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
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DGC/3242

26th February, 1953.

Chairman,
United States Communications Intelligence Board.

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



2. In December 1951 Chairman L.S.I.B. informed Chairman U.S.C.I.B. // that L.S.I.B. had examined the report of the Tripartite Group and had concluded that the [redacted] intent and capability to establish security arrangements were sufficient to warrant the U.S. and the U.K. making an initial approach to them about their communications security.

3. In reply^x Chairman U.S.C.I.B. stated that the report of the Tripartite Group on general security did not in itself represent an



until the report had been approved by each of the participating

- * Para. 3(1) of Conference report
- / Para. 3(k) of Conference report
- ** Conference report, para. 47(a) of Enclosure 'B'
- // LSIB/244/51
- x Dated 24th January, 1952.

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 23/48 dated 31 March 1953.

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countries and the [] Government had undertaken definite implementing action on the basis of its approval. Following these developments U.S.C.I.B. would, as previously agreed, be prepared to discuss the means for approaching the [] along the general lines proposed by L.S.I.B.

4. It is now understood by L.S.I.B. that, in spite of reservations about Civil Ministries, both the U.S. and U.K. delegations to the recent conference of the Tripartite Security Working Group have agreed that positive steps have been taken by the [] to put into effect the principles and standards laid down in the 1951 Tripartite report, and L.S.I.B. feels that U.S.C.I.B.'s principal objection to an early approach to the [] is therefore less valid.

5. There have been two other developments since 1951 which affect the situation:

(a)



felt that they had a moral responsibility to bring these insecurities to the attention of the U.K. authorities with the object of discussing what remedial action could be taken. They were told that this matter would be represented in the right quarter in London. The



to put matters right.

(b) During 1952 there has been a marked improvement in the



6. L.S.I.B. considers that the developments outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5(a) and (b) above reflect an improvement in []

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those of other NATO nations.

7. L.S.I.B. feels, however, that it might be desirable for U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B., in the light of recent developments, to



A further conference of U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. representatives appears the only satisfactory method of conducting an adequate survey of the current position. A related subject that might appropriately be considered at a conference of U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B.



be essential to stop such a leak before the outbreak of any war between NATO powers and the Soviet bloc.

8. L.S.I.B. therefore urges that a conference on the above questions between representatives of the two Boards should be convened as early as possible, either in London or in Washington. While L.S.I.B. would like an opportunity to welcome U.S. representatives to London, it would be happy to comply if for any reason U.S.C.I.B. preferred to hold the conference in Washington.



Chairman

London Signal Intelligence Board

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605