### REF ID: A58813


# Office Memorandum • United States Government

TO: 00T/ Thru: 04T, 04T, 04 FROM: 0412

DATE: 15 June 1951

SUBJECT: Telecrypto and Cryptex Model CI

- 1. Inclosed herewith is a report "Brief Security Estimate of Telecrypto", as requested.
  - 2. Also inclosed are comments on Cryptex Model CI.
  - 3. Mr. Hagelin's letter is returned herewith.



Inclosures - 3

- 1 Brief Security Estimate of Telecrypto
- 2 Comments on Cryptex Model CI
- 3 Letter from Mr. Hagelin Zolled in Hayelin consequence. Aug 5, 1950]

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-17-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13520

REF ID:A58813

AFSA-412B/egb 15 June 1951

#### BRIEF SECURITY ESTIVATE OF TELECRYPTO

- 1. Telecrypto is a key generator using the M-209 pin wheel assembly (which steps as in M-209), 4 key cylinders and 12-bar drum. The key cylinders are stepped erratically by the teeth on the 12 bars of the drum which in turn are slid by the interaction of the pins and lugs. The selection of which key cylinder is to be used is controlled by a second reading position on 3 of the pin wheels.
- 2. AFSA 412B conducted a week's intensive security study of Telecrypto. This paper is a summary of the results of that study.
- 3. Cryptographic Requirements.
- a. Daily Key. Telecrypto has many variables that must be set daily, thereby creating many chances for operator error. The system, being a teletype system, does not permit easy checking. The daily set-up published in a key list would have to contain the following:
  - (1) Daily pin and lug set-up.
  - (2) Daily setting of 128 plugs, 52 on each of four cylinders.
  - (5) Daily setting of 4 "A" plugs between the cylinders and the selectors.
  - (4) Daily setting of 3 "B" plugs to choose the three selector pin wheels.

The lug set-ups must be carefully made up in order to assure 1 to 6 steps for each cylinder per half-turn of the drum, i.e., per operation of the machine. The fixed teeth in the model in the diagrams are probably not the best arrangement possible but no matter what arrangement is used, lug patterns must be carefully derived.

b. Message Alignments. - For each message the pin wheels and cylinders must be set. If the cylinders are set for each message, there is a chance for off cylinder situations to occur which may lead to reconstruction of the machine variables. To avoid such occurrences, the cylinders could be zeroized for each message. But this also leads to a bad situation because, if the cylinders are set the same at the beginning of each message, the cylinders will step in and out of phase between messages, since all sylinders step at approximately the same rate. This situation could become very dangerous. Therefore, either solution is undesirable.

				 		,	<b>E</b>
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605	_	* 1		MAN N		1 ,	_ :
EO 3.3(h)(2)	-1-		∵las		を と	۱ _	
Inclosure 1 to AFSA Serial	dat		-	ma tomat vistor	War you	_ د	,

REF ID: AS

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

BRIEF SECURITY ESTIMATE OF TELECRYPTO (continued)

AFSA-412B/egb 15 June 1951

Inclosure 1 to AFSA Serial

dated

TOP SECRET



BRIEF SECURITY ISTIMATE OF TELECRIPTO (continued)

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

## AFEA-412B/egb

				To berie Teor	
					1
					1
<b>A A M</b>					
6. Summary To	Tecrapic redute	s norm out se	e jese mijaski ee-ab erme to	r it to be practice	na kie

6. Summary. - Telecrypto requires too much set-up time for it to be practical for use by the U.S. Armed Forces. ASAM 2-1 is less vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack so that Telecrypto would not be any improvement over the comparable system now in use.



Inclosure 1 to AFSA Serial \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_



**REF ID: A58813** 



AFSA-412B/egb 15 June 1951

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

#### COMMENTS ON CRYPTEX MODEL CI

1. Cryptex, Model CI is similar to Telecrypto but differs from it in the fact that the pin wheel assembly in Telecrypto is the same as M-209 and in Cryptex, Model CI is similar to the modified Hagelin with erratic stepping. The paper on Cryptex, Model CI is dated 5 August 1950 and therefore may be a forerunner of Telecrypto. Perhaps there were difficulties in its manufacture with the more complicated erratic motion.

2.	The	security	studies	recently	cerried	out by	AFSA-412B	were	all on	Tele-
CIN	pto.	j								
1										

The set-up time for Cryptex, Model CI and its liability to operator error would be the same as Telecrypto. This time alone would appear to make the system impracticable.



Inclosure 2 to AFSA Serial \_\_\_\_\_ dated

