ends N. V. corn Inn out with U cud Inn heaven day
nest Wed roe Moore Tom darkey hat Creek Why Hawk of abbott Inn
B chewed I if.--Bates.

By reading the above backward, observing the phonetics, and bearing in mind that flesh is the equivalent of meat, the real meaning is easily found. It cannot be said that this specimen exhibits especially clever work on the part of the War Department staff, nor is it likely that the Confederate operator, if he overheard its transmission, had much trouble in unraveling its meaning. As to this we can only conjecture.

Burnside readily translated this cryptogram, if it may be dignified with so high-sounding a name, and replied in similar gibberish that he would meet Lincoln at the place and time specified. At this meeting on the steamer Baltimore was discussed the plan of a movement against Lee's intrenchments which was made three weeks later, and which resulted in our army being repulsed with the loss of many thousands of lives.

Another special transposition of this type was used in 1865 when Lincoln was staying at City Point and Richmond. After 6 April the route transposition ciphers were no longer used for presidential dispatches. [Did they continue to be used for military communications? Plum states that "No. 4 and all other ciphers were discarded after 20 June 1865," but he goes on to say that No. 5 was sent to about 20 U.S. Military Telegraphers, so presumably that cipher book may have been used for a short time. Plum adds that the books were retained by these recipients "until they were discharged".] The reason for this abandonment of cipher is not clear: the operator may have felt that now that the war was believed practically over--Lee surrendered three days later--cipher communications was less imperative. In any case, telegrams were sent in plain text thereafter. [Communications security discipline became very lax, now that the war was over].

For an important message sent by Lincoln on 3 April a special type of cipher was used, closely resembling that to Burnside. The reason for the unusual encipherment was a desire to conceal the news from cipher operators who might happen to see it while relaying it to Washington. The ruse resorted to was surprisingly simple: the order of the words was merely reversed and nonstandard spelling adopted! The text is as follows:

City Point, Va., 8:30 A.M., April 3, 1865.

Tinker, War Department: A. Lincoln its in fuse a in hymn to start
I army treating there possible if of cut too foreard pushing is
He is so all Richmond aunt confide is Andy evacuated Petersburg
reports Grant morning this Washington Secretary War. Beckwith

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I can hardly leave the subject of the cryptosystem used by the USMTC without citing a couple of messages which appear in nearly every account I've seen of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War. These are messages which were sent by President Lincoln under circumstances in which, allegedly, the usual cipher could not be or, at least was not, employed. The first of the two was sent on 25 November 1862 from the White House to Major General Burnside, Falmouth, Virginia. The circumstances are so bizarre that if I merely presented the cipher message to you without some background I doubt if you would believe me. And after I've presented the background, I'm sure you won't know what to think - at least, I don't really know what to make of the incident. Let me quote from an account of it in the book by David Homer Bates, one of the first members of the USMTC, in his Lincoln in the Telegraph Office (D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1939, pp. 58-61);

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8:30 a.m., April 3, 1865

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Both Plum and Bates cite the foregoing telegram and their comments are interesting if not very illuminating. Plum says merely: "By reading the above backward with regard to the phonetics rather than the orthography, the meaning will be appaerent". Bates says:

"The probable reason for adopting this crude form was to insure its reaching its destination without attracting the special attention of watchful operators on the route of the City Point-Washington wire, because at that crises every one was on the Qui vive for news from Grant's advancing army, and if the message had been sent in plain language, the important information it conveyed might have been overheard in its transmission and perhaps would have reached the general public in advance of its receipt by the War Department.

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"It is not necessary to give the translation of this cipher-message. To use a homely term, 'Any one can read it with his eyes shut.' In fact, the easiest way would be for one to shut the eyes and let some one else read it backward, not too slowly. The real wording then becomes plain.

Can you imagine for one moment that a "cryptogram" of such simplicity could not be read at sight by any USMTC operator, even without having someone read it to him backward? Such a "cryptogram" is hardly worthy of a schoolboy's initial effort at preparing a secret message. But I assure you that I did not make this story up, nor compose the cryptogram.

Ruminating upon what I have shown and told you about the cryptosystems used by both sides in the Civil War do you get the feeling, as I do, that there was, even for those days, much room for improvement and that the cryptologic achievements of neither side can be said to add lustre to its undoubtedly great accomplishments on the battlefield? Perhaps this is a good place to make an appraisal of the cryptologic efficiency of each side.

First, it is fair to say that professional cryptologists of 1961 can hardly be impressed with the cryptosystems used by either side. In both the Union and the Confederate Armies, their respective Signal Corps at first transmitted by visual signals messages wholly in plain language and such messages were often intercepted and read straight-away. Then both sides began enciphering such messages, the Signal Corps of the Federal Army using a cipher disk invented by the Chief Signal Officer, the Signal Corps of the Confederate Army using the Vigenère cipher. In both cases the use of cryptography for tactical messages was quite inept, although it seems that from time to time the Federal

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signalmen had better success with the Vigenère-enciphered visual messages of the Confederate signalmen than the latter had with the disk-enciphered messages of the Union signalmen.

