

SPSIS-3

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Security of Communications

**TO: Commanding Officer
Signal Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.**

1. Reference is made to a memorandum issued by the Deputy Chief, MIS, dated 3 March 1945, subject: "Intelligence Concerning Security of Communications" (Tab A). A part of the first paragraph of this memorandum reads as follows:

"1. The Director of Intelligence, MIS is hereby charged with primary responsibility for conducting research in connection with material obtained from Ultra sources relating to (1) compromises of cryptographic systems employed by U. S. or Allied forces and (2) indications of enemy traffic analysis of U. S. or Allied communications."

2. After three months of working under this directive, it is believed that this part of it should be changed to vest primary responsibility for analyzing and synthesizing this material in a joint MIS-SSA committee since MIS personnel alone lack sufficient background and experience in communications, traffic analysis, cryptographic and cryptanalytic techniques. Thus, studies and reports would be prepared at Signal Security Agency with MIS assistance, but dissemination would still be a responsibility of MIS. Under the present arrangement, Signal Security Agency personnel have been working on these studies at MIS on an experimental basis. After SSA personnel have prepared the studies, the latter are then subject to delays in publishing and editing out of important phases by MIS personnel due to a different point of view and the aforesaid lack of experience.

3. In order to insure proper coordination in these matters between Signal Security Agency and MIS, and within Signal Security Agency itself, it is recommended that a permanent Joint SSA-MIS Committee be set up to consist of the following members:

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Director of Communications Research, Chairman
 Asst. Director of Communications Research, Deputy
 Representatives from MIS
 Security Division Liaison Officer to MIS
 Representative from Protective Security Branch
 Representative from T/A and Control Branch
 Representative from Communications Security Branch,
 Secretary

4. Broadly stated the functions of this committee would be to determine what studies are necessary, coordinate their preparation, and recommend their distribution. More details are given in the subsequent paragraphs.

5. Coordination will be necessary for the pertinent functions, which functions are recommended to be assigned as follows:

a. The assemblage of the complete information of the Japanese T/A results and their explanation in terms of standard T/A techniques. This should be the primary responsibility of the T/A section of the Intelligence Division, SSA.

b. The assemblage of the complete information of the Japanese cryptanalytic results, the identification of the Allied cryptographic system or communications practice referred to by the Japanese, and the determination of the correctness of the Japanese conclusions. This should be the primary responsibility of the Security Division, SSA, since this unit has access to the actual cryptographic systems and the communication practices employed as well as to collateral information (including any possible deception program which may be used).

c. The determination of the correctness of the information reported by the Japanese with respect to battle order, disposition, subordination, and operations of Allied troops. This should be the primary responsibility of MIS, since it has access to such information.

6. When the foregoing phases of analysis and synthesis have been completed, recommendations for corrective action would be made jointly, and the result, written up in usable form for the theater commander, would be disseminated through established MIS channels.

7. The process of analysis and the derivation of corrective recommendations should be applied to communications not only of a War Department echelon but to those employed in

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the Theaters, since the knowledge of such possible breaches of security, their analysis and possible corrective action may be available only in Washington.

8. There is attached hereto a draft of a letter to the Deputy Chief, MIS, which has the concurrence of MIS personnel concerned, implementing the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs, and which has attached thereto a revised directive to replace that of 3 March 1945.

1 Incl:

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
Director of
Communications Research

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