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13 April 1951Pages 1 - 29 incl.NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE COMMITTEE

on

THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC  
TREATY ORGANISATION SECURITY SYSTEM

Reference: a. D.C. 2/1  
 b. D.C. 2/2  
 c. D.C. 2/4  
 d. SGM-112-50  
 e. SGM-295-50

1. At enclosure is a report by the Military Representatives Committee to the North Atlantic Defence Committee on the proposed Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Security System.

2. This paper is primarily concerned with special security regulations necessitated by the introduction of COSMIC. Unless otherwise stated documents marked "NATO" will receive the same care and handling as laid down for national classified material in each Nation's own Security Regulations. In addition to the regulations laid down this paper will serve as a guide to the National Security Authorities when elaborating their national security regulations.

C.H. DONNELLY

V.H. PATRIARCHE

Secretaries

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~~CONFIDENTIAL-NATO~~ENCLOSUREREPORT BY THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

to the

NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE COMMITTEE

on

PROPOSED REVISION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC  
TREATY ORGANIZATION SECURITY SYSTEM

References: - a. D.C. 2/1  
b. D.C. 2/2  
c. D.C. 2/4  
d. SGM-112-50  
e. SGM-295-50

1. At its third meeting on 6 January 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Council approved the security system for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [D.C. 2/2 and D.C. 2/1]. The Council likewise approved the action of the Defense Committee in directing the Standing Group to proceed immediately with the implementation of the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization regulations for the security of information.

2. Appendix "B" to D.C. 2/1 provided for the establishment of a Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group, this committee to be responsible directly to the Standing Group but eventually to the Military Committee and the Defense Council.

3. In Appendix "A" to D.C. 2/1, there was set forth a proposed "Security Agreement" by the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that agreement has been executed by all of the member nations.

4. In D.C. 2/1 and SGM-112-50, provisions and regulations to cover COSMIC and NATO features of the security system were set forth.

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5. Experience having shown that there is a need for a revision of the security regulations and Standing Operating Procedures, the Security Coordinating Committee have reviewed the regulations, and partly also as a result of on-the-spot surveys of the operation of the security system in certain member countries and in central agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have prepared and submit at Appendix revised regulations.

6. The Appendix is intended to supersede D.C. 2/1 and Appendix "B" thereto, and D.C. 2/4, SGM-112-50 and SGM-295-50. Appendix "A" to D.C. 2/1, the General Security Agreement above referred to, and Annex "A" to Appendix "B" of D.C. 2/1, "Definition of Security Classification," will be continued in full force and effect and are incorporated in the Standing Operating Procedure to be read with the revised regulations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

7. The Military Representatives Committee recommend that the North Atlantic Defence Committee approve this Report.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL NATO~~APPENDIXBASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM  
FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. This document establishes the basic principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization security system, the purpose of which is to guarantee the application, by each NATO power, of the Security Agreement (Annex "A") executed by all nations signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. Detailed rules in the form of a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) designed to carry out the following principles are set up at Annex "B". This SOP will be used also in conjunction with the regulations governing the handling and use of cryptographic material provided for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

3. Establishment of Agencies to Control and Coordinate Security.

a. At the Standing Group Level: The Security Coordinating Committee. A Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group is constituted, composed of French, United States and United Kingdom representation. Security representatives of other member countries or spokesmen from Regional Security Committees will be called upon for assistance when necessary. The Security Coordinating Committee is responsible directly to the Standing Group for the supervision of security within the whole of the NATO system at all levels and for the periodic examination of the functioning thereof. Any security policy affecting NATO as a whole will require final approval at the Council level.

b. At the Regional Group or Major Command Level.

(1) The Regional Security Committees. Within each Regional Planning Group, a Security Committee is set up responsible to the senior organization of that Group. The

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Security Committee of each Regional Planning Group will meet as necessary to discuss any detailed security problems arising from Regional Planning. Where any policy problems arise, requiring a revision of or amendment to the standard security procedure or necessitating the coordination of security measures with another Regional Planning Group or central organization, the Regional Security Committee will submit recommendations for approval to the Security Coordinating Committee of the Standing Group subject, if necessary, to confirmation by higher authority.

