

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.17/2 Item 4 of the Agenda for the 101st Meeting of USCIB, held on 12 March 1954.

Subject: COMINT Arrangements with Third Parties [redacted].
(USCIB 29.17/1)

THE CHAIRMAN recalled that this problem had been discussed in executive session at the last meeting, and asked General Canine if he wished to present further information.

GENERAL CANINE stated that there was two facets to his problem, the first of which concerns his specific reply to the British. Providing background information, he recalled that in 1951 the British proposed that USCIB agree to the [redacted] [redacted], and that USCIB had voted to disapprove the request on 12 October 1951. The most recent request, he said, which was received in late December 1953, asks USCIB approval of an [redacted]

[redacted] and the U.K. He pointed out that these requests parallel closely our requests concerning [redacted] which were tabled with the British some three months ago. He expressed his opinion that we will not get a reply on [redacted] until we have replied to the British request concerning [redacted] and, accordingly, moved that the Board approve the request (re [redacted] now before it.

MR. SHELDON seconded the motion.

GENERAL CANINE went on to point out that he will never be able to satisfy some of the requirements of the consumers until he can receive intercept from [redacted].

CAPTAIN TAYLOR read paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appendix "P" which indicate limitations on such negotiations with third parties.

THE CHAIRMAN asked if it would not be best to be perfectly frank with the British and try to obtain simultaneous approval of the [redacted] [redacted] cases. He said he would agree to sign a letter to Chairman, ISIB, on the subject if the content of such a letter would have approval of the Department of State.

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested that the matter be put squarely to Brigadier Tiltman and, through him, make arrangements for simultaneous action on the two problems.

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This suggestion was acceptable, and General Canine agreed to discuss the matter with Brigadier Tiltman at the same time that he informs him of the Board's decision on the Viet Minh problem.

GENERAL CANINE then brought up the second facet of this problem. He asked that the Board consider whether we should depend upon the British to supply us with information on [redacted], or go into [redacted] on our own as we did in [redacted]. He added that by going in ourselves we might disturb our relations with the British but, on the other hand, we will probably stand to gain more COMINT by such action.

THE CHAIRMAN asked if the [redacted] are capable of providing information which the [redacted] could not.

GENERAL CANINE replied affirmatively, stating that we have received some very fine information from the [redacted], including the bulk of what we know about the [redacted]

It was his opinion that the [redacted] have the greatest degree of COMINT sophistication of all the [redacted] countries.

THE CHAIRMAN asked if we would be prepared in principle to let the British go into [redacted] with us.

GENERAL CANINE replied that the British are already there under a U.K. [redacted] arrangement of long standing, made by Brigadier Tiltman during the war and maintained on an undercover basis. He added that the U.K. [redacted] relations are of a more recent vintage and came into being about the time that we were attempting to line up with the [redacted] on the basis of a [redacted]-to-U.S.-Navy approach. He explained that our attempted negotiations came to a sudden end when the British broached to us, at Board level, a request for approval of U.K.-[redacted] arrangements.

GENERAL TRUDEAU informed the members that he was working informally on an approach made by the [redacted], through the USMA in [redacted] for exchange of various types of high-grade intelligence including COMINT.

GENERAL SAMFORD asked if it is the view of the Board that the ultimate objective of our U.S. policy is to accomplish COMINT agreements with [redacted]

On the basis of the discussion, THE CHAIRMAN replied that all members appear to be in agreement with such action as an ultimate objective; however, he said that he had some misgivings about the use of the word "formal", and that we may have to consider arrangements of an informal nature.

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In a brief discussion on the effect that such agreements may have on UKUSA relations THE CHAIRMAN asked if there is a possibility of joining with the British to accomplish, on a bilateral basis, COMINT agreements with the [redacted] countries.

MR ARMSTRONG stated his view that possible deterioration of our relations with the British by taking independent action is a matter to be seriously considered. He suggested that we may now be at a point where it will be profitable to sit with the British at a fairly high level to discuss the proper handling of the whole [redacted]. He said that he believes resentment would inevitably run high if we were to tell the British to go ahead with the [redacted] and then put them on notice that we intend to compete with them, and added that such resentment could well affect our success in other parts of the world - for example, in [redacted].

The members discussed Mr. Armstrong's proposal and were in agreement that it offered a possible solution to the many aspects of the [redacted]. It was ultimately agreed that, rather than reply to the British request at this time, as agreed earlier, the Director, NSA, will discuss the problem informally with U.K. authorities, either here or in London, to determine their reaction to a proposal that the whole problem of [redacted] be discussed between U.S. and U.K. COMINT representatives at a fairly high level, and at an early date.

In view of the foregoing, GENERAL TRUDEAU expressed his intention to withhold for the time being any positive action on the COMINT aspects of the [redacted] approach which he had mentioned earlier.

GENERAL CANINE informed the members that any COMINT arrangements which may ultimately be concluded with the [redacted] on the basis being discussed will undoubtedly require going beyond the limitations of Appendix "P" in the exchange of information. He added his opinion that while such will be necessary and desirable he would not expect [redacted] to be as extensive as those provided for between the British and ourselves.

DECISION: (12 March 1954) USCIB, after discussing the ISIB request contained in USCIB 29.17/1, as well as the over-all problem of U.S. and U.K. COMINT dealings with individual [redacted], agreed that the Director, NSA, would approach U.K. COMINT authorities informally, either here or in London, to determine their reaction to a proposal that the whole [redacted] be discussed between U.S. and U.K. COMINT representatives at a fairly high level and at an early date.

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