

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~100th USCIB Meeting

Item 2

PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY OF NATO COUNTRIESBACKGROUND

1. On 10 July 1953, USCIB approved the final report and papers of the US/UK Conference on Allied (NATO) communications security as a basis for negotiations with the UK and agreed that the UK authorities would be so notified. The Department of State was named the "designated U.S. authority" for preliminary steps in the negotiations which included (a) the nature of the initial approach to the French, and (b) the terms of reference and composition of the Combined Working Group (CWG) to be set up in Washington to facilitate coordination on this program.

2. The CWG, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Polyzoides, has been working since September to coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach to the French and for other matters connected with the over-all program to improve communications security of NATO countries. NSA members of the CWG are Mr. Friedman and Mr. Austin.

CURRENT CONSIDERATION

3. The papers for consideration at this meeting represent the formal U.S. position for initiating the approach to the general program. USCIB is asked to approve these papers, as well as to direct the Ad Hoc Committee to complete the necessary negotiations and adjustments with their British counterparts in the CWG without further reference to the Board, unless disagreement over matters of policy cannot be resolved within the CWG; additionally, USCIB is asked to reaffirm that policy aspects of the subject program will continue to be referred to the CWG until the program is completed.

4. The Ad Hoc Committee has approved this series of papers unanimously. The British members of the CWG have participated in the preparation of these documents and have given informal approval in principle to them. It is understood that final formal approval of these papers was received from London on Friday, 5 February 1954. However, this information was received too late to be included in para 3 of Inclosure 1 (revised) with USCIB 29.1/6 now under discussion.

5. The papers represent a "one package deal" which includes the following:

a. Items to be included in the joint brief for the US and UK Ambassadors, who will make their approach to the French jointly.

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Item 2 (continued)

b. An Aide Memoire to be left with the French when the approach is made. This document recommends that the French member of the Tripartite Security Working Group (TSWG) arrange for a technical conference with the US and UK for a discussion of communications security problems. This will enable the US and UK members to screen the French representatives from a security standpoint.

c. A brief for the delegates to the technical discussions which restates the limitations agreed upon in the final report of the COMSEC conference in June, and which establishes a plan of action for guidance of the US and UK delegates in bringing the real purpose of the conference into focus. Additionally, the brief outlines predictable difficulties that may arise during the discussions and offers suggestions for resolving them. (NOTE: Upon the advice of NSA, the Executive Secretary will request that this brief for the delegates be classified TOP SECRET Codeword in view of the information in para 3b thereof.)

d. There is also included a draft memorandum for the Standing Group to issue to member NATO nations, inviting them to review their own communications to ensure that they are free from dangerous practices and procedures listed in an appendix to the invitation.

6. With respect to the collateral issue concerning the French request for assistance in purchasing new cipher machines for their Foreign Office, the French representative (M. de Vosjoli) was informed on 21 January 1954 that the U.S., while sympathetic, was unable to render the assistance desired owing to the fact that commitments to meet U.S. requirements are quite firm and cannot be diverted to meet the French requirements in less than 30 to 36 months, and no assurance can be given even of this. It was suggested that the French might wish to explore the possibility of using commercial sources, several of which were listed for them.

7. On 27 January 1954, M. de Vosjoli again brought up the subject of obtaining assistance from the U.S. He asked whether it would be possible to obtain at least 5 machines, pointing out that the commercial sources mentioned were of no use to the French. He said machines of the type he desired were manufactured only in the U. S. and in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He remarked that the French were even considering how they might obtain some of the machines manufactured under Soviet Control.

8. The U.S. spokesman told M. de Vosjoli that he would look into the matter again but did not offer him any encouragement. The new request was then referred to the Ad Hoc Committee. The NSA members reported that there were not five complete equipments available. It was recommended that a suitable reply be made with the idea of gaining time and yet leaving the door open for a favorable reception to the joint approach to the French in Paris.

RECOMMENDATION

9. It is recommended that the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee be approved.

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