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CIB # 000195

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2 July 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE JULY 1954
UKUSA CONFERENCE:

Subject: Summary of U.S. Delegation Discussions.

The enclosed notes reflecting views of the U.S. Delegation on matters to be considered at the coming conference are forwarded for information.

H. D. Jones

H. D. JONES
Secretary, U. S. Delegation

Enclosure
a/s.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605I INTRODUCTION

- | <u>Par.</u> | <u>U.K. Citation</u> | <u>Comment</u> |
|------------------|--|--|
| 1. 3 (last sent) | "...the [] have stopped their supply of [] to the U.K." | Some question as to whether U.K. referring to [] but generally conceded this is what is meant. U.S. paper indicates U.K. continuing to get a drop copy; know of no cessation. <u>Agreed:</u> Necessary to determine facts at conference, including investigation of possibility of U.K. being able to reinstitute receipt of drop copy. |
| 2. 4(a) | "...either U.S. or U.K. may act as Executive Agent on behalf of both..." | Army strongly opposed to use of term "Executive Agent". U.S. papers not specific on manner in which one party will represent both. <u>Agreed:</u> To note that U.S. may not want to use term "Executive Agent". |

II GENERAL PRINCIPLES

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| 3. 5(a) | [] | [] to be considered "upper limit". <u>Agreed:</u> Not practicable to prepare and exchange lists of specific items or systems at the conference. Cases should be treated individually and lists exchanged at later date. |
| 4. 5(b) | "Certainty" of Inter-[] | <u>Agreed:</u> To ask for evidence of that certainty. |
| 5. 5(c) | "Existing COMINT arrangements...shall not be disturbed." | Understood to mean that U.K. plan to weave existing arrangements into a new plan. |
| 6. 5(d) | Other intelligence interests not to be disturbed. | Indicates possibility that U.K. will wish to consider intelligence arrangements along with COMINT. <u>Agreed:</u> U.S. delegation must make clear, without delay, its position of inability to consider intelligence matters outside COMINT field. |

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| 7. 5(e) | "Feed-back" to be provided explicitly on behalf of both the U.S. and U.K. | U.S. purpose in making any disclosure primarily to be honest with [redacted] or, if necessary, to obtain what we want from the U.K. <u>Agreed</u> : U.S. has not accepted as policy either (1) the Executive Agent concept or (2) disclosure of collaboration. |
| <u>III METHOD OF APPROACH</u> | | |
| 8. 8 | Joint U.S.-U.K. negotiations at an early stage. | 8a and 8b (indicating U.S. Approach to [redacted] and U.K. approach to [redacted] roughly comparable to U.S. position; however, <u>agreed</u> neither 8a nor 8b acceptable with final sentence of paragraph providing for joint approach at early stage. In addition, Army will accept 8b only with understanding that U.K.- [redacted] agreement will fulfill U.S. needs. |
| 9. 9 | Simultaneous approach to 3 countries. | Not contemplated by U.S., and objectionable. <u>Desirable</u> to await results of [redacted] contacts before approaching [redacted] <u>Agreed</u> to inform U.K. accordingly, giving reasons for position. |
| 10. 10 | Security guarantees with reference to revelation to other countries. | Not covered in U.S. papers. No strong objection to general knowledge of existence of COMINT relationship between U.S. and U.K.; however, would object to such information being passed from one [redacted] to another. |
| 11. 11 | Extent of GCHQ and NSA participation in negotiations. | The U.K. has spelled out recommended channels of negotiations. <u>Agreed</u> no need for such specific details at this juncture. |

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| 12. 12 | ELINT. | U.K. serves notice that COMINT will not be excluded from minds of the conferees. <u>Agreed</u> (1) must reiterate to U.K. our inability to discuss ELINT; (2) willing to hear U.K. ideas at a meeting outside the conference; (3) willing to state our Government has under consideration the consolidation of the ELINT problem without further details; (4) should determine whether U.K. relations with [redacted] are purely ELINT or whether they also include COMINT. |
| 1. | Joint US/UK dealings. | [redacted] CIA produced information indicating that [redacted] wants to deal with only one country. Clauses (a) and (b) indicate an intent on the part of the British to separate [redacted] Discussion indicated [redacted] probably has, as a result of discussions with the Air Force, considerable information concerning our ELINT plans. |
| 2. 4 a thru 8 | Proposals for breaking the "impasse". | These paragraphs deal, for the most part, with non-COMINT intercept, which is outside the Delegation's authority to consider. <u>Agreed</u> that this, in effect, wipes out all of paragraph 4 except "g", which deals with security regulations. Delegation felt U.K. should not enter into a COMINT relationship with the [redacted] |
| 1. 3 | LSIB knows of no U.S. COMINT approach to [redacted] approach to the U.S. | Discussion of [redacted] Intelligence approach to Army which resulted in receipt of certain COMINT reports. Army distributed a briefing note indicating that [redacted] Army willing, however, that U.K. be informed that the reports were not received through any COMINT channel. |

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| 2. 4 | U.K. [redacted] | Noted that USCIB has approved this; however, Army member suggested it be permitted only if the U.K. makes with [redacted] an arrangement acceptable to the U.S. Agreed U.K. [redacted] negotiations should be left solely to the U.K. with no mention of U.S. interests - the converse of the U.S. [redacted] negotiations. |
| 3. 6 b | In event of [redacted] refusal. | Pointed out that difference exists in [redacted] papers on what is to be done in the event either objects when approach is made. Noted that this paragraph has value to U.S. in its position on [redacted], i.e., when U.K. is asked to withdraw from [redacted] commitments. |
| 1. 1 | Existing situation re [redacted] | Agreed paragraph unclear, particularly with respect to [redacted] [redacted] Clarification will have to be obtained at outset of the conference. |
| 2. 4 | Fear impact on U.K. intelligence interests outside of COMINT. | Agreed U.S. must reject argument concerning detriment to other intelligence interests. |
| 1. | <u>General Notes on U.S. Position</u> | |
| a. | U.S. not agreeable to granting U.K. an "Exclusive" with [redacted] | |
| b. | U.S. paper recommends, in essence: | |
| | (1) That U.S. continue with their contact of the past three years. | |
| | (2) That no technical assistance be given the [redacted] | |
| c. | [redacted] COMINT service is not under the Intelligence Service, as in [redacted] | |
| d. | U.S. position does not make [redacted] an "Exclusive" for the U.S. | |

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~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605~~TOP SECRET FROTH~~DEFINITION OF "REASONABLE TIME"

In clarification of the "Reasonable time" clause contained in the U.S. position papers on [redacted] it was agreed that a "reasonable time" would be one year for negotiations, and an additional year for assessing the results of those negotiations.

SUMMARY OF INITIAL U.S. POSITION AT THE CONFERENCE

In view of the size and importance of the [redacted] Effort, the U.S. feels that it is in about equal balance with [redacted]. Thus, so far as these three countries are concerned the U.K. should continue to develop its relations with [redacted] and the U.S. continue with [redacted]. No change is contemplated for [redacted].

POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS BY U.S.:

- (1) To permit the U.K. to pursue their [redacted], provided this does not prohibit the U.S. from so doing.
- (2) Encourage the U.K. to continue efforts to obtain [redacted]
- (3) Place dealings with [redacted] on a competitive basis, within the provisions of Appendix "P".

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