

USCIB: 29.18/8

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

9 June 1954

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: UKUSA Conference on

Reference: USCIB 29.18/7 dated 8 June 1954.

1. Further to the reference, the six Enclosures herewith contain recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, Chaired by Mr. Raven, with regard to Items 1e, 2e, 3e, 1f, 2f, and 3f, respectively, of the agenda for the subject Conference.

2. These papers are forwarded for study in connection with the reference with a view to consideration at the 104th Meeting of USCIB.


RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosures
a/s

USCIB: 29.18/8

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[Redacted]

e. Desirability of Extension

(1) Advantages

(a) Critical UKUSA requirements for

[Redacted]

would be satisfied. Listed below are the specific advantages which could be expected from such an extension, together with a statement of the UKUSA contribution believed necessary to realize each advantage:

[Redacted]

(2) [Redacted] could prove of considerable value because of [Redacted]'s concentrated and timely attack on nearby [Redacted] an attack which is often assisted by excellent [Redacted]. Such traffic analytic and cryptanalytic results could be applied immediately by the US to other [Redacted] (To realize this advantage, the [Redacted] would require in exchange UKUSA [Redacted] on the problems being worked).

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.18/8 dtd 9 June 1954.

(3) It would be possible to obtain [redacted]

[redacted]

(To realize this

advantage, it would be necessary to underwrite an approximate doubling of [redacted]).

(4) The [redacted] could be directed to [redacted]

[redacted] and undesirable

duplication eliminated. (To realize this advantage, [redacted] would have to be provided to the [redacted]).

(5) Additional high quality [redacted] for research would become available.

(6) UKUSA would be able to obtain more accurate, complete, and timely information and [redacted] (To realize this advantage, the gaps in [redacted]

being worked would have to be filled, up to the general level of [redacted]. The rapidity and completeness of

[redacted] has been limited by their lack of access to the overall [redacted] picture. Thus, [redacted]

[redacted] could be improved if certain [redacted] information developed by UKUSA could be provided to the [redacted] who have already recovered the essentials of the system.)

(7) [redacted] unique capabilities to [redacted]


[redacted] on a regular basis would be advanced appreciably. (To realize this advantage, the [redacted] would have to be supplied with the necessary equipment, training, and detailed technical support).

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(8) The [redacted] effort could be improved, and UKUSA would profit directly through receipt of more accurate bearings. (To realize this advantage the [redacted] would require instructions on better methods and techniques and provisions of technical information.)

(b) The UKUSA [redacted] COMINT relationship would be improved. Although there seems to be no immediate danger that the [redacted] will terminate the present agreement, it must be recognized that this termination could be accomplished readily by the [redacted] if they are dependent upon UKUSA only for cash and equipment. In the case of the UK, [redacted] discontinued the provision of traffic on the basis that the UK would not furnish [redacted] Under an arrangement where UKUSA [redacted] were provided, a more permanent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated.

2. Disadvantages



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3. Conclusions

(a) An appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of extension with the [] COMINT service clearly demonstrates that it is in the best interests of the UKUSA COMINT effort to expand our COMINT relationships with [].

(b) This extension will involve inherent security risks. The precise level of [] security cannot be determined. Available evidence indicates that the COMINT security standards of the [] are high, but there can be no guarantee that an expanded relationship with the [] and the material exchanged within this relationship would not be compromised. It is evident, however, that by limiting the [] falling within the demonstrated COMINT capability of the [] and pertinent to the problems in question, the extension will not endanger any significant COMINT secrets that cannot already be compromised by the [] even without an extension.

(c) Further, this extension and our resulting continuous dependence on [] probably will raise additional security problems in the future in order to maintain the desired level of [] capability to cope with []. For example, in the event of [] seriously affecting []s effort, it might be necessary to furnish [] obtainable (only at the time on the basis of the overall UKUSA technical effort) in order to permit [].

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tasks. Providing such information (beyond the established level of [redacted] competence) in order to satisfy UKUSA requirements would raise security considerations which would have to be examined in each instance by USCIB and LSIB.

(d) An integral part of an expanded relationship with [redacted] must be an effort to secure [redacted] adherence to appropriate security standards.