(2) Each Commander, within his Command, is vested with the responsibility to maintain security in accordance with these regulations. He will designate an authority for the performance of these duties.

c. At the National Level: The National Security Authority.

Each member nation will establish a National Security Authority responsible for NATO Security within that country.

d. At the Agency Level: Each agency shall establish a security authority responsible for NATO security within that country and its National agencies abroad.

4. Definitions

a. "COSMIC". The word COSMIC has been designed as a security warning only. This designation shall, in addition to the appropriate security classification, be placed on all joint and national papers tabled at meetings of any body or committee set up under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which contain and reveal:

(1) Strategic or operational military appreciations, plans or decisions.

(2) Political-military appreciations, plans or decisions.

(3) Economic planning based on strategic military plans and decisions which could lead to disclosure of such plans and decisions.

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(4) Classified information of one country tabled or circulated by another country, unless the "owner" country agrees otherwise.

b. "NATO". On all other joint or national documents tabled or circulated within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the word "NATO" shall appear, together with the appropriate security classification. This "NATO" marking, however, does not require the special handling or accounting provided for "COSMIC" documents, other than as warranted by the security classification, and no special screening (as required for "COSMIC" personnel) is necessary for access to NATO documents.

5. Responsibility for placing the appropriate word "COSMIC" or "NATO" on documents, dispatches, etc., rests with the originating authority.

6. Grading and Downgrading.

a. Grading. Within the NATO Security System, documents will be graded TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED according to the contents. Responsibility for grading will rest with the originating authority. Standards for classification of documents in each of the security categories are set forth in Annex "C".

b. Downgrading. No COSMIC or NATO documents will be downgraded from their original security classifications without agreement of the originator. Similarly, no documents will have their COSMIC or NATO markings removed except on the authority of the originator. Issuing authorities will examine their documents frequently with a view to releasing them from the security system. The retention of rigid control over information which has become public property will lead to a clogging of the security machinery and will lessen the security value of the system.

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7. Principles of Distribution.

There will be no automatic distribution of any "COSMIC" document, and distribution shall be made on a need-to-know basis. It is required that:

a. At any time, it shall be possible to know who detains any given copy of any COSMIC document.

b. In no case shall a COSMIC paper be in the hands of an individual who has not been duly authorized to handle it.

c. The courier system shall be so organized that an individual authorized to transport a document can do so without knowledge of the contents of the document.

d. "NATO" TOP SECRET and SECRET documents shall be distributed with discretion on a need-to-know basis.

e. No electronic transmittal of COSMIC or TOP SECRET and SECRET "NATO" material will be made except by means of authorized cryptographic equipment.

8. Principles of Personnel Screening and Clearance.

Each national authority will be responsible for screening and clearance of all its nationals who have access to COSMIC information, be it in national or international agencies. These authorities will observe the following principles for screening and clearance:

a. Every individual authorized to have access to COSMIC material or information, shall be designated by name, and certified as positively cleared by the appropriate security authority.

b. The numbers of the above personnel shall be kept down to a workable minimum.

c. They shall have access only to such COSMIC information as is necessary to perform their functions.

9. Principles of Physical Security.

Detailed regulations are included in Annex "B" to

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to insure that in no case will an individual who has not been cleared for COSMIC have access to COSMIC information.

10. Safeguarding of COSMIC Material in Case of an Emergency.

Each member nation and agency has full responsibility in cases of emergency, internal or external, to safeguard, by timely destruction or otherwise, all registered COSMIC materials.

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Appendix to  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL - NATO~~ANNEX "A"SECURITY AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES TO  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

1. The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty having formed an organization for the purpose of uniting their military efforts for their collective defense, and realizing that the effective planning for this defense entails the exchange of classified information among the parties, agree that they will protect and safeguard the classified information of the others; will make every effort to insure that they will maintain the security classifications established by any party with respect to information of that party's origin; will safeguard accordingly such information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and will not disclose such information to another nation without the consent of the originator. This agreement applies to information disclosed by any party to another party on and after the date of acceptance of this agreement by the parties.