With regard to the cryptosystem used by the Confederate Signal Corps, although there may initially have been cases in which mono-alphabetic substitution alphabets were used, such alphabets were probably drawn up by agreement with the signal officers concerned, and changed from time to time. Nowhere have I come across a statement that the Myer disk or something simple and similar was used. In any event, messages transmitted by visual signals were read from time to time by Union signalmen, the record showing a number of cases in which the latter "worked out the rebel signal code" - meaning, of course, that the substitution alphabet involved was solved. When did the Confederate Signal Corps begin using the Vigenère cipher? The answer seems to be quite clear. In a letter dated 6 June 1888 from General J. H. Alexander (brother of General E. P.) to J. Willard Brown* we find the following statements:

"At the first inauguration of the Signal Service in the Confederacy, I, having received in the first place the primary instruction from my brother, Gen. E. P. A., then a colonel on Beauregard's staff near the Stone Bridge at Manassas, was assigned the duty of preparing a confidential circular of instruction for the initiation of officers and men, in this branch. I did prepare it, in Richmond, in early spring, 1862, and surrendered the copy to Hon. James A. Seddon, the then Secretary of War at Richmond. It was issued in form of a small pamphlet. I had attached a table for compiling cipher dispatches - which was printed with the rest of the matter - and the whole was issued confidentially to the officers newly appointed for signal duty. (My emphasis)

* Op. Cit. , p. 206

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I have italicized the last sentence because I think that the "table for compiling cipher dispatches" can refer only to the Vigenère square table, for that and only that sort of table is even mentioned in accounts of the ciphers used by the Confederacy. One could, of course, wish that the writer had given some further details but there are none. However, the statement about the table is sufficiently explicit to warrant the belief that it was Gen. J. H. Alexander who officially introduced the Vigenère square into Confederate cryptography; although he may have obtained the idea from his brother, since he states that he "received in the first place the primary instruction from my brother".

In the Federal Signal Corps it is quite possible that the poly-alphabetic methods Myer cites in his Manual for using his cipher disk (changing the setting with successive words of a message) were used in some cases, because there are found in the record several instances in which the Confederate Signalmen, successful with ~~none~~ monoalphabetic encipherments, were completely baffled. One is warranted in the belief that it was not so much the complexities introduced by using a keyword to encipher successive words of the plain text as it was the lack of training and experience in cryptanalysis which hampered Confederate signalmen who tried to solve such messages. In World War I a German Army system of somewhat similar nature was regularly solved by Allied cryptanalysts, but it must be remembered, in the first place, that by 1914 the use of radio made it possible to intercept volumes of traffic entirely impossible to obtain before the advent of radiotelegraphy;

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and, in the second place, would-be cryptanalysts of both sides in the Civil War had nothing but native wit and intelligence to guide them in their work on intercepted messages, for there were, so far as the record goes, no training courses in cryptanalysis on either side, though there were courses in cryptography and signaling. To cryptanalysts of 1961, a century later, native wit and intelligence nevertheless should have been sufficient to solve practically every message intercepted by either side, so simple and inefficient in usage do the cryptosystems employed by both sides appear today.

No system employed by the Federals, either for tactical messages (Signal Corps transmissions) or strategic messages (USMTC transmissions) would long resist solution today, provided, of course, that a modicum of traffic were available for study. Although technically far less secure in actual practice than properly or even faultily enciphered Vigenère messages, the route ciphers of the USMTC seem to have eluded the efforts of inexpert Confederate cryptanalysts. Ex-USMTC operators make the statement that none of their messages was ever solved and that the Confederates published intercepted messages in Southern newspapers in the hope that somebody would come forward with a solution; yet it must be remembered that those operators were Northerners who were very naturally interested in making the achievements of the Union operators, both in cryptography and in cryptanalysis, appear more spectacular than they really were. And it is probable that they wrote without having made a real effort to ascertain whether the Confederates did have any success. A "real effort" would have been a rather imposing undertaking then - as it still is, I fear. Now it must be presumed

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that if Confederate operators had succeeded in solving intercepted traffic of the USMTC they would have recorded the facts to their own credit. But in his seven volumes on the campaigns of Lee and his lieutenants, Douglas S. Freeman does not mention a single instance of interception and solution of telegraphic messages of the Union. Perhaps Freeman was seeking 100% confirmation, which is too much to expect in a field of such great secrecy. This failure of the Confederate cryptanalysts is the more astonishing when we know that copies of the USMTC cipher books were captured and that, therefore, they must have become aware of the nature of the route ciphers used by the USMTC, unless there was a lack of appreciation of such captures and failed to forward the books to the proper authorities, who could hand them over to their experts. In those books the USMTC route ciphers would have been seen in their naive simplicity, complicated only by the use of code equivalents but sometimes hardly to the degree where a message would be entirely unintelligible because of their presence. It seems to me that there can be only four possible explanations for this failure. Let us examine them in turn.

First, it is possible that there was not enough intercept traffic to permit solution. But this is inadequate as an explanation. The route cipher is of such simplicity that "depth" is hardly an absolute requirement - a single message can be solved, and its intelligibility will be determined to a large degree by the number of "arbitraries" it contains. Where there are many, only the dim outlines of what is being conveyed by the message may become visible; where there are few or even none, the meaning of the messages becomes fairly evident. But the

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abundant records, although they contain many references to intercepts, fail to disclose even one instance of solution of a USMIC message. Thus we are forced to conclude that it was not the lack of intercept traffic which accounts for lack of success by the Confederates with USMIC messages, but some other factor.

Second, the lack of training, experience, and patience on the part of Confederate cryptanalysts might have been at the root of their failure to solve the messages. This sounds plausible until we look into the matter with a critical spirit. The degree of intelligence possessed by Confederate officers and men was certainly as high as that of their Union counterparts who were up against a technically far superior cryptosystem, the Vigenère, than that underlying the route ciphers used by the USMIC. We may safely conclude that it was not lack of intelligence that prevented them from solving messages (enciphered by the USMIC route ciphers.

