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RESTRICTED

DATE 11 April 49

TO	FROM	TO	FROM
✓ Chief, ASA	(10)	Tech Staff	(96)
Asst to the Chief	(11)	Ch, Security Div	(80)
Co'r Joint Oper	(12)	Tech Staff	(81)
Deputy Chief, ASA	(20)	Ch, Materiel Br	(82)
Secretariat	(20)	Ch, Methods Br	(83)
Ch, Comm Res Sec	(14) ✓	Ch, Protective Br	(84)
Ch, Hist Unit	(18)	Ch, Maint Br	(85)
Ch, Pers Sec	(21)	Ch, Res & Dev Div	(70)
Ch, Org & Tng Sec	(22)	Tech Staff	(71)
Ch, Plans & Oper Sec	(23)	Ch, Ciph & Cif Br	(72)
Ch, Material Sec	(24)	Ch, Int Equip Br	(73)
Ch, Fiscal Sec	(25)	Ch, Electromech Br	(74)
Adjutant General	(26)	Ch, Lab Serv Br	(75)
Ch, Sec Cont Sec	(27)	Ch, Cryptologic Br	(76)
Ch, Operations Div	(90)	Ch, Electronics Br	(77)
Ch, Lab Br	(91)	Ch, Pers & Tng Br	(61)
Ch, Machine Br	(92)	Ch, Supply Br	(62)
Ch, Crypt Br	(93)	CO, Arlington Hall	(40)
Ch, Int Cont Br	(94)		
Ch, I & D Br	(95)		

- ( ) Approval & Return
- ( ) Information & File
- (✓) As Requested
- ( ) Recommendation
- ( ) Concurrence or Comment
- ( ) Signature if Approved
- ( ) Information & Forwarding
- ( ) Your Action by
- ( ) Information & Return
- ( ) For recommended reply

1. Herewith two papers.

a. Draft of ASA comment on proposed memo from C/S-USA to Joint Chiefs, Subject Establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau. Comment was coordinated with AS-20 and AS-90. Note that I make no reference to GLINT material in comment, in view of classification of basic paper, which perhaps purposely left GLINT out of the picture.

b. Proposed memo from D/I to Chairman, USCIB, Subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT. This paper, based upon the 1st draft which you already have seen, was worked over with two collaborators who shall be

anonymous and who, I think, did an excellent job.

2. Suggest both papers be presented to D/I with explanation that the 2d one has a bearing on 1st. The latter would make an excellent first step in a proper direction and would be most helpful to the 2d. Both plans, if executed, would supplement each other and put us a long way forward toward establishing a really efficient intelligence service. The last step would be to integrate and unify cryptanalytic processing and the three steps would put us at least on a par with British. (Draft attached)

J.

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D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Intelligence, GSUSA

SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT

1. Herewith is a proposed memorandum for the Chairman of USCIB, Subject :  
Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.
2. This paper has as its object the establishment of a single organization for the evaluation and dissemination of communication intelligence. It proposes to do for COMINT, at least in respect to the matter of evaluation and dissemination, the same thing that you propose for other intelligence in the paper on the subject: establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau.
3. A Joint Intelligence Bureau and a central organization for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT would complement each other in important respects and both steps would take the U.S. a long way forward in establishing a much more efficient intelligence service for the U. S. Government.
4. The final step would be, of course, the real integration of COMINT processing, by unifying the operations of the latter processing agencies under a single head, either along the lines proposed by the Army in the Stone Report or along similar lines.

CARTEP W. CLARKE  
Colonel, Signal Corps  
Chief, Army Security Agency

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB

SUBJECT: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. Under the present organization of US COMINT, the government is not provided with total intelligence derivable from COMINT source material.

2. A review of the present methods of producing and disseminating intelligence from this source indicates that radical changes in these methods must be made if USCIB is to fulfill all of its responsibilities.

3. a. A study has been prepared by ID, GSUSA, which examines present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination with the purpose of determining a method which will provide full exploitation of this source and insure maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy. In this study, the following recommendations are made:

(1) That a central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the USCIB technical agencies.

(2) That this unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U. S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

(3) That each USCIB member contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments and operationally subordinate to the Chief of the technical agency and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.

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(4) That upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.

b. The complete text of the study is attached as Inclosure 1.

4. It is requested that the recommendations made in this study be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB.

1 Incl.

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SUBJECT: maximum Exploitation of COMINT.

1. The Problem: To examine present US COMINT exploitation and dissemination in order to determine a method which will provide full exploitation of this source with the maximum efficiency, security, timeliness, and economy.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

a. The U.S. annually expends approximately \$35,000,000 for the technical production of COMINT raw material. It has roughly a \$48,000,000 plant investment in the facilities of the USCIB technical agencies, ASA, and CSAN.

b. Each of the members of USCIB maintains a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit. For the most part, the work of these five units is not coordinated and, to date, there has not been produced an integrated, comprehensive, COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. Under the present arrangement, there is no provision for the timely application of total COMINT to the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council or the policy planners of the departments of USCIB.

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### 3. Discussion

a. The unique and vital nature of COMINT and the cost of COMINT production require arrangements which can provide the United States with maximum exploitation of this source. The present arrangements for the evaluation and dissemination of COMINT preclude such exploitation. They are not efficient, not secure, and not economical, and, moreover, they fail to insure timely dissemination of intelligence.