2. It is agreed in respect to classified information communicated by one party to another, that the recipient nation shall use its best endeavors within the framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically it is declared and agreed that:

a. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

b. Each party when so requested by another and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavors:

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(1) To have maintained in secrecy and patent application in the recipient country in respect of information for so long as may be desired by the party of origin, and

(2) To supply upon request of the originator reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

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annex "A"  
to appendix

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for the

SECURITY SYSTEM

of the

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. This Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) supplements and amplifies the foregoing paper which establishes the basic security principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and shall be read in conjunction with SGM 201-50 of 20 July 1950, containing the regulations governing the handling and use of cryptographic material provided for the Treaty Organization.

2. It is intended that this SOP be given a wide distribution throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. All personnel dealing with COSMIC material must be fully cognizant of these principles and regulations.

3. "COSMIC" Registries

Each Command Headquarters, Regional Group, Member Nation and Agency will set up a central COSMIC registry and distributive machinery to handle COSMIC documents. One end of this organization will be set up at the parent location with sub-registries as required. No COSMIC material will be passed except through registry channels. NATO documents, if desired, may be handled in the same manner as COSMIC documents. No documents other than NATO or METRIC (the Western Union security procedure) shall be filed or permanently co-mingled with COSMIC material. No personnel other than those cleared for COSMIC shall have access to restricted registry areas.

4. No new registry shall be set up without the prior approval of the Security Coordinating Committee.

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Annex "B"  
to Appendix~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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#### 5. Distribution Lists

There will not be an automatic distribution, according to security grading of any "COSMIC" documents, and distribution will be made by the responsible secretariat or authority on a need-to-know basis. Such distribution should be prescribed separately for each individual document according to its subject matter. Where a particular document is tabled by an individual member country, the representatives of the other countries should, if required, be in a position to state what distribution of the document will be essential as far as their countries are concerned and this will be jointly agreed. NATO Top Secret and Secret documents should be distributed with discretion on a strict need-to-know basis.

#### 6. Distribution Procedure

a. All documents having been graded with the appropriate security classification and distribution agreed will be produced in the requisite quantity of numbered copies by the responsible Secretariat or authority, which will also assign a reference number for registration purposes which does not disclose any indication of the contents. The Secretariat will then issue the requisite number of copies to each Treaty Delegation or Body against receipt. The receipt should quote only the serial and reference number of the document and not its title. No "COSMIC" document will be copied or paraphrased in full except upon authority of the originator or the Control Officer of a registry receiving a "COSMIC" paper via radio electronic transmission.

b. Where "COSMIC" telegrams and NATO Top Secret and Secret telegrams are distributed internally by the responsible authority, the distribution will be made on a need-to-know basis.

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c. Whenever a COSMIC document is transmitted by electronic channels the message should include a block of copy numbers under which the paper is to be distributed. Moreover when application is made to the originator for permission to distribute additional copies, the originator in granting permission should state the copy numbers to be given to the additional copies when distributed. Within the Treaty Organization departments receiving "COSMIC" documents may include extracts therefrom, so far as is necessary, in papers prepared requiring action by subordinate branches or persons who have not been authorized to handle "COSMIC" documents.

#### 7. Control Officers

The Control Officer for each registry shall be responsible for the secure storage of "COSMIC" papers received therein and for ensuring the distribution laid down for each document. These registries will be responsible also for the security of all "COSMIC" documents in transit and for obtaining receipts at all hand-over points so that the progress of the package can be traced throughout.

8. Each Central "COSMIC" Registry will publish periodically a list of COSMIC Control Officers and alternates and will distribute copies of this list to all other Central Registries and interested sub-Registries through the Standing Group. Any changes of COSMIC Control Officers will be reported promptly to Central Registries, together with authorized signatures. Central Registries will maintain a list of signatures of Control Officers and alternates of their sub-Registries, and also numbers of all nationally cleared COSMIC personnel, (names of nationally cleared COSMIC personnel will be maintained in the respective sub-Registries). Reports of changes of personnel authorized to handle COSMIC material shall be made as promptly as possible to the appropriate Central Registry.

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### 9. Inventories of Documents

There shall be held on 1 July of each year an inventory of all "COSMIC" documents. A second annual inventory on 2 January is desirable. In addition control officers should carry out frequent unannounced checks of documentary series. The July inventory shall be conducted by each responsible Registry as to all documents charged out by that registry. When any document cannot be accounted for, the procedure set forth in para. 20 hereof shall be followed.