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[redacted]

e. Desirability of Extension

1. Advantages

(a) Important UKUSA requirements for obtaining [redacted] COMINT reports and technical results, expanding the [redacted] effort to match its unique potential, and improving the [redacted] effort in order to obtain more timely, accurate, and complete materials and information, would be satisfied. Listed below are the specific advantages which could be expected from such an extension, together with a statement of the UKUSA contribution believed necessary to realize each advantage:

[redacted]

(2) [redacted] results could prove of considerable value because of [redacted]'s concentrated and timely attack on nearby [redacted] an attack which is often assisted by excellent collateral such as [redacted]. Such traffic analytic and cryptanalytic results could be applied immediately by UKUSA to other [redacted] (To realize this advantage, the [redacted] would require in [redacted]

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.18/8 dtd 10 June 1954.

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(3) It would be possible to obtain intercepts of, and timely reports on, additional important [redacted]

[redacted] (To realize this advantage, it would be necessary to underwrite an increase in [redacted] or possibly to insure that the total present [redacted] is obtained).

(4) The [redacted] could be directed to [redacted] [redacted] not being covered adequately by other sources, and undesirable duplication eliminated. (To realize this advantage, [redacted] [redacted] would have to be provided to the [redacted].

(5) Additional high quality raw material for research would become available.

(6) UKUSA would be able to obtain more accurate, complete, and timely information and reports from [redacted]. (To realize this advantage, the gaps in [redacted] being worked would have to be filled, up to the general level of [redacted]

[redacted] The rapidity and completeness of [redacted] results has been limited by their lack of access to the overall [redacted] picture. Thus, [redacted] could be improved if certain [redacted] developed by UKUSA could be provided to the [redacted].

(7) [redacted] unique capabilities to [redacted] [redacted] on a regular basis would be advanced appreciably. (To realize this advantage, the [redacted] would have to be supplied with the necessary equipment, training, and detailed technical support).

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(8) The [redacted] effort could be improved, and UKUSA would profit directly through receipt of more accurate bearings. (To realize this advantage the [redacted] would require instruction on better methods and techniques and provision of technical information).

(9) In an extension of the present arrangements to include a technical exchange, it is possible that the [redacted] might make available to UKUSA the results of [redacted] which produce information of COMINT interest. Such contributions, particularly on [redacted]

[redacted] could be of great importance to the US/UK research effort.

(b) The UKUSA-[redacted] COMINT relationship would be improved. It appears that both the US and the UK have a potential to negotiate for expansion of arrangements with [redacted]. The advantages listed in (a) above could be realized through the efforts of either the US or UK. The specific advantages attaching to each are listed below:

(1) For the UK - The UK has indicated that the [redacted] are insistent that the UK contribute significant [redacted] in order to maintain a satisfactory COMINT arrangement. Under an arrangement where UKUSA [redacted] were provided, a more permanent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated without undue delay.

(2) For the US - The US contact in [redacted] is with the Director of the Intelligence Staff, who controls the [redacted] the UK arrangement is presumably between the British Admiralty and the [redacted] Navy, and is described by the UK as delicate and [redacted]. It is considered probable, therefore, that the US has a greater capability than the UK to obtain an agreement which will provide maximum assurances of continuity.

2. Disadvantages

[redacted]

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(d) In addition to the disadvantages listed above, which would apply equally to the US and UK, the following apply to an extension by the US:

- (1) Unless prior LSIB concurrence could be obtained, serious damage to UKUSA relations might result.
- (2) A considerable period of time would be required for the US to negotiate and implement a satisfactory agreement, since only a preliminary contact has been made to date.

3. Conclusions

(a) An appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of extension with the COMINT service clearly demonstrates that it is in the best interests of the UKUSA COMINT effort to expand COMINT relationships with

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(b) This extension will involve inherent security risks. The precise level of [] security cannot be determined. Available evidence indicates that the COMINT security standards of the [] are high, but there can be no guarantee that an expanded relationship with the [] and the material exchanged within this relationship would not be compromised. It is evident, however, that by limiting the []

[] falling within the demonstrated COMINT capability of the [] and pertinent to the problems in question, the extension will not endanger any significant COMINT secrets that cannot already be compromised by the [] even without an extension.

(c) Further, this extension and the resulting continuous dependence on [] probably will raise additional security problems in the future in order to maintain the desired level of [] technical capability to cope with [] For example, in the event of [] seriously affecting []'s effort, it might be necessary to furnish [] obtainable only on the basis of the overall UKUSA technical effort in order to permit [] to resume [] The provision of information beyond the established level of [] competence would raise security considerations which would have to be examined in each instance by USCIB and LISB.

(d) An integral part of an expanded relationship with [] must be an effort to secure [] adherence to appropriate security standards.

[Redacted]

c. Desirability of Extension.