Third, it is possible that Confederate high commanders were not interested in communications-intelligence operations or in gathering the fruits of such operations. Such an explanation seems on its face, fatuous and wholly unacceptable. We know of the high estimate of value minor commanders placed upon the interception and solution of tactical messages transmitted by visual signaling; but an appreciation of the extraordinary advantages of knowing the contents of enemy communications on the strategic level may have been lacking. My colleague Mr. Fishel thinks that "intelligence consciousness" and "intelligence sophistication" were of a very low order in the Union Army, and of a

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markedly lower order in the Confederate Army. But to us, in 1961, to disregard the advantages of a possible reading of strategic messages seems almost incredible and I am inclined to discount this sort of explanation.

Fourth, it is possible that Confederate cryptanalysts were far more successful in their efforts to solve USMIC transmissions than present publicly-available records indicate; that Confederate commanders obtained great advantages from their communications-intelligence operations; that they fully recognized the supreme necessity of keeping this fact and these advantages secret; and that the Confederate States Government adopted and enforced strict communications-intelligence security regulations, so that the truth concerning these matters has not yet emerged. Let it be noted in this connection that very little information can be found in the public domain today about Allied cryptanalytic successes during World War I; and were it not for the very intensive and extensive investigations in the matter of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, very little, if any, information would be known to the public about British and American successes in communications-intelligence during World War II. Immediately following the capture of Richmond and before Confederate records could be removed to a safe place, a great fire broke out and practically all those records were destroyed. It is possible that this is the reason why the records of their communications-intelligence successes have never come to light and that Confederate cryptanalysts kept their secrets to themselves? We know that the records possessed or taken by

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certain Confederate leaders have been gone over with great care and attention, but what happened to those retained by other Confederate leaders such as the Secretary of War Seddon, or his predecessor Judah P. Benjamin who later became Secretary of State, etc, etc? Here is a fascinating speculation and one which might well repay careful, painstaking research. I shall leave the delving into this speculation to some of you younger aspiring professional cryptanalysts who may be interested in undertaking such a piece of research and with this thought I bring this lecture to its close.

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Paul

C.C.

Lecture No. 4

I can hardly leave the subject of the cryptosystem used by the USMIC without citing a couple of messages which appear in nearly every account I've seen of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War. These are messages which were sent by President Lincoln under circumstances in which, allegedly, the usual cipher could not be or, at least was not, employed. The first of the two was sent on 25 November 1862 from the White House to Major General Burnside, Falmouth, Virginia. The circumstances are so bizarre that if I merely presented the cipher message to you without some background I doubt if you would believe me. And after I've presented the background, I'm sure you won't know what to think - at least, I don't really know what to make of the incident. Let me quote from an account of it in the book by David Homer Bates, one of the first members of the USMIC, in his Lincoln in the Telegraph Office (D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1939, pp. 58-61):

"During Burnside's Fredericksburg campaign at the end of 1862, the War Department operators discovered indications of an interloper on the wire leading to his headquarters at Aquia Creek. These indications consisted of an occasional irregular opening and closing of the circuit and once in a while strange signals, evidently not made by our own operators. It is proper to note that the characteristics of each Morse operator's sending are just as pronounced and as easily recognized as those of ordinary handwriting, so that when a message is transmitted over a wire, the identity of the sender may readily be known to any other operator within hearing who has ever worked with him. A somewhat similar means of personal identification occurs every day in the use of the telephone.

"At the time referred to, therefore, we were certain that our wire had been tapped. In some way or other the Confederate operator learned that we were aware of his presence, and he then informed us that he was from Lee's army and had been on our wire for several days, and that, having learned all that he wanted to know, he was then about to cut out and run. We gossiped with him for a while and then ceased to hear his signals and believed that he had gone.

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* Op. Cit. , p. 206

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I have italicized the last sentence because I think that the "table for compiling cipher dispatches" can refer only to the Vigenere square table, for that and only that sort of table is even mentioned in accounts of the ciphers used by the Confederacy. One could, of course, wish that the writer had given some further details but there are none. However, the statement about the table is sufficiently explicit to warrant the belief that it was Gen. J. H. Alexander who officially introduced the Vigenere square into Confederate cryptography; although he may have obtained the idea from his brother, since he states that he "received in the first place the primary instruction from my brother".

In the Federal Signal Corps it is quite possible that the poly-alphabetic methods Myer cites in his Manual for using his cipher disk (changing the setting with successive words of a message) were used in some cases, because there are found in the record several instances in which the Confederate Signalmen, successful with ~~the~~ monoalphabetic encipherments, were completely baffled. One is warranted in the belief that it was not so much the complexities introduced by using a keyword to encipher successive words of the plain text as it was the lack of training and experience in cryptanalysis which hampered Confederate signalmen who tried to solve such messages. In World War I a German Army system of somewhat similar nature was regularly solved by Allied cryptanalysts, but it must be remembered, in the first place, that by 1914 the use of radio made it possible to intercept volumes of traffic entirely impossible to obtain before the advent of radiotelegraphy;

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and, in the second place, would-be cryptanalysts of both sides in the Civil War had nothing but native wit and intelligence to guide them in their work on intercepted messages, for there were, so far as the record goes, no training courses in cryptanalysis on either side, though there were courses in cryptography and signaling. To cryptanalysts of 1961, a century later, native wit and intelligence nevertheless should have been sufficient to solve practically every message intercepted by either side, so simple and inefficient in usage do the cryptosystems employed by both sides appear today.