### 10. Destruction of Documents

Surplus or no longer needed "COSMIC" papers may be destroyed by burning on authority of the Control Officer concerned. For destruction of all papers in an emergency see para. 25 below. A certificate of destruction will be executed by the Control Officer or alternate actually performing the destruction and one copy thereof will be forwarded to the appropriate Central Registry where records of all destruction will be maintained. Attention is invited to Para. 11 of S.G.M.-201-50 of 20 July 1950, regarding destruction of cryptographic material.

11. To ease the task of the Secretariats and to lighten the loads of Registries, the final edition of a document will indicate the preceding documents which the final edition has superseded and which may therefore be destroyed.

### 12. Microfilming

In order to clear space in Registries, microfilming of documents is permitted for record purposes. Microfilms must be accorded the same security as the original documents.

### 13. COSMIC Personnel

Each National Security Authority will be responsible for selecting and certifying cleared personnel, by name (including individuals contributed by that Nation to a NATO International

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Secretariat and delegates to Central Bodies and Agencies) who may have access to COSMIC papers. The number of persons cleared to handle "COSMIC" papers must be kept strictly to a workable minimum but will include secretaries, typists, Registry personnel and messengers, as well as executives. Cleared personnel shall be required to sign a document drawing attention to their special responsibility for safeguarding COSMIC information and the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of the country provides if, either by intent or negligence, they allow it to pass into unauthorized hands. Only cleared personnel shall have access to COSMIC registries and other offices dealing with COSMIC affairs. Personnel visiting any Departments other than their own on COSMIC business, either in their own country or abroad, shall first determine from their department whom they may contact. The visit will then be cleared by the Department from which the visit originates before the person concerned actually makes the visit. The visitor, on arrival, shall produce credentials to prove his identity and to show that he has COSMIC clearance.

#### 14. Transmission

COSMIC information and documents may be transmitted by only two means:

- a. By accompanied bag.
- b. By cryptographic arrangements as indicated in para.

17 below, which should only be utilized when time does not permit the use of accompanied bag.

#### 15. Courier Transmission

When COSMIC material is transmitted by courier, the outer envelope will be addressed to the known permanent address of the COSMIC registry of the Department or agency concerned.

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The word "COSMIC" will not appear on the outer envelope. The inner envelope shall be plainly stamped with the word "COSMIC" and only the COSMIC Control Officer (or his alternate) of the Registry concerned, shall open and receipt for the COSMIC document(s) enclosed therein. Each outer envelope shall be franked with a package number for receipting purposes. Separate receipts will be contained in the inner envelope for each document and will be returned to the issuing Secretariat signed by the Control Officer or his alternates. An authorized governmental courier pouch may be considered the "outer envelope" for the above purposes, provided the regulation in paragraph 7 of the Enclosure and paragraph 13 above are complied with. Rules for local distribution are contained in paragraphs 21 and 22.

16. Motor or other vehicles containing COSMIC documents will never be left unattended.

17. Electrical Transmission

The special cryptographic arrangements which have been provided will enable national delegates or their national diplomatic representatives at the seat of all NATO bodies to communicate with their Governments and will allow inter-communication between all NATO Secretariats. Similar arrangements will be made to allow supreme Commanders to communicate with Naval, Military and Air Commanders and Service Ministries. The only cryptographic system to be used for the present time at these levels for COSMIC communications of all security classifications and NATO communications classified TOP SECRET or SECRET is Typex Mark II with simplex settings.

18. Press Releases

Where no joint communique on any COSMIC topic has been agreed by the Committees concerned, individual member countries wishing to make a release to their own press will obtain clear-

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ance from the Secretariat before doing so. No classified information may be the subject of a press release. In the event of it being desired to release classified material to the press, it must first be declassified by the originating authority. The Secretariat of each North Atlantic Treaty body or committee will normally be responsible for seeing that this is enforced. Where, however, any Committee is meeting for any reason away from its normal location, the security authority of the host country will be responsible for taking all possible precautions to prevent leakage of classified information through unauthorized press releases.