1. Advantages:

(a) UKUSA requirements for obtaining [Redacted]

[Redacted] expanding and improving the [Redacted] effort in order to obtain more timely, accurate, and complete materials and information, would be satisfied. Listed below are the specific advantages which could be expected from such an extension, together with a statement of the UKUSA contribution believed necessary to realize each advantage:

(1) At present, timely [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(To realize this advantage, the [Redacted] would have to be advised on the method of integrating technical results into a useful COMINT product).

(2) [Redacted] results would prove of value, especially

in view of their integration with physical sighting reports. Traffic

analytic results could be applied immediately by the U.S. to other [Redacted]

areas. (To realize this advantage, the [Redacted] would require in exchange

UKUSA [Redacted] on the problems being worked.)

[Redacted]

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c.l. (a) (Cont'd)

(4) The [redacted] could be diverted to [redacted]

[redacted] not being covered adequately by other sources, and undesirable duplication eliminated. (To carry out this diversion, [redacted]

[redacted] would have to be provided to the [redacted]

(5) Additional high-quality [redacted] for research would become available.

(6) UKUSA would be able to obtain more accurate, complete, and timely [redacted]. (To realize this advantage, the gaps in [redacted] being worked would have to be filled, up to the general level of [redacted]

[redacted] The rapidity and completeness of [redacted] results has been limited by their lack of access to the overall [redacted] picture. Thus, [redacted] could be improved if certain limited [redacted] developed by UKUSA could be provided to the [redacted]

(7) [redacted]

[redacted] on a regular basis would be advanced appreciably. (To realize this advantage, the [redacted] would have to be supplied with the necessary equipment, training, and detailed technical support.)

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
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c.l. (Cont'd)

(b) The UKUSA- COMINT relationship would be improved. Although there seems to be no imminent danger that the will terminate the present agreement, it must be recognized that no agreement based solely upon the provision of equipment can be entertained indefinitely, particularly when the other party presses for technical information and refuses to accept cash. Under an arrangement where UKUSA were provided, a more permanent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated.

2. Disadvantages:



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3. Conclusions:

(a) The advantages to be gained by an extension of arrangements with [] at this time are limited. While the [] COMINT service is now providing unique material of value to the UKUSA COMINT effort and while the [] have an inherent capacity to provide additional material of high value, it seems clear that current UKUSA COMINT requirements can be satisfied largely by a continuation of the present basic arrangement with []

(b) It is believed that in the near future the UKUSA COMINT effort will be able to minimize that portion of the [] product which is now unique. At the same time, because of the [] capacity to provide unique, high value material by making full use of the presumed potentialities of the [] the U.S. should maintain a position which permits ready expansion if required.

(c) In order to insure continuing cooperation from [], to obtain a diversion of intercept to more important targets, and to improve the [] potential against targets not adequately covered by the UKUSA effort, it may be necessary to provide certain []

(d) The provision of technical assistance would involve inherent security risks, but in view of the strict selection of material that would be released to [] such risks would be minimal.

(e) If it becomes necessary to release [] [] the security consideration should be reexamined at that time.

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I. f. Recommendations on [redacted]

It is recommended that USCIB approve the following:

1. US Policy Objectives:

a. The objectives of US policy with respect to [redacted]

COMINT relations are:

(1) To obtain a COMINT agreement with [redacted] authorities which will provide maximum assurance of continuity.

(2) To agree that one of the UKUSA parties will have main responsibility for the conduct of the UKUSA COMINT arrangements with [redacted]

(3) To obtain [redacted] to fill existing gaps.

(4) To obtain other [redacted] promptly enough to be of maximum intelligence value.

(5) To assure to the maximum degree the continuing availability of these [redacted]

(6) To expand the [redacted] effort to permit its fulfillment of UKUSA requirements for COMINT information on targets not otherwise accessible.

(7) To improve the [redacted] effort so as to obtain for UKUSA the best quality COMINT results possible.

(8) To enable UKUSA to guide the efforts of the [redacted] to those tasks whose performance by them is of maximum advantage to UKUSA.

(9) To compartment the COMINT relationship insofar as feasible from all other intelligence relationship.

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(10) To achieve the objectives set forth above with ^{minimum} risk to the UKUSA COMINT effort.

b. Any actions disadvantageous to UKUSA on the COMINT and national levels must be avoided; that is, any actions which might:

(1) Disturb US/UK COMINT relations, or UKUSA relations with Canada or Australia.

(2) Reveal the extent of UKUSA collaboration beyond the tasks involved in this agreement.