No system employed by the Federals, either for tactical messages (Signal Corps transmissions) or strategic messages (USMIC transmissions) would long resist solution today, provided, of course, that a modicum of traffic were available for study. Although technically far less secure in actual practice than properly or even faultily enciphered Vigenère messages, the route ciphers of the USMIC seem to have eluded the efforts of inept Confederate cryptanalysts. Ex-USMIC operators make the statement that none of their messages was ever solved and that the Confederates published intercepted messages in Southern newspapers in the hope that somebody would come forward with a solution; yet it must be remembered that those operators were Northerners who were very naturally interested in making the achievements of the Union operators, both in cryptography and in cryptanalysis, appear more spectacular than they really were. And it is probable that they wrote without having made a real effort to ascertain whether the Confederates did have any success. A "real effort" would have been a rather imposing undertaking then - as it still is, I fear. Now it must be presumed

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that if Confederate operators had succeeded in solving intercepted traffic of the USMTC they would have recorded the facts to their own credit. But in his seven volumes on the campaigns of Lee and his lieutenants, Douglas S. Freeman does not mention a single instance of interception and solution of telegraphic messages of the Union. Perhaps Freeman was seeking 100% confirmation, which is too much to expect in a field of such great secrecy. This failure of the Confederate cryptanalysts is the more astonishing when we know that copies of the USMTC cipher books were captured and that, therefore, they must have become aware of the nature of the route ciphers used by the USMTC, unless there was a lack of appreciation of such captures and failed to forward the books to the proper authorities, who could hand them over to their experts. In those books the USMTC route ciphers would have been seen in their naive simplicity, complicated only by the use of code equivalents but sometimes hardly to the degree where a message would be entirely unintelligible because of their presence. It seems to me that there can be only four possible explanations for this failure. Let us examine them in turn.

First, it is possible that there was not enough intercept traffic to permit solution. But this is inadequate as an explanation. The route cipher is of such simplicity that "depth" is hardly an absolute requirement - a single message can be solved, and its intelligibility will be determined to a large degree by the number of "arbitraries" it contains. Where there are many, only the dim outlines of what is being conveyed by the message may become visible; where there are few or even none, the meaning of the messages becomes fairly evident. But the

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abundant records, although they contain many references to intercepts, fail to disclose even one instance of solution of a USMIC message. Thus we are forced to conclude that it was not the lack of intercept traffic which accounts for lack of success by the Confederates with USMIC messages, but some other factor.

Second, the lack of training, experience, and patience on the part of Confederate cryptanalysts might have been at the root of their failure to solve the messages. This sounds plausible until we look into the matter with a critical spirit. The degree of intelligence possessed by Confederate officers and men was certainly as high as that of their Union counterparts who were up against a technically far superior cryptosystem, the Vigenère, than that underlying the route ciphers used by the USMIC. We may safely conclude that it was not lack of intelligence that prevented them from solving messages enciphered by the USMIC route ciphers.

Third, it is possible that Confederate high commanders were not interested in communications-intelligence operations or in gathering the fruits of such operations. Such an explanation seems on its face, fatuous and wholly unacceptable. We know of the high estimate of value minor commanders placed upon the interception and solution of tactical messages transmitted by visual signaling; but an appreciation of the extraordinary advantages of knowing the contents of enemy communications on the strategic level may have been lacking. My colleague Mr. Fishel thinks that "intelligence consciousness" and "intelligence sophistication" were of a very low order in the Union Army, and of a

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markedly lower order in the Confederate Army. But to us, in 1961, to disregard the advantages of a possible reading of strategic messages seems almost incredible and I am inclined to discount this sort of explanation.

Fourth, it is possible that Confederate cryptanalysts were far more successful in their efforts to solve USMTC transmissions than present publicly-available records indicate; that Confederate commanders obtained great advantages from their communications-intelligence operations; that they fully recognized the supreme necessity of keeping this fact and these advantages secret; and that the Confederate States Government adopted and enforced strict communications-intelligence security regulations, so that the truth concerning these matters has not yet emerged. Let it be noted in this connection that very little information can be found in the public domain today about Allied cryptanalytic successes during World War I; and were it not for the very intensive and extensive investigations in the matter of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, very little, if any, information would be known to the public about British and American successes in communications-intelligence during World War II. Immediately following the capture of Richmond and before Confederate records could be removed to a safe place, a great fire broke out and practically all those records were destroyed. It is possible that this is the reason why the records of their communications-intelligence successes have never come to light and that Confederate cryptanalysts kept their secrets to themselves? We know that the records possessed or taken by

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certain Confederate leaders have been gone over with great care and attention, but what happened to those retained by other Confederate leaders such as the Secretary of War Seddon, or his predecessor Judah P. Benjamin who later became Secretary of State, etc, etc? Here is a fascinating speculation and one which might well repay careful, painstaking research. I shall leave the delving into this speculation to some of you younger aspiring professional cryptanalysts who may be interested in undertaking such a piece of research and with this thought I bring this lecture to its close.

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beticity. I came across that message in a work-book in my collection, the work-book of one of the important members of the USMIC -- none other than our friend Plum, from whose book, The Military Telegraph during the Civil War, comes much of the data I've presented in this lecture. On the fly-leaf of Plum's work-book there appears, presumably in his own handwriting, the legend "W. R. Plum Chf Opr with Gen. G. H. Thomas". Here's one of the messages he enciphered in cipher book No. 1, the book in which, he says, more important telegrams were sent than in any other:

Fig 11

Note how many "arbitraries" appear in the plain-text message, that is before transposition. After transposition

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Fig 11

Note how many "arbitraries" appear in the plain-text message, that is before transposition. After transposition the melange of plain-text, code words, indicators and nulls makes the cryptogram mystifying.* And yet, was the system as inscrutable as its users apparently thought? It is to be remembered, of course, that messages were then transmitted by wire telegraphy, not by radio, so that enemy messages could be obtained only by "tapping" telegraph lines or capturing couriers or headquarters with their files intact. Opportunities for these methods of acquiring enemy traffic were not frequent, but they did occur from time to time, and in one case a Confederate signalman hid in a swamp for several weeks and tapped a Federal telegraph line, obtaining a good many messages. What success, if any, did Confederate cryptanalysts have in their attempts to solve such USMTC cryptograms as they did intercept? We shall try to answer this question in due time.