#### 19. Military Security Committees

Outside the COSMIC Security procedure, it will eventually be necessary for the members of NATO to exchange detailed information and material which, although it has a classified security grading, cannot be limited in the same way as COSMIC information for the reason that to be of practical use it must be widely distributed. For example, classified training manuals or weapons being standardized for use by all member nations but the property of one member will have to be used for training. Similarly, member nations may offer to accept or exchange students or observers for special courses. In order to safeguard this type of information, Regional Planning Groups will set up Military Security Committees as and when necessary. The function of these Military Security Committees will be to satisfy the Regional Planning Groups, and eventually the Standing Group and the Military Committee, that security standards in the Service Departments and Forces of all the member nations are adequate to allow a confident exchange of any classified information and material not suitable for handling within the COSMIC procedure.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL NATO~~GENERAL SECURITY PROVISIONS20. Custody

Any person receiving a COSMIC or NATO document shall be responsible for its safe custody and shall ensure that at all times, when not in use, it is securely stowed. When the holder of a document no longer has use for it, he should return it to the responsible Registry. Whenever such a document is lost, misplaced, or compromise suspected, the person charged with its safe custody should immediately inform the responsible Security Officer so that an investigation may be started at once. Attention is invited to paragraph 10 of SGM-201-50 of 20 July 1950 regarding action to be taken in the event of loss or suspected compromise of any cryptographic material. All COSMIC documents will be kept in three-combination steel safes or their equivalent. Safe combinations should be changed periodically at intervals of not less than six months and whenever there is a change in personnel or compromise has occurred or is suspected. Special precautions should be taken to prevent safes being left closed but unlocked.

21. Distribution

Strict adherence to good security practice is necessary in the distribution of COSMIC and NATO documents within departments, between departments in the same city, and between cities in the same country or in another country. Classified information has, of course, frequently to be conveyed by word of mouth. No formal system of security will prevent indiscreet conversations, but a sense of responsibility and discretion must be instilled into those who have to be let into secrets. They must be educated not to discuss secrets outside their offices, never

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to talk about them in their offices in the presence of strangers, and in no circumstances to mention them over the telephone or other electrical transmission device.

## 22. Buildings

Buildings must be secure. The following practices are recommended:

a. Control of entrances. This includes the closing of unessential entrances, the barring of windows and other means of entry and the provision of alert doorkeepers to guard authorized entrances.

b. Pass Systems. The issuance of passes should be controlled in that they shall only be issued to those who really need them; that the holders are instructed to return them when they no longer require them, and that a record of the holders is kept. Passes should be made valid for a specified period only (say 12 months) when they should all be called in and new passes of a different design or color issued. Passes should bear the signature of the holder and should preferably include his photograph and at least one fingerprint.

c. Control of Visitors. Visitors, whether official or unofficial, who do not hold passes should be allowed access only on registering in writing their name, title, address and official to be visited, with the doorkeeper and should be provided with a temporary pass valid only for that particular visit. This pass should include the visitor's name and the name of the official who is being visited. Before being allowed beyond the entrance or reception desk, the doorkeeper should check with the official whom the visitor wishes to see that he is willing to receive him. Thereafter the visitor should be escorted to the official's

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room by a messenger and the official should be made responsible for conducting the visitor back to the building entrance when the interview is concluded and for signing and handing in the temporary pass issued on entering.

d. Office Security. Rooms should be locked when left empty or all classified documents securely stowed. When a visitor is received, classified documents should not be left where they can be read by the visitor.

The senior official in each office will be personally responsible for the security of that office. He will cause inspections to be made after the close of business to determine that all classified documents are securely locked away; that safes, filing cabinets, lockers, desks and any other containers are properly locked; that windows, bars and doors are secure; that alarm systems are turned on; and that classified waste paper has been gathered up for burning.

When it is necessary for classified documents to be passed from one official to another in the same building, they should either be taken by hand by the official or, if given to messenger, should be enclosed in envelopes. Documents conveyed between buildings should be suitably enclosed.

Night watchmen who must have been screened should be provided, and they should regularly patrol the building throughout the night. They should check that all safes and cupboards are locked and that no classified documents or waste paper have been left lying about in offices. Keys of room doors, safes and file cabinets should never be removed from the building and, at night, should be deposited at some central point where they are under the control of a specially selected Duty Officer.