(3) Reveal US/UK COMINT capabilities beyond the level of our collaboration with the [redacted]

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(4) Disrupt vital intelligence contacts now established with

[redacted] insofar as this is compatible with the fulfillment of the objectives in paragraph a above.

2. The U.S. position for the London Conference:

a. That, in order to meet critical UKUSA COMINT requirements which can be satisfied only by the development of the [redacted] potential, it is now desirable to enter into close and continuing technical COMINT working relationships between NSA and the [redacted]

[redacted] problems, in those areas in which they have COMINT capability, up to their established level of competence. In implementation of this recommendation it is understood that:

(1) No [redacted] will be provided without approval of both USCIB and LSIB in each instance.

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(2) The provision of end-product will be avoided.

(3) COMINT materials provided by the U.S. need not be sterilized, but the U.K. must remove UKUSA notations from any materials which it is later agreed that they provide to the [redacted]

(4) All material provided will concern or be directly related to the problems being worked by the [redacted]

(5) No [redacted] personnel can be accepted at NSA or GCHQ.

NSA will station a Senior COMINT representative in [redacted]

(6) Assurances must be received from the [redacted] that they will adhere to personnel and physical security standards at least equivalent to SHAPE Y standards.

(7) Only one UKUSA channel will exist for [redacted]

(8) [redacted] must be placed in COMINT channels as soon as possible and must be classified on the same basis as corresponding UKUSA material.

(9) All [redacted]

[redacted] will be exchangeable immediately within UKUSA.

(10) At the present time, the U.S. can see no advantages to tripartite UKUSA [redacted] discussions.

(11) Arrangements will be made for the rapid electrical transmission of [redacted] and other vital materials and information to US and UK COMINT processing centers and field units as required.

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(12) No changes in Appendix P to the UKUSA agreement will be required as a result of the implementation of the above policies and objectives.

b. That the US will be the UKUSA channel for technical COMINT working relations with the []

c. That the development of the UK contact with the [] be explored by the conference with a view to determining whether it should be extended, and, if so, in what manner.

d. That, if it is required to achieve a (9) above, it is agreed that UKUSA collaboration up to [] in the problems concerned in the agreement with the [] may be revealed.

e. The Director, NSA will be responsible for the conduct of the COMINT collaboration with []. If it is deemed desirable, the [] will be informed that the Director, NSA is the US COMINT authority responsible for US COMINT activities and that the Senior NSA representative will speak for him.

In similar form as in Swed 2.c

→ 3. Internal US Relationships:

a. The DCI will be responsible for the negotiation of a new COMINT agreement with [] in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above. The Director, NSA will provide representatives to participate in these negotiations, [] and will determine the precise technical nature of the COMINT collaboration with []

b. After the London Conference, USCIB will approve terms of reference, based upon paragraphs 1 and 2 above and upon the final conclusions of

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the London Conference, for the negotiation of a new COMINT relationship
with

c. Immediately upon conclusion of the negotiations with
 the agreement will be submitted to USCIB for approval and for
establishment of the policy for its implementation.

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II. f. Recommendations on []

It is recommended that USCIB approve the following:

1. US Policy Objectives.

a. The objectives of US policy with respect to []

COMINT relations are:

(1) To obtain a COMINT agreement with [] authorities which will provide maximum assurance of continuity.

(2) To agree that one of the UKUSA parties will have main responsibility for the conduct of the UKUSA COMINT arrangements with []

(3) To obtain [] to fill existing gaps.

(4) To obtain other [] promptly enough to be of maximum intelligence value.

(5) To assure to the maximum degree the continuing availability of these []

(6) To expand the [] effort to permit its fulfillment of UKUSA requirements of COMINT information on targets not otherwise accessible.

(7) To improve the [] effort so as to obtain for UKUSA the best quality COMINT results possible.

(8) To enable UKUSA to guide the efforts of the [] COMINT service to those tasks whose performance by them is of maximum advantage to UKUSA.

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(9) To compartment the COMINT relationship with [redacted] insofar as feasible from all other intelligence relationships.

(10) To achieve the objectives set forth above with minimum risk to the UKUSA COMINT effort.

b. Any actions disadvantageous to UKUSA on the COMINT and national levels must be avoided, that is, any actions which might:

(1) Disturb US/UK COMINT relations, or UKUSA relations with Canada or Australia.

(2) Reveal the extent of UKUSA collaboration beyond the tasks involved in this agreement.

(3) Reveal US/UK COMINT capabilities beyond the level of our collaboration with the [redacted]

(4) Disrupt vital intelligence contacts now established with [redacted], insofar as this is compatible with the fulfillment of the objectives in paragraph a above.

