

~~SECRET~~Suspected 1 June 44
FCONFERENCE ON SIGNAL SECURITY
4th May 1944

A committee composed of:

Colonel Corderman
Colonel Hayes
Colonel Allsopp
Colonel Cook
Major Sheets
Major Martan
Major Brown
Captain Hall
Lieutenant Redick
Mr. Friedman

met for the purpose of discussing a memorandum of 13 April 1944 from Colonel Tozer, of YMA Committee, North Africa, to British War Office, subject Signal Security, and to consider an agenda of problems relating to the activities of the Signal Security Agency upon which the paper by Colonel Tozer had focused attention.

Colonel Corderman presided; he opened the discussion by stating that he considered the problem to be broader than the paper by Colonel Tozer indicated since it was concerned mainly with the use of call signs and frequencies. He referred to the fact that Signal Security Agency cryptanalysts get into enemy systems because of the errors they make and suggested that we may make similar mistakes which enable the enemy to get into our own traffic. He continued, that the paper though not cryptographic or cryptanalytic in approach does describe prescribed procedure and that regardless of the merits of the paper it had brought certain problems to our attention. Therefore, procedures now in use by the American Army should be reviewed to determine if any aspects of security with which Signal Security Agency is concerned are endangered.

There followed a discussion of Colonel Tozer's paper. Colonel Hayes stated that some of the points made in the paper are valid but that certain contentions therein are without sufficient foundation. For example, it cannot be shown that "the size and activity of our Y strategic network is thus laid bare to the enemy" (i.e. by the use of fixed call signs.)

Colonel Hayes' remarks led to a general discussion by all of the members. The consensus of opinion was that the paper was largely theoretical and had been written from that viewpoint rather than from that of the intercept operator. It was pointed out that changing of call signs would not seriously hinder the enemy unless corresponding changes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

were made in frequencies and that many operational difficulties arise when frequencies are changed. Furthermore, it was thought that the paper was more a comparison of British and German procedure than of American and German and while it is true that the Germans have been able to change call signs and frequencies more often than the Allies, this was due to the different conditions under which the Germans operate.

It was concluded that the proposals contained in the paper are not feasible from an operational viewpoint. It was agreed, however, that the paper had focused attention on the problems given in paragraph 2 of the Agenda and that action should be taken with regard to them.

Accordingly, the entire problem was referred to a working committee to be composed of members from "A", "B", "C" branches as these are the ones chiefly concerned. The members are:

Major Hartan	C Branch
Major Sheets	A Branch
Major Brown	C Branch
Captain Baskin	C Branch
Captain McFarthey	B Branch
Captain Hall	E Branch

Other members may be added if needed.

The first task of this committee will be to review existing regulations covering United States Army Communication procedure and current practices, in so far as they affect the security of communication. A similar study will be made on enemy procedure as known to us and the findings will be compared with our procedure.

Following these preliminary studies, ways and means for improving the security of our own signal communications will be considered.

Colonel Corderman requested a progress report by 15 May.

The committee adjourned.

RDB
Robert D. Brown,
Major, Signal Corps.

~~SECRET~~