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23. Consideration must be given to the possibility of a grave emergency suddenly arising which will require prompt and effective action for the destruction of COSMIC documents. Such an emergency may be created by subversive elements within a country, or by armed assault from without.

24. It is not practicable to lay down comprehensive instructions or regulations for specific and uniform application throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, distributed documents must be considered the property and responsibility of National and/or Regional and Central agencies and Command Headquarters.

25. Copies of all "COSMIC" and "NATO" papers that have been tabled and circulated to member nations and agencies are, of course, also held in the files of central body secretariats, so that the loss by destruction of such papers in a National Registry will pose no insolvable problem. However, Control Officers of all Registries are authorized to microfilm documents, and to insure that in emergency all COSMIC and NATO documents held will be destroyed without reference to originating bodies. One over-all destruction certificate shall be submitted to each interested Secretariat.

26. National Security Authorities and Regional Security Committees should, therefore:

a. Consider the problem and devise such emergency security plan as is best adapted to local conditions in coordination with National Security Authorities on the spot; and

b. Promulgate, within their respective organizations, such instructions as are considered necessary to prevent COSMIC papers, correspondence, cyphers, and equipment from falling into hostile hands.

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Information and material (matter), the security aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to our nations shall be classified as TOP SECRET.

The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded TOP SECRET.

a. War plans and plans or particulars of future major or special operations.

b. Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with a above.

c. Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.

d. Information of the methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services or which would imperil our secret agents.

e. Certain specialized techniques or methods which may be used in future operations, and the identity and composition of certain units, wherever located, which are especially intended for employment of such techniques or methods.

f. Critical information of new and important munitions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.

g. Important particulars of communication intelligence, communication security, and associated devices and material.

h. Photographs, negatives, diagrams or models of TOP SECRET matter.

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1. Certain compilations of data or items which individually may be classified SECRET or lower when the aggregate of the information contained warrants the higher classification.

2. ~~SECRET.~~

Information and material (matter), the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of our nations, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified as SECRET.

The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded SECRET:

- a. Particulars of operations in progress.
- b. Plans or particulars of operations, or war plans, with necessary enclosures thereto, not included under TOP SECRET.
- c. Instructions regarding the employment of important new munitions of war, including scientific and technical developments.
- d. Important improvements to existing munitions of war until accepted for service use including scientific and technical developments.
- e. Information relating to new material including material of the type described in 2 above.
- f. Information of the type described in 2 above concerning specific quantities of war reserves.
- g. Development projects of the type described in 2 above.
- h. Information of enemy or potential enemy material or other material, procedure, dispositions, and activities, the value of which depends upon concealing the fact that we possess it.

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i. Reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.

j. Vital military information on important defenses.

k. Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.

l. Communication intelligence information and important communication security devices and material of the type described in 2 above.

m. The following military maps and aerial photography:

(1) In the limits of our countries, those showing vulnerable points or vital installations.

(2) In overseas possessions or foreign territory occupied by our forces, those showing the layout of permanent defense works and naval bases, other vulnerable points or vital installations, and the adjacent terrain vital to their defense; and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element which discloses functioning characteristics of permanent defense works and naval bases.

(3) Aerial photographs and negatives of foreign areas when necessary to protect the source or to accord with conditions imposed by the foreign country concerned.

(4) Maps, relief maps, charts and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by the content thereof and not by the classification of directives ordering its accomplishment.

n. Information indicating the strength of our troops, air and naval forces, identity or composition of units or quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto in active theaters of operation except that mailing addresses will include organizational designations.

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o. Certain new or specialized techniques or methods to be used in future operations, the identity and composition of units, wherever located, which are especially intended for employment of such techniques or methods.

p. Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of SECRET matter.

q. Certain compilations of data or items which individually may be classified CONFIDENTIAL or lower when the aggregate of the information contained warrants the higher classifications.