2. The US position at the London conference be:

a. That, in order to meet critical UKUSA COMINT requirements which can be satisfied only by the development of the [redacted] potential, ~~it is now desirable to enter into close and continuing [redacted] potential,~~ it is now desirable to enter into close and continuing [redacted] working relationships with the [redacted]

[redacted] problems, in those areas in which they have COMINT capability, up to

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their established level of competence. In implementation of this recommendation it is understood that:

- (1) No [redacted] will be provided without approval of both USCIB and LSIB in each instance.
- (2) The provision of [redacted] will be avoided.
- (3) [redacted] provided will not need to be sanitized.
- (4) All material provided will concern or be directly related to the problems being worked by the [redacted] service.
- (5) No [redacted] personnel will be accepted at NSA or GCHQ. UKUSA technical COMINT personnel may be stationed in [redacted] as technical working contacts.
- (6) Assurances must be received from the [redacted] that they will adhere to personnel and physical security standards at least equivalent to SHAPE Y standards.
- (7) Only one UKUSA channel will exist for [redacted]
- (8) All [redacted] [redacted] will be exchangeable immediately within UKUSA.
- (9) [redacted] will be placed in COMINT channels as soon as possible and will be classified on the same basis as corresponding UKUSA material.

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(10) Arrangements will be made for the rapid electrical transmission of [redacted] and other vital information and materials to UK and US COMINT processing center and field units as required.

(11) No changes in Appendix P to the UKUSA agreement will be required as a result of the implementation of the above policies and objectives.

b. That the UK will be the UKUSA channel for [redacted]

[redacted] subject to successful outcome of their negotiations.

c. That, if UK negotiations do not result, within a reasonable length of time, in the establishment of a stable relationship sufficient to fulfill the objectives set forth in a above, UKUSA policy toward [redacted] should be mutually re-examined with a view to determining whether a new approach is required.

3. Other arrangements.

a. The US should accept the offer of the Director of [redacted]

[redacted]
US COMINT

materials or information will not be offered by the US.

b. COMINT information obtained under this arrangement will be made available to the UK under the provisions of Appendix G to the UKUSA agreement.

c. In carrying out this arrangement, every effort will be made to avoid disrupting the achievement by the UK of a COMINT arrangement as set forth in paragraph 2 above.

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III. f. Recommendations on []

It is recommended that:

1. The Board approve the following U. S. COMINT policy objectives with respect to []

a. The objectives of U. S. policy with respect to

[] are:

- (1) To insure continued receipt of COMINT products now available.
- (2) To divert the intercept efforts of the [] to those tasks whose performance by them is of maximum present and potential advantage to UKUSA.
- (3) To expand the [] effort, if necessary, to cover targets not otherwise accessible to UKUSA.
- (4) To maintain COMINT relations with the [] in a state which will permit of ready expansion if desired.

2. That the U. S. position for the London conference be:

a. That, in order to meet UKUSA COMINT requirements which can be partially satisfied by maintaining cordial COMINT relations with [] and by improving [] against certain targets not otherwise available to UKUSA, it may be necessary to feed back to the [] a limited quantity of [] pertinent to the tasks on which they are or may be engaged. In implementation of this recommendation, it is understood that:

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(1) COMINT material provided will in no case exceed the limits of [REDACTED], and will not include [REDACTED].

(2) No specific type of material will be released without the prior agreement of the Director, NSA.

(3) Specific security assurances will be obtained from the [REDACTED] with regard to each type of material released to the [REDACTED]

(4) All [REDACTED] will be exchangeable within UKUSA.

(5) [REDACTED] provided to [REDACTED] will not need to be sanitized.

(6) [REDACTED] will be classified on the same basis as corresponding UKUSA material and will be placed in COMINT channels as soon as possible.

b. That the present UKUSA channels for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are desirable and should be continued, i.e., that the U.K. will be the channel for receipt of drop copies of all [REDACTED] and that the U. S. will be the channel for receipt of [REDACTED]

c. That, should it become apparent in the future that the [REDACTED] are developing potentialities for intercepting additional unique material, the situation will be mutually received by the U. S. and the U. K.

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d. That the present UKUSA- arrangements be maintained, subject to the understanding that:

(1) Should it become necessary, in order to fulfill the objectives stated in 1a above, specific information and assistance, not to exceed , may be released to the subject to agreement by the Director, NSA, and the Director, GCHQ.

(2) It may at that time become necessary to renegotiate the US- agreement within the limitations outlined above.

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