As indicated earlier, there were no competing signal organizations in the Confederacy as there were on the Union side. There was nothing at the center of government in Richmond or in the combat zone comparable to the extensive and tightly-controlled civilian military telegraph organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with such an iron hand from Washington. Almost as a concomitant it would seem, there was in the Confederacy, save for two exceptional cases, one and only one officially established cryptosystem to serve the need for protecting tactical as well as strategic communications, and that was the so-called Vigenère

*In searching for a good example my eye caught the words "Lincoln shot" at the left of the matrix and I immediately thought that the message had to do with Booth's assassination of the President. But after hurriedly translating the message and finding nothing in it having anything to do with the shooting it occurred to me to look up the indicators for a matrix of six rows and eight columns. They turned out to be LINCOLN (message of 8 columns), SHOT (6 rows). The word SMALL beneath the "Lincoln shot" is a variant for SHOT, also meaning "6 rows".

Cipher, which apparently was the cipher authorized in an official manual prepared by Capt J. H. Alexander as the partial equivalent of Myer's Manual of Signals. You won't find the name Vigenère in any of the writings of contemporary signal officers of either the North or the South. The signalmen of those days called it the "Court Cipher", this term referring to the system in common use for diplomatic or "court" secret communications about this period in history. It is that cipher which employs the so-called Vigenère Square with a repeating key.* Here is the square which Plum calls the "Confederate States Cipher Key" and which is followed by his description of its manner of employment:

Fig 12

To put into cipher the first message, which is put up by using "Manchester Bluff" as the key, and the second by the key term, "Complete Victory", find at the left-hand side of the table the first letter of the first word to be ciphered, and columns in which these letters are so found, will be seen the arbitrary letter with each successive letter of the message and key term, repeating on the latter till finished. Thus, "Sherman is victorious," put in cipher by using the first key, would read, as shown by the capitals, c-o-m-p-l-e-t--e-v--i-c-t-o-r-y. C-o-m-p- Of course, any change in the key
 U V Q G X E G MN D K V H F P K C G H
 word, term or phrase changes the arbitraries, and if neither the real message nor the key is known, it would be somewhat vexatious working it out, unless there were some such suggestive words as occur in Davis's message above, which indicate the ciphered words very clearly; e.g.,

"By which you may effect" o t p q g e x y k "above that part" h j o p g k w m c t
 a crossing of the river

This meaning occurred to the author, at first sight, and doubtless would be to any one familiar with military affairs in that section. Having guessed real words, it is very easy to work out the letters of the key. The following two important ciphers were transmitted as divided below; i.e., each word was sent separately, not all mixed, as in the Pemberton cipher. This division does not facilitate translation by the key at all, but materially assists without it, and was, therefore, bad practice. We give below, each message, with its translation, because these telegrams were very important. The curious reader may, at his leisure, by using the key board, study out the key terms, one of which will be found entirely new and quite apropos, in the light of what speedily followed.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, MILITARY TELEGRAPH, Dated Headquarters, February 25, 1865, Received at Richmond, Va., 12:25 AM.

TO HON. J. C. BRECKENRIDGE, Sec'y of War:--I recommend that the tsysmee fn qoutwp rfatvmy ubwaqbqtm exfvxj and iswaqjru ktmtl are not of immediate necessity, uv kpqfmbpgr mpc thnlfl should be lmghtsp.

(Signed)

R. E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--I recommend that the removal of public property, machinery, stores and archives which are not of immediate necessity, be commenced. All powder should be secured.

* A keyword is employed to change the alphabets cyclically, thus making the cipher what is called today a periodic or multiple-alphabet cipher controlled by the individual letters of a key, which may consist of a word, a phrase, or even of a sentence, repeated as many times as necessary.

HEAD-QUARTERS C. S. ARMIES, March 24, 1865.

GEN. E. KIRBY SMITH, comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept., Gen:--
 Vvg ecilmymppm rvcog ui lhommides kfch kdf wasptf us tcfsto
 abxc bix azjkhmgjsiimivbceq qb ndel ueisu ht kfg auhd egh
 opcm mfs uvajwh xrymcoci yu ddxxtmpt iu icjqkpxt es vvjau
 mvrr twhtc abxc iu eolcg o rdegx en ucr pv ntiptyxec rgvariyyb
 rgzq rspx rksjoph ptax rsp ekez raecdstrzpt mzmseb acgg nsfqvfv
 mc kfg smhe ftrf wh mvv kkgc pyh fefm ckfrlisytyxl xj jtbbx
 rq htcd wbbz awv fd acgg avxwzv yciag ce nzyfet igxa scuh.

I am most respectfully your obdt. servt.,

(Signed) R.E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--Gen: The president deems it advisable that you should be charged with the military operations on both banks of the Miss., and that you should endeavor as promptly as possible to cross that river with as large a force as may be prudently withdrawn from your present Dept. You will accordingly extend your command to the east bank of the Miss., and make arrangements to bring to thi-side such of your present force as you may deem best.

I am most respectfully your obedient servant.