(1) Efficiency: The five COMINT evaluation units produce and disseminate a number of publications covering fields of primary interest to their respective departments--e.g., the MILITARY DIGEST (Army); the SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (Navy); the DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY (produced largely by State under the authority of USCIB); ORDER OF BATTLE (Army, Navy, Air); and special studies (all departments). These publications contain evaluated COMINT on various subjects. Occasionally, the same raw material--evaluated from the point of view of the Department involved--is used as the basis for reports from two or more of the units. To date, there has not been produced an integrated COMINT estimate covering any given subject from the point of view of total U.S. intelligence requirements. For example, there is not available to the National Security Council a combined COMINT estimate of the military capabilities and industrial potential of the  Nor, under the present arrangements, could a combined estimate be produced with sufficient speed to make such an undertaking practicable, and policy level recipients of COMINT receive a variety of ~~GLINT~~ reports, which may duplicate, or conflict with, one another, and which the reader himself must synthesize.

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In addition to its separation from other COMINT units, each of the five evaluating units of USCIB functions more or less apart from the general intelligence units within its department and, of course, from the general intelligence units of the other departments. Such arrangements, although necessary for COMINT security under present conditions, inhibit rapid, direct application of collateral intelligence to COMINT and militate against the timely production of total intelligence on a given subject both within and among the USCIB members.

(2) Timeliness: Clearly, the value of all intelligence depends to a large extent on its timeliness. This is particularly true in the case of COMINT. A message indicating impending attack disseminated after the fact is of academic interest only. Under the present arrangements, however, the inevitable time-lag resulting from the separation of the five evaluating agencies from each other, and of each of them from one or both of the processing agencies, effectively reduces the chances of receiving such a message before it is too late to act. (It is assumed as a strong probability that no message will contain positive, self-evident indication of hostile intent--without evaluation on the basis of other information available at one or all of the intelligence units.) In addition, the separation of evaluating and technical units makes impossible the timely preparation of basic COMINT studies on subjects of joint interest and the maintenance of such studies at a current date level.

(3) Security: The distribution of COMINT raw material to five intelligence units in Washington presents an obvious physical security

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hazard. The separation of these units from the technical agencies requires the publication of individual message texts, notated so as to reveal the cryptographic system in which they were sent and the radio circuits from which they were intercepted—a practice which reveals the core of US COMINT operations: specific status of cryptanalytic attack. The possibility cannot be ignored that the rigid security measures adopted by the USSR are a direct result of the insecurity inherent in the present COMINT organization in the United States.

(4) Economy: The existence of five COMINT evaluating units results in excessive expenditures for personnel and equipment and considerable duplication of effort. This duplication of effort results in a dissipation of the limited, available, qualified manpower and limits the quality and quantity of COMINT produced. In addition, it creates the need for publishing many copies of the COMINT raw material, for a large courier service, for several files of the same material, and for the publication by the technical agencies of many items which could have been discarded at the first stage of processing if an evaluating group had been close at hand to guide the work of the technicians.

b. The establishment of a single COMINT evaluating unit, located at one of the USCIB technical agencies, would eliminate the disadvantages described in para. a., above, and would insure full exploitation of COMINT with maximum efficiency, timeliness, security, and economy.

(1) Efficiency

(a) Such an arrangement would provide, at the very least, the physical conditions necessary for collaboration among the COMINT evaluating personnel of the USCIB member agencies.

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(b) Basic COMINT evaluation would be improved, for the following reasons:

(i) The raw material would be evaluated at its source--an optimum condition for accurate intelligence production.

(ii) Integration of other source intelligence with COMINT would be facilitated. The technical agency, for its own cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of intelligence reports from all sources. The single evaluating unit, through the collateral files of the technical agency, would have direct access to the material from other intelligence sources now separately held by each of the five USCIB members.

(iii) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields of primary interest to each of the USCIB members would be improved by the proximity of evaluators to translators and traffic analysts.

(c) COMINT operations as a whole would be improved. The quick and unimpeded exchange of new ideas, new developments, and new intelligence or technical requirements would greatly increase the efficiency of both technical and evaluating personnel.

(d) Finished GLINT intelligence would be available for dissemination to policy-level recipients in a form designed to meet their needs--i.e., they would receive total COMINT on a given subject, in one synthesized report.

(2) Timeliness:

(a) The proximity of evaluating personnel to technical personnel would permit discarding of unimportant material at the earliest stages of cryptanalysis and, in so reducing the mass of material fully processed, would expedite the processing of vital material.

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(b) Basic intelligence studies of joint interest to all consumers could be expeditiously initiated and currently maintained.

(c) Elimination of the publication and delivery of many copies of COMINT raw material would substantially reduce the time lag between message solution and evaluation.

(3) Security:

(a) The dissemination of COMINT raw material outside the technical agencies would be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Knowledge of the degree of specific cryptanalytic success could more easily be limited to working personnel with the need to know and, in the case of evaluating personnel, confined to one installation.

(4) Economy:

(a) Discard of unimportant material at earliest stages of cryptanalytic processing would reduce the total cost of intelligence produced in relationship to total material processed.

(b) Publication costs would be materially reduced.

(c) Duplication of intelligence files, with its attendant uneconomical use of limited space and personnel, and unnecessary duplication of effort at the evaluation level would be eliminated.

4. Conclusions:

a. A central COMINT evaluating unit should be set up at one of the technical agencies, with the responsibility for producing all intelligence based on COMINT and disseminating all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

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b. Each USCIB member should contribute personnel to this center. Such personnel should perform the dual function of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.

c. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members should be dissolved.

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. A central COMINT evaluating unit be set up at one of the USCIB technical agencies.

b. This unit be responsible for the production of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publication and dissemination of all such intelligence to U.S. government personnel authorized to receive it.

c. Each USCIB member contribute personnel to this center, such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their respective departments and operationally subordinate to the Chief of the technical agency and to have the dual responsibility of producing total intelligence for the National Security Council and intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments.

d. Upon the establishment of the central unit, all existing COMINT evaluating units of the five USCIB members be dissolved.

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