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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 [pursuant to E.O. 13526

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MEMORANDUM to Chairman, USCIB

Subject: Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination of SIGINT.

1. It is recommended:

a. That a single unit be established under USCIB direction for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the fruits of signal intelligence activities of the Armed Forces.


b. That the foregoing central unit be located at the cryptanalytic center having the most effective collateral information center.

c. That a single SIGINT Summary be published on a weekly basis, suplemented by more detailed monthly and quarterly publication with cumulative indexes. The first few pages of each Summary should contain highlights for the busy reader.

d. That such special GLINT publications as are elaborated by the respective cryptanalytic processing centers or by the respective intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces, of the pepartment of State, or of the Central Intelligence Agenc; be also published and disseminated by the central unit.

. The reasons for the foregoing recommendations are st forth in Indl. 1.





3. It is requested that the foregoing recommendations be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB.

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Gen. Irwin.

1 Incl. Discussion

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DISCUSSION

1. a. There are now at least three publications which contain the final product of the signal intelligence activities of the Government and which are issued on a periodic basis. They are as follows:

- (1) The Diplomatic Summary, prepared and issued on a daily basis by the Department of State;
- (2) The Militar Digest, prepared and issued on a weekly basis by the Intelligence Division, U.S. Army; and
- (3) The Soviet Intelligence Summary prepared and issued on a weekly basis by the U.S. Navy.

b. In addition to the foregoing periodic publications containing GLAT material there are several others which are prepared and issued on a non-periodic basis, such as the following:

Prepared by (1)Special Reports Special Research Branch, Intelli-Order of Battle Studies (2)gence Division. Communication Intelligence Briefs) Dept.of the Army (3) (4) Special Reports) Prepared by havy (5) CSAW Handbooks Priared by Order of Battle Studies) (6) A Security Agency Special Studies (7) c. Finally, there are peric^c publications hich do not contain GLINT material t which often use Incl. 1]



such material as collateral sources of information. These are produced and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.


2. With reference specifically to the publications listed under Par. 14, it is only to be expected, and it is perhaps unavoidable, because they are produced separately by different agencies, that duplications of material or items of intellignce should appear from time to time. Such duplication, however, is not a particularly serious matter, and might even be considered desirable in some small degree. What is much more serious is that the intelligence coverage and the broad picture that might be painted from GLANT sources is not and cannot be painted b the present system of decentralized evaluation and descemination.

3. a. Taking up first the Diplomatic Summary, this polication, being on a daily-production basis, can only repeated at best a series of isolated items of intelligive. In fact, it is possible that the old adage to the effect that "one cannot see the forest for the trees" is opplicable in this case. Little atempt is made in the present Diplomatic Summary to concludate or integrate thisolated and seriatim items into comprehensive



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picture of the policies, diplomatic maneuvers, intrigues, and aims of other countries, as they are reflected by GLINT intelligence, which is by far the most reliable and timely source by means of which an accurate and <u>timely</u> estimate of the international diplomatic situation can be made.

In regard to the failure to paint a compreb. hensive picture of the sort indicated, the situation which now exists is not much better than that which existed prior to Pearl Harbor and which was censured in no uncertain terms by the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Upon the shoulders of those engaged in the SIGINT effort rests the tremendous responsibility of forewarning the proper authorities of the Government in all international crises. But if all the bits of information obtained from various SIGINT sources are not properly pieced together and fused with the many items from collateral intelligence to give a timely and complete picture, the SIGINT effort as well as the other intelligence effort will have been wasted if another Pearl Harbor catches, unawares.

4. a. It is estimated that the Army has an investment of about \$30,000,000 in the Army Security Agency plant, and an annual budget (FY 1949) of approximately \$22,000,000.