There are certain comments to be made on the foregoing messages. In the first place, note that in the first message certain words are left unenciphered; in the second place, in both the first and second message, the ciphers retain and clearly show the lengths of the words which have been enciphered. Both of these faulty practices greatly weaken the security of ciphers because they leave good clues to their contents and can easily result in facilitating solution of the messages. We know today that cipher messages must leave nothing in the clear. Even the address and the signature, the date, time and place of origin, etc., should if possible be hidden; and the cipher text should be in completely regular groupings, first, so as not to disclose the lengths of the plain-text words, and second, to promote accuracy in transmission and reception.

So far as my studies have gone, I have not found a single example of a Confederate Vigenère cipher which shows neither of these two fatal weaknesses. The second of the two examples is the only case I have found in which there are no unenciphered words in the text of the message. And the only example I have been able to find in which word lengths are not shown (save for one word) is in the case of the following message.

Vicksburg, Dec. 26, 1862.

GEN. J.E. JOHNSTON, JACKSON:

I prefer oaavvr, it has reference to xhvkjqchffabpzelreqpzwnyk to prevent anuzeyxswstpjw at that point, raelpsghvelvtzfautlilaslt lhifnaigtmmifgccajd.

(Signed) J. C. PEMBERTON
 Lt. Gen. Comdg.

Even in this case there are unenciphered words which afforded a clue which enabled our man Plum to find the key and solve the message. It took some time, however, and the story is worth telling.

According to Plum, the foregoing cipher message was the very first one captured by USMTC operators, and it was obtained during the siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered on 4 July 1863. But note the date of the message: 26 December 1862. What was done with the captured message during the months from the end of December 1862 to July 1863? Apparently nothing. Here is what Plum reports:

What efforts General Grant caused to be made to unravel this message, we know not. It was not until October, 1864, that it and others came into the hands of the telegraph cipherers, at New Orleans, for translation

The New Orleans operators who worked out this key (Manchester Bluff) were aided by the Pemberton cipher and the original telegram, which was found among that general's papers, after the surrender of Vicksburg; also by the following cipher dispatch, and one other.

Plum gives the messages involved, their solution, and the keys, the latter being the three cited above. It would seem that if the captured Pemberton message had been brought to General Grant's attention and he did nothing about it, he was not much interested in intelligence. Secondly, the solution of the Pemberton message and the one message with its plain text (the Pemberton message) and two messages not only with interspaced plain-text words but also with spaces showing word lengths. But Plum does not indicate ¹ how long it took for solution. Note that he merely says that the messages came into the hands of the telegraph cipherers in October 1864; he does not tell when solution was reached.

In the various accounts of these Confederate ciphers there is one and only one writer who makes a detailed comment on the two fatal practices to which I refer. A certain Dr. Charles E. Taylor, a Confederate veteran (in an article entitled "The Signal and Secret Service of the Confederate States", published in the Confederate Veteran, Vol. XL, Aug-Sept 1932), after giving an example of encipherment according to the "court cipher" says:

It hardly needs to be said that the division between the words of the original message as given above was not retained in the cipher. Either the letters were run together continuously or breaks, as if for words, were made at random. Until the folly of the method was revealed by experience, only a few special words in a message were put into cipher, while the rest was sent in plain language. This . . . I think it may be said that it was impossible for well prepared cipher to be correctly read by any one who did not know the key-word. Sometimes, in fact, we could not decipher our own messages when they came over telegraph wires. As the operators had no meaning to guide them, letters easily became changed and portions, at least, of messages rendered unmeaningly (sic) thereby.

Frankly, I don't believe Dr. Taylor's comments are to be taken as characterizing the practices that were usually followed. No other ex-signalman who has written about the ciphers used by the Confederate Signal Corps makes such observations and I think we must simply discount what Dr. Taylor says in this regard.

It would certainly be an unwarranted exaggeration to say that the two weaknesses in the Confederate cryptosystem cost the Confederacy the victory for which it fought so mightily, but I do feel warranted at this moment in saying that further research may well show that certain battles and campaigns were lost because of insecure crypto-communications.

A few moments ago I said that, save for an exception or two, there was in the Confederacy one and only one cryptosystem to serve the need for secure tactical as well as strategic communications. One of these exceptions concerned the cipher used by General Beauregard after the battle of Shiloh (8 April 1862). This cipher was purely monoalphabetic in nature and was discarded as soon as the official cipher system was prescribed in Alexander's manual. It is interesting to note that this was done after the deciphered message came to the attention of Confederate authorities in Richmond via a northern newspaper: It is also interesting to note that the Federal War Department had begun using the route cipher as the official system for USMIC messages very promptly after the outbreak of war, whereas not until 1862 did the Confederate States War Department prepare an official cryptosystem, and then it adopted the "court cipher".

The other exception involved a system used at least once before the official system was adopted and it was so different from the letter that it should be mentioned. On 26 March 1862, the Confederate States President, Jefferson Davis, sent General Johnston by special messenger a dictionary, with the following accompanying instruction:*

I send you a dictionary of which I have the duplicate, so that you may communicate with me by cipher, telegraphic or written, as follows: First give the page by its number; second the column by the letter L, M or R, as it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-hand columns; third, the number of the word in the column, counting from the top. Thus, the word junction would be designated by 146, L, 20.

The foregoing as you no doubt have already realized, is one of the types of cryptosystems used by both sides during the American Revolutionary Period almost a century before, except that in this case the dictionary had three columns to the page instead of two. I haven't tried to find the dictionary but it shouldn't take long to locate it, since the code equivalent of the word "junction" was

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, New York: The Century Co., 1884, Vol. I p. 581.

given: 146, L, 20. Moreover, there is extant at least one fairly long message, with its decode. How many other messages there may be in National Archives I don't know.

