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USCIB: 2/28

24

14 April 1953

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Release of CCM to the Turkish Government.

Enclosed for information is a copy of USCIB's
reply to the Chairman, LSIB, on the above subject.

H. D. JONES
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure
CIB # 00037 dtd
8 April 1953.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

CIB 00037

APR 8 1953

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, LONDON SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Release of CCM to Turkish Government

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 8 December 1952 respecting the release to the Turkish Government of CCM equipments for diplomatic communications (LSIB/317/52).

2. USCIB is pleased to learn that LSIB concurs in USCIB's decision to release the CCM to the Turkish Government. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that USCIB would not have taken this decision as it did but for the knowledge that LSIB had received adequate notice of the Turkish intentions. Despite this, however, it is regretted that LSIB was not directly informed of this matter before the USCIB decision was made. It is believed that the combination of circumstances attending these negotiations, as described below, may be informative and helpful in understanding the lack of official prior notice to LSIB.

3. On 25 April 1952, informal notification was received from the Director, GCHQ, via the British Liaison Officer in Washington, that "the Foreign Office have been informed by a member of the Turkish diplomatic staff that 50 cypher machines are being bought from the U.S.A." The British Liaison Officer advised that the Director, GCHQ, "would like to know, if possible, whether the Turkish statement is correct and if so what type of machine it is intended to supply."



5. The matter was placed before USCIB in July 1952. In weighing the advisability of aiding the Turks, USCIB gave careful consideration
 In view of prolonged U.S.-U.K.

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
EO 3.3(h)(2)

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discussions on this general problem in the past, USCIB felt that the



6. Based upon these considerations, a decision was finally made by USCIB in favor of assisting the Turks, and LSIB was advised of U.S. intentions in advance of any definite commitment to the Turks. In fact, the machines requested by them have not yet been provided nor has any other technical assistance been supplied.

7. With respect to your inquiry concerning "technical assistance as an alternate or supplement," the latter refers to changeable elements, instructions for operation, security regulations, etc., and even the possibility of providing keys and of wiring rotors. The former refers in particular to a paper and pencil cryptographic system as a substitute for a cipher machine. However, a suggestion that such a system might be used met with no interest on the part of the Turkish representative.

8. It is believed that neither the Turkish request nor the limited amount of crypto-equipment that we have offered will be sufficient to ensure safeguards against the use of other insecure Turkish systems. USCIB recommends, therefore, that this be considered as a separate problem which will have to be discussed between USCIB and LSIB once the effects of the provision of the CCM can be assessed.

9. USCIB

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desires to assure LSIB of its belief that, in addition to the requirement for agreement set forth in paragraph 5 above, consultation prior to action is desirable when questions arise concerning assistance

activities. It must be understood, however, that the decision to commit the U.S. Government to provide cryptographic assistance to Third Parties does not rest in USCIB. For this reason, USCIB cannot ensure that recommendations either for or against the provision of cryptographic assistance would prevail even though bilaterally-agreed to by USCIB and LSIB.

(Signed)

ALLEN W. DULLES

Chairman

United States Communications Intelligence Board

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605