
TOPSICHT

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

101st USCIB Meeting

TOP ESSECUT
Item 4 COMINT RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
PACKUROUND // // //
2. On 29 December 1953 Director, GCHQ requested, on behalf of ISIB, approval of USCIB to an extension of the present SIGIMT co- operation between the U.K. and ISIB proposed to supply in
addition to providing equipment. It was hoped that extended of the
service would enable the U.K. to renew pressure on the for
nore In fact, the possibility of and the U.K. was suggested.
or and the U.K. was suggested.
3. At the 100th Meeting of USIB on 11 February 1954, the Director, MBA, in executive session, reviewed the background of U.S. COMINT relations with the and distributed two papers: (1) The request of Director, UCHQ for an extension of the SIGHT arrangements with (2) An Aide Memoire prepared by Director, MSA summarising the history of U.S. COMINT arrangements with 4. In the Aide Memoire, the Director, MSA, recommended that: (a) USCIB approve the LSIB request for an extension of the SIGHT arrangements with and (b) USCIB approve in principle
CURRENT CONSIDERATION
6. On 8 March, Director, MSA forwarded the LSIB request for USCIB semaideration at this meeting, with a recommendation that the Board seneur (USCIB 29.17/1). He stated that he would not forward USCIB's views until after he had heard from GCHQ on his



was something and and the me divine their ever

EO 3.3(h)(2)

OGA

TOP BECRET

	the tentative Minutes of the Executive
	is Agency has already substitted certain
Middlications to these Minutes.	
A .	
	from EUSIO that the GCSO response to
	omplicated by a //
approach to the RAF.	/_
	The matter is further
complicated, according to BUBLD.	by the fact that GCHQ has had no reply
from us on their	. It appears that a firm GCHQ reaction
	delayed until USCIB's views on the
are received in	London; //
	4. 4.4
	to determine unofficially the reaction
	ector's recommendations (set forth in
	obtaining USCIB approval in principle
	ent. As a consequence, it is not feasible
	this facet of the problem. It is
doubtful that any decision will be	reached at this meeting.
consider the LSIB request (USCIB ament proposed by the British vould have proposed to furnish the seem to be in the best interests amutual agreement on an as well as with Although decision until after the British received, such a course of action (assuming it is favorable) will he in an effort to obtain favorable	is no longer feasible. USCIB's decision we to be transmitted to ISIB promptly
RECOMMENDATION	
11. It is recommended that the	ne Board first consider the LSIB request
	ion has been reached on this item, it
	encouraged to express their views on
the proposals for a U.S	COMINT agreement.
	-

29 April 1954

EO 3.3(h)(2) RL 86-36/50 USC 3605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: 102nd Minutes of USCIB

- 1. Attached minutes of 102nd meeting of USCIB provide interesting reading.
- 2. On page 4, sub-paragraph c of Decision on matter, preparation of U.S. position papers was emitted. I queried the Executive Secretary regarding this; he checked the original Minute notes and confirms fact that preparation of position papers by Working Group was actually a part of the Decision, and the Minutes will be corrected accordingly.
- a. In this connection, at the second meeting of the Working Group, the CIA member (Mr. Rowlett) objected to our proposal that Group prepare U.S. position papers, on the ground that "it would be premature, and that it exceeded the terms of reference of the Working Group." Other members supported CIA.
- b. Since that time NSA forwarded to Executive Secretary for USCIB consideration, NSA draft of what we think should be the "Basis of U.S. Regotiations" and the "Terms of Reference for U.S. Delegation." These two papers will be on agenda for the next USCIB meeting.
- c. I feel that you should make a strong effort to secure USCIB approval of these two papers. Unless USCIB does accept these papers, substantially as written, the Working Group will never be able to come up with U.S. position papers acceptable to NSA. (CIA has some outside support, and as long as he has, the Group will never come to agreement.)

d. If you desire to make this "all-out fight", (and it will be one) to gain USCIB approval of formal collaboration with you should understand CIA position as submitted by Rowlett,

and understood (unofficially) to be supported by State, Army and Navy (more strongly by latter two). CIA position is "that the Working Group should study in detail the CONIAT capabilities of each country in turn, determining the material each can supply, determining uniqueness and absolute value, and then determine best way of obtaining it. Only then, if it appears to be best single alternative, should U.S. enter into U.S. collaboration."

3. On page 8 of Minutes the Chairman quotes you as the maker of the recommendation to turn down the British request on Circuit Mercury. Actually your sole recommendation was "USCIB should say Yes, or No - not Maybe". General Trudeau was the originator of the recommendation attributed to you; shall we initiate corrective action? (I do not believe it is sufficiently important to matter).

cc: V/DIR
Senior Special Assistant
P/P

D. M. AGNEW Captain, US Navy Deputy Chief of Staff

TOPSECRET