Coming back now to the "court cipher," you will probably find it just as hard to believe, as I find it, that according to all accounts three and only three keys were used by the Confederates during the three and a half years of warfare from 1862 to mid-1865. It is true that Southern signalmen make mention of frequent changes in key but only the following three are specifically cited:

1) COMPLETE VICTORY 2) MANCHESTER BLUFF 3) COME RETRIBUTION.

It seems that all were used concurrently. There may have been a fourth key, IN GOD WE TRUST, but I have seen it only once, and that is in a book explaining the "court cipher". Note that each of the three keys listed above consists of exactly 15 letters, but why this length was chosen is not clear. Had the rule been to make the cipher messages contain only 5-letter groups, the explanation would be easy: 15 is a multiple of 5 and this would be of practical value in checking the cryptographic work. But, as has been clearly stated, disguising word lengths was apparently not the practice even if it was prescribed, so that there was no advantage in choosing keys which contain a multiple of 5 letters. And, by the way, doesn't the key COME RETRIBUTION sound rather ominous to you even these days?

Sooner or later a Confederate signal officer was bound to come up with a device to simplify ciphering operations, and a gadget devised by a Captain William N. Barker seemed to meet the need. Myer's Manual there is a picture of one form of the device, shown here in Fig. 13. I don't think it necessary to explain how it worked, for it is almost self-evident. Several of these devices were captured during the war, one of them being among the items in the NSA Museum (Fig. 14). But here's a photograph, Fig. 15, of the one found in the office of Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin after the capture of Richmond.

CIPHER DEVICE Fig. 15

How many of these devices were in existence or use is unknown, for their construction was an individual matter--apparently it was not an item of regular issue to members of the corps.

In practically every account of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War you will find references to ciphers used by Confederate secret service agents engaged in espionage in the North as well as in Canada. In particular much attention is given to a set of letters in cipher which were intercepted by the New York City Postmaster and which were involved in a plot to print Confederate currency and bonds. Much ado was made about the solution of these ciphers by cipher operators of the USMTC in Washington and the consequent breaking up of the plot. But I won't go into these ciphers for two reasons. First, the alphabets were all of the simple monoalphabetic type, a total of six althgether being used. Since they were composed of symbols, a different series for each alphabet, it was possible to compose a cipher word by jumping from one series to another without any external indication of the shift. However, good eyesight and a bit of patience were all that was required for solution in this case because of the inept manner in which the system was used: whole word, sometimes several successive words, were enciphered by the same alphabet. But the second reason for my not going into the story is that my colleague Edwin C. Fishel, whom I've mentioned before, has done some research among the records in our National Archives dealing with this case and he has found something which is of great interest and which I feel bound to leave for him to tell at some future time, as that is his story, not mine.

So very fragmentary was the amount of cryptologic information known to the general public in these days that when there was found on John Wilkes Booth's body a cipher square which was almost identical with the cipher square which had been mounted on the cipher reel found in Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin's office in Richmond. The Federal authorities in Washington attempted to prove that this necessarily meant that the Confederate leaders were implicated in the plot to assassinate Lincoln, and had been giving Booth instructions in cipher. Here's a picture of the cipher square found on Booth, and also in a trunk in his hotel room in Washington.

Fig. 15

The following is quoted from Philip Van Doren Stern's book entitled Secret Missions of the Civil War (Rand McNally and Co., New York, 1951, p. 320):

Everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher and that for a Confederate agency (which Booth is known to have been) to possess a copy of a variation of it meant no more than if a telegraph operator was captured with a copy of the Morse Code. Hundreds--and perhaps thousands of people were using the Vigenere. But the Government was desperately seeking evidence against the Confederate leaders so they took advantage of the atmosphere of mystery which has always surrounded cryptography and used it to confuse the public and the press. This shabby trick gained nothing, for the leaders of the Confederacy eventually had to be let go for lack of evidence.

To the foregoing I will comment that I doubt very much whether "everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher." Probably not one of them had even heard the name Vigenere or had even seen a copy of the table, except those captured in operations. I doubt whether anyone on either side even knew that the cipher used by the Confederacy had a name; or least of all, that a German Army reservist named Kasiski, in a book published in 1863, showed how the Vigenere cipher could be solved by a straightforward mathematical method.

I have devoted a good deal more attention to the methods and means for crypto-communications in the Civil War than they deserve, because professional cryptologists of 1961 can hardly be impressed either by their efficacy from the point of view of ease and rapidity in the cryptographic processing, or by the degree of the technical security they imparted to the messages they were intended to protect. Not much can be said for the security of the visual signaling systems used in the combat zone by the Federal Signal Corps for tactical purposes, because

they were practically all based upon simple monoalphabetic ciphers, or variations thereof, as for instance, when whole words were enciphered by the same alphabet. There is plenty of evidence that Confederate signalmen were more or less regularly reading and solving those signals. What can be said about the security of the route ciphers used by the USMC for strategic or highcommand communications in the zone of the interior? It has already been indicated that, according to accounts by ex-USMC men, such ciphers were beyond the cryptanalytic capabilities of Confederate cryptanalysts, but can we really believe that this was true? Considering the simplicity of these route ciphers and the undoubted intellectual capacities of Confederate officers and soldiers, why should messages in these systems have resisted cryptanalytic attack? In many cases the general subject matter of a message and perhaps a number of specific items of information could be detected by quick inspection of the message. Certainly, if it were not for the so-called "arbitraries" the general sense of the message could be found by a few minutes work, since the basic system must have been known through the capture of cipher books, a fact mentioned several times in the literature. Capture of but one book (they were all generally alike) would have told Confederate signalmen exactly how the system worked and this would naturally give away the basic secret of the superseding book. So we must see that whatever degree of protection these route ciphers afforded, message security depended almost entirely upon the number of "arbitraries" actually used in practice. A review of such messages as are available shows wide divergencies in the use of "arbitraries". In any event the number actually present in these books must have fallen far short of the number needed to give the real protection that a well-constructed code can give. Thus it seems to me that the application of native intelligence, with some patience, should have been sufficient to solve USMC messages--or so it would be quite logical to assume. That such an assumption is well warranted is readily demonstrable.

