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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.11/11 Item 3 of the Agenda for the 109th Meeting of USCIB, held on 12 November 1954.

Subject: U.S. Relations, [ ] (USCIB 29.11/8; 29.11/10).

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell), pointing out that this item contains several problems and that it is of vital interest to CIA, suggested that initial consideration be given the CIA recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of USCIB 29.11/10.

GENERAL CANINE stated that he has no objection to recommendation 5a; however, with regard to 5b, he reminded the members that the Standing Group of NATO has already taken a position on this problem and recommended against the U.S. also handling it. He recalled earlier unilateral U.S. action regarding the provision of CCM's to the [ ] which had caused great concern among U.K. authorities and, noting that [ ] is a member of NATO, recommended that NATO channels be used in handling this matter.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN stated that recommendation 5b does not "freeze out" NATO, nor does it propose unilateral action on the part of CIA.

In reply to General Canine's question as to whether this isn't a matter which can be taken care of by the Executive Secretary, the Acting Chairman expressed a negative opinion, explaining that the situation has become somewhat complicated as a result of [ ] visit to Washington.

GENERAL CANINE recognized the fact that CIA has dealings with [ ] but reiterated his opinion that CIA should not become involved in the question of [ ] internal security when the matter is already under NATO cognizance. He continued by saying that he would prefer that the Board not make a final decision in this matter until the members have had an opportunity to read a startling and shocking report which he has just received on other (than communications) aspects of Turkish security, such as security discipline. He stated that he would distribute the report as soon as he can obtain clearance to release it.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN pointed out that one phase of the CIA-recommended action is to attempt to improve [ ] security discipline.

GENERAL TRUDEAU inquired concerning plans for accomplishing this.



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GENERAL CANINE said that it appears to him that we could not take such action without first going to the British and NATO.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN explained that it is not intended to act prior to discussions with the British. Pointing out that the main objection to proceeding through NATO (SECAN) channels is that this method is too time-consuming, he suggested that the British be made aware of this fact and be asked to concur in a direct approach.

GENERAL CANINE said that he thought NATO could do something about this problem promptly if they wanted to, and, stating his belief that the British consider this a NATO problem, he suggested that we first determine whether NATO proposes to do anything about it.

GENERAL TRUDEAU asked what would have to be given to the [ ] in the way of equipment.

MR. ROWLETT replied that nothing specific would be proposed at this time, it being a problem which would have to be worked out with interested agencies. He intimated that general use of one-time pads would probably be preferred, but that it would be necessary to be prepared for a [ ] query on how we make the pads.

GENERAL CANINE said that he would "object violently" to any disclosure of our methodology in making one-time tapes or one-time pads.

ADMIRAL ESPE asked why SECAN couldn't handle this problem.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN replied that we have a peculiar opportunity with the [ ] at the present - a chance to accomplish a great deal in a short time. He said that seizing this opportunity would result in much quicker action than would result from becoming involved in the SECAN mechanism.

On the subject of one-time tape production Mr. Rowlett noted that there are two one-time pad machines on the market, one called HAZARDO and the other a Hagelin machine, resembling a slot machine in appearance.

GENERAL CANINE commented that the slowness of operation of the HAZARDO would make it necessary to have several rooms full of them to produce pads in any appreciable amount. He then reiterated his suggestion that all members read the report he mentioned earlier before making a decision, and enquired as to the urgency of the matter from CIA's viewpoint.

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THE ACTING CHAIRMAN replied that the only need for immediate guidance arises out of [ ] current visit here, which is to be followed by a visit to London.

MR. ROWLETT added that some urgency is also occasioned because other plans are dependent upon action in this case.

The members then discussed further the possibility of handing the matter with the British through SECAN. The great length of time required to handle the French problem in this manner was brought out; however, GENERAL CANINE expressed his opinion that our own Board was largely responsible for most of the delay. He said that he thought it would be possible to obtain much quicker action in this case.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN explained that there has been a tug-of-war between [ ] dealings and that we presently have a definite advantage which we could press by acting alone.

GENERAL ERSKINE said that he thought we would stand to lose more than gain by encouraging the [ ] to violate established NATO procedure.

In reply to a question by General Erskine, MR. ROWLETT stated that the question of improvement of [ ] communications security has not been raised by Turkmen.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN asked if anyone would object to CIA's asking Turkmen if he has checked his communications security, and recommend to him that if he does and finds improvement needed that he go to SECAN, through which channel we will be able to give him assistance.

There were no objections to this action being taken while Turkmen is here.

The members then proceeded to consider the draft message for GCHQ on this subject (enclosure with USCIB 29.11/9) along with recommendations made by the CIA member. As a result of this consideration it was agreed that the following message would be sent by the Director, NSA to the Director, GCHQ:

PARA 1 PD USCIB BELIEVES CMM AS YOU PROPOSE CMM THAT IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO DEVELOP AND ESTABLISH A COMMON AGREED UKUSA

[ ]

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
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PARA 2 PD RE PARA 5A CMM DGC SLANT 4916 CMM COMINT END PRODUCT PD  
SINCE THE US DID NOT OFFER



PARA 3 PD RE PARA 5C CMM DGC SLANT 4916 CMM CRYPTANALYTIC  
TRAINING PD IT IS THE VIEW OF USCIB THAT BEFORE CRYPTANALYTIC TRAINING  
IS PROMISED CMM THE TWO BOARDS SHOULD AGREE UPON THE DETAILS OF THE  
COURSES TO BE CONDUCTED AND THE TRAINING MATERIALS TO BE PROVIDED PD  
US IS DRAFTING A PROSPECTUS OF SUCH TRAINING WHICH WILL BE PRESENTED TO  
LSIB IN NEAR FUTURE PD IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT A PROMISE OF  
CRYPTANALYTIC TRAINING BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE BOARDS HAVE AGREED  
ON THIS MATTER PD



PARA 4 PD WE AGREE TO ADVISING  TO APPLY TO SECAN FOR  
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSISTANCE CMM AS YOU PROPOSE IN PARA 5B OF DGC SLANT  
4916 CMM ESPECIALLY SINCE THE NATO COUNCIL HAS DISTRIBUTED A STANDING  
GROUP MEMORANDUM PAREN SGC 620 DASH 54 PAREN TO MEMBER NATIONS ON THE  
SECURITY OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND HAS ISSUED AN IMPLEMENTING  
MEMORANDUM PAREN NATO TOP SECRET C DASH M PAREN 54 PAREN 78 PAREN  
REQUESTING MEMBER NATIONS TO APPLY TO SECAN FOR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE  
ON TECHNICAL MATTERS PD

PARA 5 PD GEN CANINE WILL DISCUSS ABOVE WITH YOU

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DECISION: (12 November 1954) USCIB approved the foregoing message for dispatch to the Director, GCHQ, and agreed that the matter of improvement of [redacted] internal security would be approached through NATO (SECAN) channels rather than independently by the U.S. before or after consultation with the British. In this connection it was agreed [redacted] to [redacted], during his visit here, that if he checks [redacted] communications security and finds it needs improvement he should make application through NATO for assistance.

This item to be dropped from the agenda.

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