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TO Colonel Marcy

DATE 14 July 1953

FROM Warren H. Turner, Jr.
T. R. Chittenden

SUBJECT Comments on COMSEC Directive

Assuming the adoption of subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h under Section 2g(1) as proposed by the Department of Defense, there remain several important defects in the Lay draft which should be tidied up. Specifically:

Paragraph 1e(2) provides only that the Board "may study" standards and practices and "shall make such recommendations" as may be appropriate, whereas it is essential that the Board "will review" and "shall take such action as may be necessary to assure compliance".

Paragraph 1i should read: "The Board shall call upon to designate a representative to participate in deliberations of the Board when the communications security needs and practices of such Departments and Agencies are considered". The Lay version is considered to weaken the Board unnecessarily.

Paragraph 2a. SECDEF should be designated Executive Agent of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than of USCSB.

Paragraph 2b. As Executive Agent, SECDEF should not be restricted by this document to taking action "within policies and procedures established by the Board".

Paragraph 2c, which has been eliminated from the Lay version and which describes the mission of the Executive Agent, should be reinserted. This should be easy once the NSA position on the four crucial points has been adopted. At our recent meeting the following wording was agreed upon and Colonel Sampson has since accepted it: "(1) integrated technical and operating policies, programs, and long range plans required to maintain high and uniform standards to insure the security of Federal telecommunications; (2) centralized over-all cognizance and authoritative supervision of the technical aspects of communications security measures necessary to provide and assure the adequacy of the COMSEC techniques and materials used by the Government; and (3) advice and recommendations in the field of communications security."

Paragraph 2g of the Lay version is unacceptable and should be changed to anticipate subsequent directives by the Executive Agent and responsibility "for the technical supervision of the COMSEC ~~executives~~ **ACTIVITIES** of the various Departments and Agencies".

Paragraph 2d of the Lay version prescribing the Director's channels to the various Departments and Agencies should certainly revert to its previous form

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which specified "the Chiefs or Heads of the organizations concerned".

Likewise, paragraph 3c, the "escape" paragraph, should read in part: "subject to the provisions of law, the provisions of this directive, and any other directives which may be issued by competent authority".

Paragraph 4b should have inserted in the third line after the word "officials" the words "of the Executive Branch".

Finally and extremely important, the footnote on page 1 establishing a super USCSB in lieu of the original concept of the Special Committee seems ludicrous and ~~F~~ cannot imagine SECDEF or the NSC buying it in its present form.

We

As we all agreed at the 1 July NSA meeting, paragraph 2c(7) further restricting the Executive Agent seems quite inappropriate, but perhaps not worth a large scale fuss. If the points made above and in the communication to Mr. Lay stick, then 2c(7) should go.

We would like to suggest that once the Director's position is affirmed by the Planning Group the entire paper be referred back to the Ad Hoc Committee for final editorial and polishing work. This point is made just in case it should be the general understanding that the paper is entirely acceptable with the exceptions noted.



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