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TO: AS-20 AS-84 27 Jan 49

Memorandum for Record

Mr. Corry Ext 324

1. The undersigned attended a lecture with Mr. Richard C. Hix, CSGAS-73, at the National War College on 19 January 1949 on the subject "Electronic Countermeasures" delivered by Dr. Julian M. West. Dr. West was associated with the Air Force countermeasures program in the European theater during World War II.

2. Since I was not prepared to take notes, the information which follows is limited to my impressions of those opinions expressed by Dr. West which are considered of most interest to the Army Security Agency.

3. Dr. West, after pointing out that it was not his intention to provide his audience with technical details but rather to explain the role of countermeasures in modern warfare, began his talk with appropriate definitions and an account of outstanding examples of the use of Electronic Countermeasures during the recent war. His definitions conformed, in general, to those contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy Number 35. Details of examples he used can be found in the report on Radio Countermeasures by the National Research and Development Board.

4. Dr. West stated that, in his opinion, we need at very high level a committee on countermeasures charged with responsibility for all aspects of all sorts of countermeasures. He said this necessity results from the troubles countermeasures people had in carrying out their program during the war, particularly with: (1) G-2, (2) communicators, and (3) research and development people. He explained how intelligence personnel sometimes appeared unreasonable in their opposition to the countermeasures people. He indicated that, during the war, countermeasures were controlled by G-2 (a great mistake in his opinion) and that an intelligence officer was along on all countermeasures projects. It was explained that control of countermeasures was originally vested in G-2 on the basis that the field, originally known as Radio Countermeasures, was principally concerned with jamming of communications, which if performed indiscriminately would seriously affect a major source of intelligence. He then pointed out that this reasoning was invalid since most Electronic Countermeasures projects were directed against targets in frequency ranges which were not exploited by intelligence, giving as an example German VHF air-ground circuits, which could not be heard by intercept stations. A good laugh was obtained from his audience by the remark that clearance of Electronic Countermeasures programs with intelligence was always extremely difficult, not only because they would stand "pat" on general grounds of interference, without explanation, but also because it was usually pretty difficult to even find them in order to discuss a project. He said that RSM's in Europe found that they could be of great value in ECM reconnaissance programs, but requests initiated for authority to pursue such a program met strenuous objection in the theater on the basis that such tactical usage would interfere with the strategic missions of the RSM's. Approval for such tactical usage was finally

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obtained from here (presumably Washington). Still on relationship with intelligence, he said that what intelligence they (the countermeasures people) obtained in Europe, they obtained themselves. It is essential, he said, that intelligence and countermeasures work hand-in-hand, and that their activities be completely complementary.

5. As for difficulties with communicators, I believe, Dr. West indicated, their objections were probably on account of fear of retaliatory measures. He stated that our reason for not jamming German communications was because of the intelligence value of same. Probably for the same reason, he said, the Germans did not jam our strategical communications. This was probably a serious defect in German strategy, because our lines of strategical communications were so long that undoubtedly our efforts could have been considerably retarded by effective jamming. Dr. West further stated that security of communications will have increased to such an extent by the next war that the intelligence value thereof will be negligible, and, as a result, we can safely expect that our strategical communications channels will be completely and effectively subjected to jamming.

6. As for research and development, he believed that the cloak of secrecy surrounding new weapons retards development of countermeasures for such weapons and that, in his opinion, work on countermeasures should proceed with development of such weapons.

7. As additional support for the high-level committee, he said that ECM responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group, because superior people are required and there just aren't enough superior people to go around.

8. He stated that the development program in the field of ECM is progressing satisfactorily, but that the training program leaves such to be desired.

9. It was his opinion, based on recent intelligence reports, that Russian radar development is at least equal to that of the Germans in the last war.

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