### 3. CONFIDENTIAL

Information and material (matter) the unauthorized disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of our nations, or would cause unwarranted injury to an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded CONFIDENTIAL:

a. Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard.

b. Routine operational and battle reports which contain information of value to the enemy but are not vital interest to him.

c. Routine intelligence reports.

d. Military radio frequency allocations of special significance or those which are changed at frequent intervals for security reasons.

e. Military call sign assignments of special significance which are changed at frequent intervals for security reasons.

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f. Information which indicates strength of our troops, air and naval forces, identity or composition of units, or quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto in areas adjacent to active theaters of operations.

g. Technical documents and manuals, of the type described in 3 above, used for training, maintenance and inspection of important new munitions of war.

h. General tactical lessons learned as a result of operations which it is desirable to withhold from any foreign nation.

i. Information relating to the design and development of new material of the type described in 3 above.

j. Communications intelligence information, security publications and security devices and material of the type described in 3 above.

k. The following military maps and aerial photography:

(1) In the continental limits of our countries, those showing layout of the permanent defense works and naval bases considered important to our defense, and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element of such permanent defense works and naval bases, except that when the complete map of a defense area consists of more than one sheet, only those sheets showing defense elements need be classified as CONFIDENTIAL.

(2) In overseas possessions and foreign territory occupied by our forces, those not classified as SECRET, showing layout of military and naval radio stations, air bases, airdromes, air depots, supply bases, arsenals, proving grounds, or any area important to defense.

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(3) Aerial photographs and negatives of foreign areas when necessary to protect the source or to accord with conditions imposed by the foreign government concerned.

(4) Maps, relief maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by the content thereof and not by the classification of directives ordering its accomplishment.

l. Technical information, of the type described in 3 above, such as of research or processes of manufacture which may be a distinct military asset and not a matter of general knowledge.

m. Information and records compiled at the request of any Department of the National Military Establishment for its use in the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of industrial organizations essential to war-time needs.

n. Information of the type described in 3 above relative to specific quantities of war reserves.

o. Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of CONFIDENTIAL matter.

p. Certain compilations of data or items which may individually be classified RESTRICTED or be UNCLASSIFIED when the aggregate of the information contained warrants the higher classification.

4. RESTRICTED

Information and material (matter) which requires secur-

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ity protection, other than that determined to be TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL, shall be classified as RESTRICTED.

The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded RESTRICTED:

a. Information indicating the strength of our troops, air and naval forces, identity or composition of units, or the total quantity of specific items or equipment pertaining thereto in areas remote from active theaters of operations.

b. Training and technical documents for official use only or not intended for release to the public.

c. Photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of restricted matter.

d. Parts of mobilization plans and regulations of the type described in 4 above.

e. Documents relating to the design and development of new material or other material of the type described in 4 above.

f. Procurement plans of type described in 4 above.

g. Communication security devices and material of the type described in subparagraph 4 above.

h. Certain documents regarding engineering principles and design details, composition, methods of processing or assembling, which are vital to the functioning or use of an article of material.

i. The following military maps and aerial photography:

(1) In our countries, those showing military and naval radio stations, air bases, airdromes, air depots, supply bases, and arsenals, considered important to our defense.

(2) During times of active hostilities, photographs and negatives not otherwise classified of territory

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under our or enemy control in or adjacent to active theaters of operation, and to territories under our control remote from active theaters of operation.

(3) Maps, relief maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from aerial photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used. Classification of aerial photography will be determined by the content thereof and not by the classification of directive ordering its accomplishment.

j. Certain compilations of data on items which may individually be unclassified when the aggregate of the information contained warrants a classification.

k. Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.

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to the

HOLDERS OF D.C. 2/7

CORRIGENDUM

Holders of D.C. 2/7 (The Proposed Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security System) are requested to make the following amendments:

- a. On page 5, Appendix to Enclosure, add to the last line of paragraph 3 c, "and its National Agencies abroad."
- b. On page 5, Appendix to Enclosure, in the third line of paragraph 3 d, delete "country and its National Agencies abroad" and insert "agency."
- c. On page 11, Annex "B" to Appendix, in paragraph 3, line two, insert the word "NATO" before "Agency."
- d. On page 13, Annex "B" to Appendix, in paragraph 8 delete the word "Central" in the last line.

C. H. DONNELLY

E. B. W. CARDIFF

P. L. de MONTJAMONT

Secretaries

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