It was, curiously enough, at about this point in preparing this lecture that my friend and colleague of my NSA days, Mr. Edwin C. Fishel, gave me just the right material for such a demonstration. In June of 1960, Mr. Fishel had given Mr. Phillip Bridges, who is also a member of NSA and who knew nothing about the route ciphers of the USMC, the following authentic message sent on 1 July 1863 by General George G. Meade, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to General Couch at Washington:

(Message to be furnished) Fig. 17

It took Mr. Bridges only a few hours, five or six, to solve the cryptogram, and he handed the following plain-text to Mr. Fishel:

Thomas been it-----"Nulls"
 For Parson. I shall try and get to you by tomorrow morning a reliable gentlemen and some scouts who are acquainted with a country you wish to know of. Rebels this way have all concentrated in direction of Gettysburg and Chambersburg. I occupy Carlisle.
 Signed Optic. Great battle very soon. tree much deal "Nulls"

The foregoing solution is correct, save for one pardonable error:

"Thomas" is not a "null" but an indicator for the dimensions of the matrix and the route. "Parson" and "Optic" are code names and I imagine that Mr. Bridges recognized them as such but, of course, he had no way of interpreting them, except perhaps by making a careful study of the events and commanders involved in the impending action, a study he wasn't called upon to undertake.

The foregoing message was enciphered by Cipher Book No. 12, in which the indicator THOMAS specifies a "Message of 10 lines and 5 columns". The route was quite simple and straightforward: "Down the 1st (column), up the 3rd; down the 2nd; up the 5th down the 4th."

It is obvious that in this example the absence of many "arbitrariness," made solution a relatively easy matter. What Mr. Bridges would have been able to do with the cryptogram had there been many of them is problematical. Judging by his worksheets, it seemed to me that Mr. Bridges did not realize when he was solving the message that a transposition matrix was involved; and on questioning him on this point his answer was in the negative. He realized this only later.

A minor drama in the fortunes of Major General D. C. Buell, one of the high commanders of the Federal Army, is quietly and tersely outlined in two ciphers telegrams. The first one, sent on 29 Sept. 1862, from Louisville, Kentucky, was in one of the USMIC cipher books, and was externally addressed to Colonel Anson Stager, head of the USMIC, but the internal addressee was Major General H. W. Halleck, "General-in-Chief" [our present day "Chief of Staff"]. The message was externally signed by William H. Drake, Buell's cipher operator, but the name of the actual sender, Buell, was indicated internally. Here's the telegram:

COLONEL ANSON STAGER, Washington:

Austria await I is over to requiring orders rature blissful
 for your instant command turned and instructions and rough looking
 further shall further the Camden me of ocean September poker twenty
 I the to I command obedience repair orders quickly pretty.
 Indianapolis your him accordingly my fourth received 1862 wounded
 nine have twenty turn have to to to alvord hasty.

WILLIAM H. DRAKE

Rather than give you the plain-text of this message, perhaps you would like to work it out for yourselves, for with the information you've already received the solution should not be difficult. The message contains one error, which was made in its original preparation: one word was omitted.

The second telegram, only one day later, was also from Major General Buell, to Major General Halleck, but it was in another cipher book--apparently the two books involved were used concurrently. Here it is:

GEORGE C. MAYNARD, Washington:

Regulars ordered of my to public out suspending received 1862 spoiled thirty I dispatch command of continue of best otherwise worst Arabia my command discharge duty of my last for Lincoln September period your from sense shall duties the until Seward ability to the I a removal evening Adam herald tribune.*

PHILIP BRUNER

As before, I will give you the opportunity to solve this message for yourselves. (At the beginning of the next lecture I shall present the plain-text of both messages.)

Next you see a photograph of an important message which you may wish to solve yourself. It was sent by President Jefferson Davis to General Johnston, on a very significant date, 11 April 1865. For ease in working on it I give also a transcription, since the photograph is very old and in poor state. I believe that this message does not appear in any of the accounts I've read.

Fig. 18

To return to J. W. Brown, whom I've mentioned before and who gives us most of what little sound information there is about the cryptanalytic successes of both sides. First, let's see what the Union signalmen could do with rebel ciphers. Here are some statements he makes (p. 214):

The first deciphering of a rebel signal code of which I find any record was that made by Capt. J. S. Hall and Capt. R. A. Taylor, reported Nov. 25, 1862. Four days later, Maj. Myer wrote to Capt. Cushing, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac, not to permit it to become public "that we translate the signal messages of the rebel army".

April 9, 1863, Capt. Fisher, near Falmouth, reported that one of his officers had read a rebel message which proved that the rebels were in possession of our code. The next day he was informed that the rebel code taken (from) a rebel signal officer was identical with one taken previously at Yorktown.

He received from Maj. Myer the following orders:

*A curious coincidence--or was it a fortuitous foreshadowing of an event far in the future?--can be seen in the sequence of the last two words of the cipher text. The message is dated September 30, 1862; the New York Herald and the New York Tribune combined to make the New York Herald-Tribune on March 19, 1924--62 years later!

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