REF ID:A65573

RESTRICTED

## 1. AS-22 AS-14 1 Sept 48

TM 32-(). Radio Intelligence

- l. In general, this manual is inadequate for the purpose intended. It is too general for a technical or field manual and too technical for an introductory manual. However, the "technicalities" are only understandable to a reader already acquainted with the operations of radio intelligence.
- 2. It is suggested that the format could be materially changed. Tabular presentation of the organization and strength of the various RI units (T/O and T/E) would obviate the need for quite a bit of discursive text in the present version. The listing of duties of the various personnel is also susceptible to improvement in the way of simplicity and specificity. (The style, in general, would stand a great deal of improvement. Simpler sentence structure and less flowery language would make a much more readable and military document.)
- 3. A major criticism is the vagueness of the responsibility of the RI companies for local intelligence as against an "ASA requirement." The "ASA Sub-section," who supposedly will direct signal intelligence activity, is treated only sketchily toward the end of the paper. The entire problem of limited between army, air force, and naval signal intelligence, as well as decision as to what the RI companies will cover (the manual implies only ground force and commercial circuits, these last for ASA), is left untouched. TICOM reports have emphasized the close relation between army and air circuits even aside from air-ground limited nets. There are also naval, naval air, and naval-army limited circuits to be considered in the case of enemy landing operations, but there is no indication of this in the manual. One is left with the impression that the writer of the draft was thinking solely of the RI companies as a supplementary source of intercept for ASA, Washington, with only occasional secondary commitments for the local commander of troops.
- 4. At the operational level, as opposed to the strategic level of ASA requirements, there is conceivable room for tapping of wire communications, but this is excluded by definition of the manual as "radio" intelligence. The German I Service Handbook, in chart form, showed the subordination of signal intelligence regiments and their intercept facilities at army group, corps, army, and division, with indication of what level of traffic was worked on and what material was passed back to higher headquarters in each case. It is believed a profitable example. A definition of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence is believed highly desirable though adequate definition is lacking in the draft.




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TH 32-(), "Hadio Intelligence" (Continued)

- 5. Emphasis on the place of signal intelligence as one of several sources of intelligence is desirable. There should also be discussion of the kinds of intelligence available as collateral information for the RI companies and channels for them to secure this should be shown.
- 6. Intercept is almost solely limited to W/T, although R/T is mentioned and facsimile may be assumed to be included. The German definition (by Lt. Werther of LH Abt 353) may be cited, which said that "Signal intelligence is concerned with every manifestation in the radio spectrum."
- 7. In view of the German experience in monitoring agent traffic, mention should be made of the possibility of this requirement at the operational and tactical level. The German regular police, the Gestapo and the Abwehr, at the start of the war were responsible for detecting and eliminating all clandestine transmitters. A special organization, the Radio Defense Corps, was formed under the German Supreme Command (OKW/AgWNV/Fu III) for coping with agent transmitters in German occupied territory. Nonetheless, in 1944 the German Army was forced to pull one entire Signal Intelligence Regiment off of operational Russian Army systems and assign it solely to Russian agent and partisan traffic. All German testimony on the scale at which agents and partisans were used by the Russians indicates clearly that any FI manual should at least refer to this problem.
- 8. It is recommended that the manual undergo considerable rearrangement and treatment in line with the foregoing remarks. Further, it is believed that the manual should be entitled, "Interception and Direction Finding," which in turn should be Part I of an overall manual entitled, "Communications Intelligence." (See paragraph 10 below.) Other parts would be entitled, "Cryptanalysis," and "Traffic Analysis." It is very probable that certain more detailed sections of each part (to be written later) will have to have a higher classification than RESTRICTED.
- 9. The writer or writers of the manual should consult the following publications:
- a. Signal Corps Board Cases #166 and #200, "Goniometric and Intercept Development," especially Section VII thereof on operation of an Army Radio Intelligence Company (on file in AS-13).
- b. Histories of Radio Intelligence Units, European Theatre, (on file in AS-13).
  - c. German "Manual for the 'Y' Service" (on file in AS-14 TICOM).
  - d. Russian "Manual for Radio Intelligence" (on file in AS-14 TICOM).
- 10. It is further recommended that the terms "radio intelligence" and "signal intelligence" be scrapped and "communication intelligence" be substituted therefor, for the following reasons:



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TM 32-( ), "Radio Intelligence" (Continued)

- a. There are no longer any radio intelligence companies.
- b. The terms "signal intelligence" and "Communication intelligence" are synonymous (see ASA Glossary of Terms).
- c. Navy, USCIB and USCICC use "communications intelligence" exclusively, hence less confusion.
- d. The term "Signal Center" has been changed to "Communication Center" (Section X, Circular 216, D/A, dated 19 July 1948) snother instance of the trend.
- e. Will save space: the constantly recurring phrase "communication security and signal intelligence," can be shortened to "communication security and intelligence."

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WILLIAM F. FRIKDMAN Chief, Communications Research

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