## REF ID AS 855

Date 9 Jan

TO

Commanding Officer
Asst. Commandant
Dir. of Com. Research
Executive Officer
Asst. Executive Officer
Adjutant
Asst. Adjutant
Chief, Headquarters Branch
Coordination Section
Inf. and Liaison Section
Chief, A Branch
Chief, B Branch
Chief, C Branch
Chief, D Branch
Chief, E Branch
Chief, F Branch
Dir. of Training
2d Sig. Serv. Bn.
Property Officer
Personnel Officer
Provost Marshal
Post Engineer
Classified Mail Room
Secretary to C. O.
General Files
201 Files

Comments and Return
 Recommendations
Information
Information and Return
 Inf. and Forwarding
Your Information and File
 Signature, if approved
See Note on Back
 As Requested
As Discussed
Your Action

This draft is very satisfactory and should bring forth adequate comments. Please prepare for my signature. I don't see why a copy should go to Iravis. See Musee letters to file copy of letters to letters to Col C paddiesses + stagnes to Demotion

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REF ID: A56855 ARLINGTON HE STATION

FROM Commanding Officer Asst. Commandant Dir. of Com. Research Executive Officer Asst. Executive Officer Adjutant Asst. Adjutant Chief, Headquarters Branch Coordination Section Inf. and Liaison Section Chief, A Branch Chief, B Branch Chief, C Branch Chief, D Branch Chief, E Branch Chief, F Branch Dir. of Training 2d Sig. Serv. Bn. Property Officer Personnel Officer Provost Marshal Post Engineer Classified Mail Room Secretary to C. O. General Files 201 Files Comments and Return Recommendations Information Information and Return Inf. and Forwarding Your Information and File Signature, if approved See Note on Back As Requested As Discussed Your Action

REF ID: A56855

## **HEADQUARTERS ARLINGTON HALL STATION**

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER
ARLINGTON VA

8 January 1944

Dear Cmdr. Denniston:

Friedman has suggested a type of study which might be highly useful even though it would have to be recognized that it would obviously involve a good deal of guesswork. Maybe you have already made such a study and if so, we would be very appreciative of receiving a copy. If you haven't we would be very glad to collaborate with you. The study he proposes is as follows:

The importance of having definite information as to what the Germans and Japanese are reading of the diplomatic systems used by presently neutral governments such as Turkey, Portugal and Spain, is obvious because of the effect it would have on our own diplomatic negotiations with those neutrals. Assuming that the Germans and Japanese are satisfied that we are not reading their high-grade systems, which seems a very reasonable hypothesis, and using this assumption as a guide or a measure of the technical provess of their cryptanalytic staffs, which of the cryptographic systems used by the foreign offices of the currently neutral governments could they be expected to read? Which are they certainly reading? Which are they probably reading? And so on. Such a study would, of course, have to be correlated with data as to the extent and sources of raw material available to them; for example, it would be clear that traffic sent by land lines or cable and not within their physical reach would not constitute source material for them.

Of course, we do have a small amount of information on this subject, gleaned from reading certain German and Japanese messages. If the data were all assembled and evaluated they might make a good basis for elaborating on the subject which Friedman suggests. I would be very glad to have your comments on the foregoing.

Sincerely,

n PC

SECRET,