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Of this probably 80% is devoted to SIGINT operations. The Navy's investment and budget are probably not much different. Roughly, then, the plant investment is \$48,000,000, and the annual budget, \$35,000,000.

b. Basically, there are only two justifications for the foregoing large investments and expenditures. The first is that signal intelligence activities do not have their counterpart in civil life and cannot, in view of their complexities, be improvised de novo on the outbreak of war. It is therefore essential to maintain, in peacetime, establishments that will function effectively just before or immediately upon outbreak of actual hostilities, a condition which is today a technical prerequisite to SIGINT success for the duration of the war. This means that large plants and large numbers of technicians have to be maintained in peacetime and kept at a high level of efficiency. On this score, while it is believed that a fairly adequate job is being done, if that accomplishment represented the only fruit of the large investments and annual expenditures, the cost thereof could certainly be questioned and might be thought to be excessive. The other basic justification for the P. 4.





large investments and annual expenditures is the peacetime production of an intelligence picture of such timeliness, accuracy, and completeness as to give forewarning of impending momentous changes in the international situation.

When viewed in the light of the latter basic c. reson for maintaining the large staff and plant devoted to peacetime signal intelligence operations, the three items mentioned in par. 1 above are not believed to represent a product commensurate with the high cost thereof. It is probable that TIME. the weekly news magazine, operates on a smaller investment and budget than is represented above. But, TIME'S very existence depends upon the perfection of its product. If we are to continue to merit the confidence and approval of the highest governmental authorities, the SIGINT product must be as nearly complete and as perfect as we can possibly make it. It is largely upon the quality of this product that the value of our SIGINT operations in peacetime can be judged and defended by those who see only this part of the SIGINT effort from day to day.

5. a. A consolidation of the research facilities and personnel presently employed in the several separate agencies concerned with the evaluation and publication








of the SIGINT product would bring about greatly increased benefits and a much improved product. Such a consolidated or centralized organization would be more thorough, more efficient, and more economical than is now the case. Currently there are four agencies concerned; when the USAF begins SIGINT operations in its assigned portion of the field there will be five.

b. It may be pointed out in this connection that placing the cryptanalytic processing and the evaluation centers in close proximity to each other has three important advantages:

(1) Voluminous files of collateral information and special data are required for cryptanalytic processing and practically the same types of information and files are essential for the proper evaluation of the final GLENT product. If the <u>same</u> files were utilized for both operations they would serve a dual purpose, eliminating the need for duplicate, triplicate, or quadruplicate facilities, space, and personnel, as is now the case. Thus, there would be a considerable monetary saving.

(2) Cryptanalytic processing often requires the elaboration, collection, or development of special information for the immediate use of the cryptanalysts; similar information is later required for proper



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


evaluation of the final product, and must often be elaborated, collected, or developed by the evaluators. If the material elaborated for or by the cryptanalysts were also directly available to and used by the evaluators, time would be saved in publishing the final GLENT product, since much of the work that the evaluators must now do for themselves by way of collecting collateral information would have already been done in connection with cryptanalytic processing. Hence there would be an improvement in efficiency of the overall SIGINT operation, since the time required to produce the final results is a vital their element in max/value.

(3) The claser the cryptanalytic, collateral information, and evaluation personnel are to one another, the more effective are SIGINT operations as a whole, since the quick and unimpeded interchange of new ideas, new developments, and new directions of interest among all the personnel involved in those operations would improve their respective effectiveness.

6. a. A single, central organization for the control and dissemination of the final GLENT product would also be advantageous in at least three respects:

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(1) Such an organization would bring about economies in facilities, space, and personnel.

(2) The substitution of a single complete publication to replace the three or more separate and incomplete ones which are now disseminated to the President and to the various higher level officials of the Government would save the time of these very busy men, would demonstrate unification of operations within and among the responsible agencies, and would give a better overall picture of the international situation.

(3) It would be more efficient in proper control for the security of all operations.

b. The last-mentioned advantage deserves further comment. One of the important byproducts of a consolidation of SIGINT evaluation, publication, and dissemination agencies would be that the present wide dissemination of the individual items of intelligence in memographed, dittoed, or printed form, a condition fraught with great hazard to the security of the operations, would no longer be necessary, which would thus improve the security of all SIGINT operations, especially the cryptanalytic. This would not mean that individual messages or items of SIGINT would no longer be available to those who have a need therefor; it would simply mean that these items would be made available only on proper request or, if the

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central dissemination unit deemed an item to be of such character as to warrant immediate forwarding to the officials concerned, the item would be forwarded with expedition without such a request. As an example of the breadth of the present dissemination of the individual processed messages, Inclosure 1 shows the distribution given by the Army Security Agency to its product.

