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SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-02-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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Office of the Chief Signal Officer Action 1

SPSIS-3

Chief, Army Communications Service, Room 4E 254, Pentagon.

2 August 1944.

Security Classification of SIGSALY SPSIS 311.5

Signal Security Branch 30 340 Code 8129, Ext. 215.

- l. At the present time all phases of the SIGSALY system are classified as Secret and the handling of all papers--blueprints, specifications, keying devices, etc., is on a Top Secret basis, in accordance with directions from Chief, Army Communications Service.
- 2. The normal method of classifying secret cryptographic systems is to use a classification of confidential for the equipment involved and a classification of secret for the keying elements.
- 3. Specific SIGSALY clearance of personnel already cryptographically cleared is of a nominal nature only, in that it does not involve additional investigation, but operates mainly to restrict admittance to SIGSALY terminal rooms.
- 4. The basic principles of the SIGSALY system (the Vocoder) have been published in various technical journals and have been submitted for patenting although at the present time all of these patents are being withheld from issue under Public Law #77.
- 5. The development of AN/GSQ-2 is proceeding rapidly and it is expected that units will be available for field tests in March of 1945. This equipment is a condensed version embodying most of the principles of the SIGSALY system with the exception of the SIGEUS and the SIGGRUV equipment. Owing to its possible very wide distribution the AN/GSQ-2 equipment can only, with the exception of the keying elements, be classified as confidential.
- 6. a. The present classification imposes a burden on SSA personnel engaged in work on or in connection with this system as strict
 adherance to security regulations precludes disclosure to one who
 may be concerned with the system in a general way, or only on some
 minor problems, but who has not been specifically cleared for knowledge
 of this system although carrying a general clearance for cryptographic
 work.
- b. This burden is also imposed on SSA personnel engaged in the development of AN/GSQ-2 who are prevented from discussing the equipment with all interested personnel owing to the lack of clearances. This burden will become extreme when the AN/GSQ-2 equipment reaches the service test stages.



- c. It would be clearly undesirable to clear all personnel engaged in AN/GSQ-2 development and service tests for SIGSALY,
- d. AN/GSQ-2 when issued will be classified as confidential in accordance with current practice in the case of other classified equipments of similar nature. Keying elements pertaining thereto will, however, be classified as secret.
- 7. The following recommendations are intended to affect the physical equipment and its handling, only, and do not affect the system's use and its personnel.
 - 8. It is recommended that:
- a. The SIGSALY equipment be classified as Secret. The SIGBUS, SIGGRUV, and all key tables which are now classified as Secret would remain secret.
- b. The present strict observance of admittance to terminal rooms be continued on a list basis. (This is normal cryptographic practice.) The list will not necessarily reflect the total number of people possessing knowledge of the system, but will include only those having access to a particular terminal room.
- c. Plans for installation of terminals And their locations be classified as Secret unless the knowledge of such locations include knowledge of troop movements etc., or other matters which would require that the terminal locations be held as Top Secret.
- d. The SIGSAIX directory be continued as a secret document and that the people authorized to use the system be restricted as per the present arrangement.
- e. The opens be continued as a secret device and information thereof be handled in the normal manner for secret information.
- f. The Recorders (RC-250-T1) (used for production of SIGGRUV) be classified as secret and all information thereof be handled in a normal secret manner.
- 9. If the recommendations of paragraph 8 are approved, it is recommended that the SSA be directed to take the necessary action to inform all concerned.

W. Preston Corderman, Colonel, Signal Corps, Chief, Signal Security Branch, SPSIS-1, Code 8129, Ext. 211